8TH NRF PROCEEDINGS

THE TRANS-ARCTIC AGENDA & 8TH NRF OPEN ASSEMBLY 2015: ENGAGING CULTURAL HERITAGE WHEN BUILDING RESILIENCE

An international academic seminar in Reykjavik, October 14-15 2015

Organized by the Northern Research Forum (NRF), University of Akureyri and the Centre for Arctic Policy Studies (CAPS), University of Iceland

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Summary & Scientific Highlights

The combined third Trans Arctic Agenda seminar and the eight Open Assembly of the Northern Research Forum (NRF) focused on how the Arctic communities can engage their cultural heritage when building resilience. This year the annual Trans Arctic Agenda merged with the biennial Northern Research Forum’s Open Assembly. The seminar also created a link into the Arctic Circle Assembly that took place in Reykjavík in October 15-18, 2015. Most of the participants of the seminar attended the 3rd Arctic Circle.

The joint Trans Arctic Agenda and NRF seminar consisted of three plenary sessions according to the following themes:

- Cultural heritage and human resources as part of ‘industrial civilization’- case studies of paradiplomacy and Indigenous / local knowledge;
- Representation of Arctic stakeholders and their internal communication;
- The interplay between science diplomacy, material and immaterial values: How can the Arctic be a space / model for peace, sustainability and innovation?

The seminar focused on the rapid changes that increased international attention and climate change, amongst other external factors, bring to the circumstances and livelihoods of the people of the circumpolar Arctic region. It built on the need to redefine cultural heritage, including Indigenous / local (environmental) knowledge, and ‘paradiplomacy’, as part of ‘industrial civilization’, given its importance in relations to fossil fuel-based development, such as offshore-drilling and the shaping of the future of the circumpolar North. By focusing on resilience, rather than sustainable development, an emphasis was put on the capability of institutions to learn and fix problems by themselves as they emerge.

The consequences of regional and global processes happening in the Arctic directly affect a multitude of actors, including important non-state local and regional ones, such as the scientific community. On every level of Arctic development, one can hear the voices of these actors, but are they given enough attention by policy-makers and researchers? How are the voices of different communities being heard, or not heard, in public and political discussions? It is also important to consider the role of different stakeholders, such as scholars and scientists, their participation in shaping Arctic futures and how, in turn, it influences other actors in the region.

The seminar shed light on the importance of maintaining and further developing the interplay between science and politics, between scientific knowledge and Indigenous / local knowledge, as
An important precondition for fossil fuel-based development is to redefine cultural heritage, including indigenous/local (environmental) knowledge, and ‘paradiplomacy,’ as part of ‘industrial civilization’. This should also include ‘resilience’, in which institutions are capable of learning and fixing problems as they emerge.

There are multiple actors, including extremely important non-state local and regional ones (e.g., the scientific community), directly affected by the results of regional and global processes in the Arctic. It is important to consider (1) how the voices of different communities are being heard, or not heard, in public and political discussions; (2) how the various stakeholders participate in the building of Arctic futures; and, (3) how this in turn influences other actors in the region.

It is important to maintain and further develop the interplay between science and politics, that between scientific knowledge and Indigenous/local knowledge, as well as the interplay between material and immaterial things and values. This supports and promotes high political stability in the Arctic, which is beneficial for science and academia.
Introduction

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The consequences of regional and global processes happening in the Arctic directly affect a multitude of actors, including important non-state local and regional ones, such as the scientific community. On every level of Arctic development, one can hear the voices of these actors, but are they given enough attention by policy-makers and researchers? How are the voices of different communities being heard, or not heard, in public and political discussions? It is also important to consider the role of different stakeholders, such as scholars and scientists, their participation in shaping Arctic futures and how, in turn, it influences other actors in the region.

The seminar shed light on the importance of maintaining and further developing the interplay between science and politics, between scientific knowledge and Indigenous / local knowledge, as
well as between material and immaterial things and values, as it supports and promotes high political stability in the Arctic. Faced with grand challenges and unforeseen problems, the value and validity of an open trans-disciplinary and inter-sectoral dialogue, where participants focus on issues and engage each other, is more important than ever.

The NRF wishes to thank the NRF Young Researchers – Laura, Olsén, Nikolas Sellheim, Jennifer Spence and Andrian Vlakhov – for their great contributions at the conference and 8th NRF Open Assembly acting as rapporteurs, as well as the chapters of the 8th NRF Proceedings. The NRF is also thankful to the Centre for Arctic Policy Studies at University of Iceland being a co-organizer of the joint seminar.

The NRF Young Researchers, Nikolas Sellheim in the podium, Jennifer Spence, Andrian Vlakhov and Laura Olsén.
Opening Remarks – The Northern Research Forum for Trans-disciplinary Dialogue

Professor Lassi Heininen, University of Lapland, Finland, Chairman of Northern Research Forum

You might ask that how come have not the prognoses of emerging conflicts in, or a ‘scramble’ for, the Arctic been materialized, at least not yet? And, why is the achieved, man-made Arctic stability so resilient? An answer lies on the fact that the stable and cooperative Arctic is so valuable for the Arctic states and their peoples in the era of globalization. The post-Cold War era has, so far, been a successful due to the shift from military confrontation into political stability and growing international cooperation – there are only winners.

This also shows the power of immaterial values and human capital – such as engaging cultural heritage – the main aim of this conference -, as well as that of cumulative, ‘soft’ methods in politics and governance (Heininen 2015). Together they have made possible the creativity of the region, as the following examples show: first, a new kind of environmental governance, such as the Polar Bear Agreement; second, self-determination and self-governing, such as the Home Rule Government of Greenland; third, devolution a’ la the Nordic welfare state model; forth, traditional environmental knowledge by the ICC and Sami Council; fifth, cooperation on environmental protection by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS); sixth, policy-shaping in the Arctic Council (AC) by eight states and Indigenous peoples’ organizations; seventh, new knowledge by the report on Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR); eighth, the Uarctic, a ‘university-without-walls’ for higher education in the Arctic; ninth, para-diplomacy in Greenland and the Russian Arctic; tenth, an implementation of the interplay between science and politics, the Northern Research Forum (NRF) and the Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security (TN); and eleventh, the Arctic Yearbook (as an outcome of TN’s activities) an online platform for academic and other dialogue.

The introduction of this year’s Arctic Yearbook (2015), “Arctic Governance and Governing” states that the intergovernmental cooperation under the auspices of the AC continues. The Arctic states and nations, including the Russian Federation and the USA, have too much at stake, if they will lose the high stability of the region, because then they will also loose the solid foundation for international cooperation there. Also international cooperation in Arctic science and research is stronger than ever. I believe in, though basically I’m rather skeptical, that none of the ministers of the Arctic states’
governments would like to open a new front in the Arctic – they, and we all, are experienced and wise enough not to do so. This was the message of our scientific report, “Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War” (Heininen, Sergunin & Yarovoy 2014, on-line – www.valdaiclub.com), as well as that from the Toyama ICASS III Conference: “The Arctic remains a region of geopolitical stability which is a precondition for sustaining Arctic research” (Toyama Conference Statement 2015).

Of course, bad things can happen – “never say never” –, and the new situation with challenges and uncertainty has put the stability into the first real test. If the Arctic states and the existing international structures, supported by the civil societies, will pass the test, we reach new experiences and gain credibility to face the real challenges of the 21st century: global environmental problems, even ‘wicked’ problems, such as climate change, new geopolitical disorder due to the ISIS, the greedy global financing system, and that new ethical questions have emerged in future development (e.g., growing inequality, loss of biodiversity, and the mass-scale offshore exploitation). This raises the question of an ‘ultimate price’ that will be accepted to be paid in the globalized Arctic and globally, if the current development will be continued.

The globalized Arctic

The post-Cold War era has come to a close in the Arctic in many ways. Furthermore, a new Arctic security and political agenda is emerging, and the agenda is global. It is also more demanding due to the reflections of regional wars, the constant warfare against international terror, and flows of globalization. As well as due to ‘Grand challenges’ as main drivers, such as long-range pollution and climate change, and ethical questions concerning the mass-scale utilization. Finally, that the Anthropocene is at play in the Arctic – the most recent stage of geological evolution, where industrial civilization has itself become a geological force > a potential tipping point for the global EarthSystem (e.g., Finger 2015). Here the Arctic states and their state-owned enterprises much influence future development by choosing either to prioritize business activities only, or have more holistic approach by taking into consideration the peoples and the environment, for example by focusing on clean technology.

In the GlobalArctic Project (see, www.globalarctic.org) we consider the Arctic region in the 2010s to have become part and parcel of global political, economic, technological and environmental, as well as societal, changes. The future of the region is not any more in the hands of Arctic actors alone. Correspondingly, what happens in the Arctic has significant implications worldwide. Indeed, there is a growing pressure from outside the region by the AC observer countries in Asia and Europe, and TNCs and SOEs as global actors. The Arctic has seen as one of the global commons, but this is
misinterpreted to mean a permission to share the resources by outsiders, when this should mean to take care of the Arctic and its unique ecosystem and climate. The Arctic region with its rich biodiversity and diversity of culture is for its nations, as well as the humankind.

Why to try to find old solutions for this situation of grand challenges: If the Anthropocene has already created the ‘Arctic Paradox’, a cumulative process and spiral, and a ‘wicked’ problem, as Palosaari mentioned in his presentation, the answer cannot be more mass-scale utilization by extractive industries. Arctic actors have shown being able to be innovative and resilient. We will continue on this track, if the Arctic states are patient to implement their commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants, the protection of the Arctic environment and sustainability, as they affirmed when establishing the Arctic Council in 1996 (The Ottawa Declaration 1996). These commitments have earned legitimacy among the people(s) and civil societies of the Arctic region.

Even more, in the front of us there will be new opportunities to find solutions for these ‘grand challenges’ and ‘wicked problems’, and whether ‘industrial civilization’ is capable and willing to slow down and eventually cease fossil fuel-based development. The current state of Arctic stability and deep cooperation together with rapid transformations occurring in the region and affecting the entire Earth System, and the new economic interests in the Arctic have established the region as a larger player in world politics and the global economy. This makes the Arctic – with its high stability, innovations, human capital and the ‘unity-in-diversity’ approach – a potentially interesting case study for further studies on the environment, climate change, stability- and peace-building in IR, and new forms of shaping regional and global governance.

Implementing the interplay between science and politics
Concerning the title of the 3rd Plenary of the conference, “The Interplay between science diplomacy, material and immaterial values” it is important to remember one of the criteria of science, the social relevance (in these days, as well as in this conference, it is also called ‘Science diplomacy’). This include the interplay between science, politics and economics, and its implementation (e.g., Heininen 2005). In other words, science is more than laboratories and theories, it’s about people, societies, and the environment. I’m a political scientist, as well as a citizen, and my role, even a duty, is to distribute my research findings to the publics and share my knowledge, as well as thoughts, with my own civil society and the global community. Even when they are not along the mainstream, or not necessarily at the first stage supported by most of the decision-makers. In the Arctic context today this means that I do not admit that there are emerging conflicts between the Arctic states, if am not able to identify them.
Here at the Trans-Arctic Agenda & NRF Open Assembly we share experiences and explore new methods, as well as we do implement the interplay between science and politics here. Hence, this is a continuity to the NRF’s and its Open Assemblies’ mission to implement the interplay between science and politics. The main objective of the NRF is to provide an international, interdisciplinary platform for, and promote, an intensive dialogue among members of research community and a wide range of other stakeholders for to facilitate research on issues relevant to the contemporary Northern agenda with global significance; and to engage researchers, the policy community and other stakeholders to discuss, assess and report on research results and applications. Another objective is to support and promote young researchers by training them to integrate the social relevance of science and implement the interplay between politics and science. Final, there is an objective to collect information, and disseminate research findings and information on both circumpolar and global issues.

The most important activity is the biennial NRF Open Assembly. There is a rather long list of those since 2000 (see: NRF Proceedings at www.nrf.is)¹. A new and exceptional element of the these Open Assemblies from the very beginning has been that the NRF Young Researchers, as early career scientists, have played an important role as presenting their own research and acting as rapporteurs of sessions. There has been altogether circa 120 NRF Young Researchers in these eight Open Assemblies in 2000-2015. The NRF Yrs always. Much behind, and partly as an outcome of, NRF Open Assemblies is an ‘Open Dialogue’ understood by the following rules for a firm commitment: first, to be an open-minded toward a dialogue as the participants’ approach – “dialogue is not a battle...”; second, “The participants are committed to ‘inclusivity’”; third, they “engage each others’ arguments”; and fourth, the participants “focus on an issue domain”; and fifth, they “embrace the open-ended nature of the dialogue.” (Kornprobst 2009). The two more rules, as learned lessons from the NRF Open Assemblies, are: sixth, to have an open and democratic dialogue with patience and mutual respect; and seventh, to include and implement ‘interdisciplinarity’ and ‘intersectorality’.

Followed from this, it is not a surprise that the NRF Open Assembly is one of the foundations for the Arctic Circle Assembly (organized annually since 2013), which is the first global platform for to discuss on Arctic issues.

Another main NRF activity is the Calotte Academy, an annual travelling symposium and doctoral school in the European North (see: Final Report 2015). Then there are NRF open dialogue sessions, such as NRF open dialogue sessions “Arctic Science in Globalization”, as a part of ICARP III process (in 2014-2015), financially supported by IASC. The main aim was to collect material for the “Building Arctic Resilience” application and the Matrix of the GlobalArctic Project. The used method was an open dialogue of the NRF Open Assembly, and among participants were scholars, young researchers, users of science.

As outcomes there are several publications, such as the NRF Proceedings from the Open Assemblies, books on Arctic strategies / policies (e.g., Heininen 2011), and the Arctic Yearbook. The Arctic Yearbook (AY) is an international, interdisciplinary online publication with a double-blind peer-review. It is dedicated to the analysis of Arctic geopolitics, security and development. It provides a platform for authors to evaluate, from a critical perspective, the debates and issues being discussed in and on the Arctic – scholarly articles, commentaries, briefing notes. The AY is published in an open access format at AY promotes the dissemination of knowledge through the maximization of information technology (see, www.arcticyearbook.com). The AY2015 focuses on “Arctic Governance and Governing”.

Last but not least, there is the Thematic Network (TN) on Arctic Geopolitics and Security, as a joint thematic network of Uarctic and NRF. The GlobalArctic Project has submitted “Building Arctic Resilience – AreC” application – its objectives are to (re)place the Arctic within the context of global multi-dimensional change, and explore worldwide implications; second to have the globalized Arctic as a new geopolitical context; third, to produce new scientific knowledge and establish strategic research capacity for problem-solving – how the globalized Arctic influences the global. There is a Matrix with two stages – Global>Arctic and Arctic>Global – and four thematic areas as a check list. More than 40 academic institutions all over the Northern Hemisphere are involved in the GlobalArctic Project. (for more details see: www.globalarctic.org)

Conclusions

To conclude, the Arctic region, not overtly plagued by conflicts, can be seen as an exception in international politics, as is the International Space Station. It might, as well as Iran after the nuclear deal, become a new metaphor for ‘Exceptionalism’ and taken as an example how to shape alternative premises of security and politics. There is neither reason nor right to underestimate the

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2 The first part took place in 2014 with the theme “What is the most important / relevant / challenging issue or question in the globalized Arctic, and for Arctic science, in the next 5-10 years?”, and the second part in 2015 with the theme “What are the most important implications worldwide of the global Arctic for Arctic research, and how they would be taken into consideration?”. 

value of human capital, including cultural heritage, representation of several actors as subjects (e.g., participatory approach, paradiplomacy), and an open discussion for to implement the interplay between science and politics. Much opposite, it is important, even critical, to maintain and further develop both the interplay between science and politics, and that between scientific knowledge and traditional/local knowledge, as well as trans-disciplinarity. This has much been done in NRF Open Assemblies.

This was also done in this very conference, where Trans-Arctic Agenda and NRF Open Assembly came together and offered a joint platform for open discussion on relevant Arctic and global issues. Among tasks of the academic community is to share experiences and explore new methods, and the more we do that in cooperation the better scientific results we will have and more credibility there is for science and research as a part of our modern societies.

References:


Change and continuity: tourism framework transitions in the Russian Svalbard settlements

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Svalbard, the Norwegian Arctic archipelago, possesses unique status in the international relations. Discovered in late 16th century, it has always been a place of interest for many European countries owing to its natural resources. In 1920, the archipelago has become a part of Norway, but according to the Svalbard treaty any signatory state can maintain settlements and economic activity there. During the 20th century, only two states have been actively using that right: Norway and the Soviet Union.

Tourism, alongside with scientific research, has become the main driver for developing Svalbard settlements when the industrial era had ended in the archipelago. After the end of the Cold War, the Arctic tourism has been developing even more rapidly as more touristic opportunities emerged. Particularly in Svalbard, the Norwegian tour operators and the Russian company authorities started to exploit the Soviet legacy and have done so for nearly two decades.

However, in the recent years the urgent need for modernization has overcome the touristic attractiveness and the major renovation of the Russian town has finally started, which means major changes in the approaches to the tourism from both sides. The community is on the verge of great changes, and the tourism is to become their main driver. Therefore, it becomes necessary to analyze the current situation in order to understand what are the challenges and opportunities for the town development.

Research Question and Methodology
This paper is a part of the larger research project aiming at describing the structure of the Russian Svalbard community, its functioning and its responses to the challenges brought by modernization. However, since the tourism is one of the main activities in the entire archipelago and is expected to be the basis of the local economy in the foreseeable future, the modern state of its development can and should be described separately in order to get better understanding of the processes undergoing in the Svalbard towns.
In this study, we briefly describe the history of the Russian Svalbard settlements and analyze the changes brought to the archipelago by the coal mining crisis. Comparing the ways how the Norwegian and Russian authorities responded to these challenges, we try to answer the main research question: what changes do the modern tourism development processes bring to the everyday life of the community, and how does the community adapt to these changes?

The analysis of the modern state of the tourism development in the town of Barentsburg is based on the in-depth anthropological interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015, supplemented with participant observation. The interviewees and interlocutors were the representatives of the tourism office from Barentsburg, the Norwegian tour guides, the town authorities and its dwellers; in addition to that, the impressions of tourists who visited the town were taken into account. This allows to represent the multitude of voices on the problems of the tourism development in the Russian Svalbard settlements.

Russian Settlements in Svalbard

The history of the Russian settlements at the Svalbard archipelago can be securely traced back at least to the early 20th century. Whereas many Russian researchers argue that the Russian presence in Svalbard has been a part of its history since 15th century, most Western scholars agree that the Russian whaling and fishing industry in the archipelago didn’t actually emerge before 1700. This discrepancy is being constantly discussed in the historical research (on these discussions, see Avango and Hacquebord (2009) and Hultgreen (2002)); however, the scientific community agrees on the fact that there is significant Russian cultural heritage in Svalbard that is at least 2–2,5 centuries old.

The new era of the Russian settlement in Svalbard began in the early 20th century when the coal mining industry was booming in the entire archipelago. Russia and the Soviet Union, its successor, always were significant players in the Svalbard arena, both for industrial and political reasons. In the 1900s–1930s, Russia had an urgent need for cheap fuel for its northern regions, and the Arctic dimension of its international politics was already well-developed at that time. Due to that, Russia has joined the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, acknowledging the Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago but choosing to actively develop its own settlements in this High North region. During the entire 20th century, Norway and Russia have been the only two major players in Svalbard. The coal industry has continued to dominate the life of the archipelago, so the main settlements were developing around the coal mines: Longyearbyen, Ny-Ålesund and Sveagruva for Norway, and Barentsburg, Pyramiden and Grumantbyen for the Soviet Union. The World War II has severely damaged most of these towns; however, they were rebuilt after the war and continued to operate.
All the Norwegian towns endured up to this day; however, Grumantbyen was closed down in 1956 and Pyramiden in 1998, so only one Russian settlement, the town of Barentsburg, is active now.

Barentsburg is the now the center of the Russian-speaking life in the archipelago. The major part of its population of 450 is employed by the Barentsburg coal mine located just in the town; they are for the most part the Ukrainian citizens coming from the cities of Donbass (mining region in the Eastern Ukraine). Such structure of the population dates back to the Soviet times when the majority of population was also of Ukrainian origin; this is due to the technical similarities between the mines in Svalbard and Donbass. Statistically, most of the town dwellers are males aged 25–40 with mining or engineering background; some of them come with their wives employed in the administration or service, and there is a moderate number of children in the town. Most people come to Barentsburg with a two-year contract which can be prolonged for another three years. The work in Svalbard is considered prestigious among its dwellers as the wages are several times higher than these in Donbass. It should be noted that 100 % of the town population is Russian-speaking, and nearly everyone is more or less loyal to the current Russian authorities and policies.

The town is run by a state-owned company, *Trust Arcticugol*, with a head office in Moscow. *Trust Arcticugol* owns the mine, the coal fields and all the town infrastructure, and everyone living in the town (except several researchers in the research station) is employed by it. The company is unprofitable: every year, it receives a large grant from the Russian government, and all the extracted coal is said to be used on site to produce heating and electric power. This is the core point of the Russian Svalbard policy: despite the fact that the mine is deeply unprofitable, the government continues financing the town to “maintain the Russian presence in Svalbard”. This activity is considered to be an important part of the Russian Arctic policy: there is a special State Commission for Maintaining Russian Presence in Svalbard, headed by Deputy Prime Minister, which aims to keep the town working and modernize it as much as possible. Therefore, it can be said that there are no short-term plans to discontinue Barentsburg; instead, some money and effort are being invested in it.

**Crisis of Coal Mining and the Norwegian Approach to Modernization**

Historically, all the Svalbard settlements that exist now have emerged as the coal mining towns: back to those days, coal was the most important energy resource in the world, while the Svalbard coal played an important role in the European and Russian energy policies. However, the importance of the coal was constantly decreasing, having reached its lowest point in the recent decades. The crisis of coal mining had a direct impact on Svalbard, a territory totally depending on coal mines operation. By the end of the 1980s, the Norwegian administrators of Svalbard have agreed that there was no
economical sense in continuing operating Svalbard settlements exclusively as mining towns due to their extreme unprofitability. Another reason was the environmental unfriendliness of the coal mining; the environmental activists, traditionally a powerful voice in the Nordic countries, have attracted public and political attention to this problem, and many political parties and activists chose to include this issue to their agendas.

Due to the aforementioned facts, the Norwegian government has decided to start diversifying the economic life of the Norwegian Svalbard settlements. As Andreas Umbreit (1996), researcher and government officer, states, it was decided to change the entire ideology of the archipelago development: instead of industry, research, education and tourism became the core elements of the new ideology. These areas, being the most modern and environmentally friendly, had to become the basis for the development of Svalbard in the 21st century and to support the Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago. In the same time, the coal extraction wasn’t meant to be discontinued: according to the Svalbard Treaty, the mineral resource extraction is a necessary precondition for maintaining the presence of any state in the archipelago (which is also an important issue of the political discourse).

As a direct consequence of this decision, Svalbard has witnessed a surge in development of the touristic business and infrastructure. Several enterprises have begun their operation in Longyearbyen; after some time, one of them, Spitsbergen Travel, became particularly significant, concentrating most of the market in its hands. Previously nonexistent, the full touristic infrastructure was created: several hotels emerged, the Svalbard Airport was renovated, and the full range of public service appeared.

But the most important challenge was to create the touristic image of Svalbard with a wide variety of touristic products; and this challenge was successfully answered. Today, the Norwegian tour operators can offer nearly all the types of the Arctic tourism to the visitors: walking, sailing, snowmobile, helicopter and dog-sledge excursions; hikes to mountains, glaciers and uninhabited islands; making contact with wild nature including reindeer, Arctic foxes and polar bears; and so on. Many touristic attractions are created on the blank spot, e. g. World Seed Bank, University Center etc. Using all these instruments, the Norwegian tour operators explicitly construct the new touristic identity of Svalbard, the identity of “the last wilderness of Europe”, “the land of pristine nature”, “the land of everything northernmost”. When saying “explicitly”, we really mean it: they hold the roundtables, conferences and seminars on creating the archipelago image, the researchers get funding for the applied projects on these topics. New local myths, or rather semi-myths, are being constructed specifically for tourists; these include, for example, the widely known narrative about
the death ban in effect in Svalbard, local narratives about encountering the polar bears, the allegedly ancient custom of taking the shoes off before entering the house, etc.

Besides all the other aspects of developing the touristic space in the archipelago, the Norwegian tour operators have also included the interaction with Soviet (and later Russian) settlements into their operation agendas, as Kaltenborn (1999) states. Barentsburg, Pyramiden and Grumantbyen were an excellent image of what the average Western tourist could never see before: a typical Soviet settlement in its full meaning. The Norwegians have included the Russian settlements into their tour programs and started promoting them under the brands like “the last remnant of the Soviet Union”, “the sanctuary of the 70s” etc. This image was supported by the peculiar (at least to the Western point of view) Soviet infrastructure which got nearly no renovation even though the perestroika was over. The touristic vessels started to make daily visits to the Russian settlements during the summer and fall seasons; the large cruise ships also frequented the town, along with helicopter and snowmobile tours.

The Russian Approach to Modernization before 2014: a Stagnation Period

In the 1990s, the Russian settlements experienced the same processes as the Norwegian ones a decade before. The coal mining, which hadn’t any commercial meaning for the Soviet Union in Svalbard since 1950s and only secured the Soviet presence in the archipelago, became deeply unprofitable for Russia after the Soviet Union had fallen. The only difference between the Russian and the Norwegian approach was the absence of the environmental strain in the political discourse. The impulse for restructuring its Svalbard activities emerged in Russia only in the late 1990s, being triggered by two events: the crash of the Russian aircraft with more than 200 people aboard in 1996, and the subsequent closure of the Pyramiden mine and town in 1998. As Portsel (2011) notes, the town dwellers had no good memories about the 1990s: the quality of life in the towns decreased dramatically, while the state totally neglected their needs and hopes. After the Trust Arcticugol CEO and steering group had changed in the early 2000s, the modernization processes were initiated: in 2002, following the Norwegian experience, the State Commission on Svalbard decided to perform a gradual transition from the coal mining to the tourism and research development. As mentioned before, the full termination of coal production is still impossible, partly due to the high costs of bringing fuel to the archipelago, partly due to the Svalbard Treaty requirements.

As a part of this new strategy, the new leaders of Trust Arcticugol started to gradually renovate the town outlook and the public infrastructure. The first objects to be renovated were the touristic ones: the Soviet-times hotel, the museum and the restaurants; in the recent years, a couple of new hotels and hostels were built anew. This modernization also influenced the rest of infrastructure: main
public spaces got renovated, the outlook of the living houses was refurbished, and the most dilapidated buildings from the 1950s and 1960s were either demolished or laid up. What is even more important, the basic touristic products were created: town excursions, hike tours, concert and museums programs. Some basic renovation was also performed in Pyramiden. The general line was the cooperation with the Norwegian tour operators and supporting their requests; so, until the early 2010s, the general touristic image of Barentsburg and Pyramiden, i.e. exploitation of the Soviet legacy and the Soviet/Russian cultural stereotypes, remained intact.

However, it should be noted that the touristic business always remained a side activity for Trust Arcticugol compared to the coal mining, even though the tourism development responsibilities are also assigned to it by the Russian state. The head of the turbyuro (tourism office) always had some other labor responsibilities in the town (school headmaster, House of Culture administrator etc.). The internal subordination was also unclear: the tourism development projects were designed in Moscow, but those responsible for their implementation were the Barentsburg dwellers, which created many organizational and financial discrepancies. There were several attempts to transfer the Svalbard tourism to the commercial operators, but they all failed; as a result, the possibility of visiting Svalbard remained largely unknown to the Russian tourists. We should also mention the complicated attitude of the mine leadership to the idea of reorienting the life towards the tourism and research. They, who have been working in the coal mining industry for many years, have obviously no desire at all to “wrap up” and decrease the coal production, because it’s this production that was the backbone of the town life for many years. They have been opposing the idea of the town reorientation since it first emerged, and the poor relationship between the leadership and the heads of the tourism office became a common place in the local discourse. The fundamental changes in this aspect only happened in 2014.

After 2014: New Team

In 2014, the new director of the Trust Arcticugol touristic subdivision was appointed, and the subdivision itself was renamed Grumant Expedition Center. One should mention two major distinctive traits of this person that make him different from his predecessors. Firstly, this was the first person in this office with significant professional experience in the tourism, and specifically, in the Russian Arctic tourism: his CV includes working with individual tourists and groups in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, Yamal and Chukotka peninsulas, Republic of Yakutia etc. Secondly, this is the first case when the head of the tourism office reports directly to the Director General of Trust Arcticugol while the tourism funds are now separated from those of the mine, making the tourism office financially and organizationally independent from the local mine directors.
The action plan of the new head of the tourism office is based on the radical changes in the Trust Arcticugol tourism ideology. The first thing that was done is a fundamental decision to abolish exploiting the “Soviet sanctuary” image. The interviewed Barentsburg townsmen explicitly express their ashamedness by the quality of life and infrastructure they and the town guests used to experience; in addition to that, they are frustrated by the fact that the impression the incoming tourist used to get in Barentsburg was rather sad and repulsing, the town being presented as unfriendly and outdated. Our assumption is that this frustration becomes even heavier as the tourism office employees, mostly coming from large and progressive cities like St. Petersburg and Moscow, have to live in these poor conditions, which induces the conflict with the reality and their desire to change it. They eagerly welcome the general infrastructure renovation, but the common opinion is that this process has to be speeded up in order to physically erase most of the Soviet legacy — a rather radical position and certainly not conforming with the cultural heritage protection concept, but nonetheless popular in Barentsburg (on such projects, see also Grydehøj (2010)).

The next step in the reformation agenda is the changes in the general methodology of working with tourists and promoting the touristic products. According to the tourism office employees, their goal is to create a new modern tourism center of the Russian Svalbard, a center where the guests can get the same level of service they are used to in the Western world. This included the launch of the new multilingual website where everyone can book tours, accommodation etc. online. The Barentsburg and Pyramiden hotels and hostels were registered in the major online booking systems and got their license, and the long-awaited internet access became available. The tourism office has also started to cooperate actively and bilaterally with the Norwegian tour operators, not just selling concerts and tours for cash.

The reorientation to the Western standards has also induced the significant infrastructure redevelopment. A new guesthouse and office was built in Longyearbyen, allowing handling the Russian tourists exclusively by the company; several new snowmobiles and cars were imported; new signposts and information boards in Russian, English and Norwegian were installed, and new tour guides with good command of English and Norwegian were hired. The “ordinary” townsmen were asked not to use swear words in front of the tourists and greet those upon meeting. In general, there is a strong will to wipe out the touristic image of Barentsburg that had existed before: the stereotypical and grotesque image of Russia, coined as “matryoshka-balalaika style”, is prohibited to use now. Instead, the image of a new modern Arctic town (much like Longyearbyen) with strong roots in the Russian culture is being constructed.
The Pomor Town: A New Ideology

The next and the main step intended to be made is the introduction of the new touristic ideology, putting a new core idea into the touristic content of the Russian Svalbard. Such a core idea, an ideological backbone was chosen to be the Pomor identity styled as “Barentsburg, the town of traditions”. (Pomors are a subgroup of the Russians living in the European North, on the shores of the White Sea; they are considered to be skilled mariners and fishermen and the culture-keepers of the Russian North). The ideology creator’s starting point is that Svalbard has many different pages in its history, including Dutch, English, Pomor, Norwegian, Soviet and Russian ones which are fused together in the inhabited part of the archipelago; and that such continuity of the cultural memory should be articulated in the new Barentsburg and linked to the Arctic identity of the town.

The roots of these ideas can be found, firstly, in their creator’s own biography and the numerous books about polar explorers he admits to have read; secondly, in the archaeological findings of Vadim Starkov, the leader of the Arctic Archaeology team from the Moscow-based Institute of Archaeology, the author of Pomor discovery of Svalbard hypothesis. There emerges an interesting collision: on the one hand, for the ideology creators, Starkov’s findings and publications have become the base for constructing the historical memory and myth legitimization; on the other hand, they consider Starkov himself and his team to be outdated and even demented. This is where the conflicts begin: both the personal ones and the conflicts about the infrastructure (possession of the museum, library etc.) which have yet to be resolved.

The introduction of the Pomor identity to Svalbard is continued by the search for its material embodiment and rooting. This can be seen in the use of place names (Pomor museum and hostel, Grumant tourist office etc.), in the choice of urban and interior design (wooden, carved and Northern Russian), in the clothing and outlook of the tourist-serving personnel, in the assortment of the souvenir store (explicitly preferring the local-made and hand-made products) and so on. In addition to that, a new Pomor Cultural Center was created where they expect to host cultural events, artwork exhibitions etc.

One should also mention that this new ideology is intended to fill in the gap of the “internal tourism”, i.e. people coming from Russia. Such trips, if made directly from Russia (the first one is planned for the early 2016), do not require any visas, so the actualization of the internal Russian cultural codes looks well grounded.

Perception of the New Ideology

The other side of the processes described above is their perception by various actors and attitudes expressed towards them. The first aspect we should elaborate on is the views expressed by the
addressees of the changes, i. e. the tourists themselves. Nearly each of them mentioned that what they had encountered in Barentsburg was totally unexpected to them. What they expect is the very same stereotypical “matryoshka-balalaika” style and the Soviet legacy the Norwegian tour guides prepare them for (it should be noted that more than 80 % of the traffic between Barentsburg and Longyearbyen is performed by Norwegian operators)¹. This is why they are partially frustrated: their expectations weren’t met. But the general mood of their opinions is usually positive: although the kitsch Russian culture they were coming for is now nearly extinct in Barentsburg, they are generally much impressed by the quality of service they got and the pace of modernization they’ve witnessed. In 2015, the first returning tourists appeared in Barentsburg: the people who have already visited the

¹ This last effect is well known to the Russian guides, and they make attempts to neutralize it as much as possible, for example with highlighting the recent changes, using good English and offering quality service; they are also working with the Norwegian tour operators to eliminate these stereotypes and negative advertisement. In fact, the Norwegian guides don’t do that willingly: first of all, the Soviet legacy is one of the best attractors for the foreign tourists; besides that, the Barentsburg modernization and the development of its infrastructure is a direct threat to the Norwegian tour operators’ positions in the Svalbard market. town before with the Norwegian guides and have decided to revisit it to have a better look at the post-Soviet changes. All in all, the ideological goal of making an absolutely new impression to tourists seems to have been achieved.

The second aspect is the attitudes toward changes among the Barentsburg townsmen. The main motive of the local urban narrative is the discrepancy between the idealized touristic image of the town and its everyday life and problems which the locals cannot escape. The pace of modernization is not as fast as the locals would like it to be; and what is more, it is mainly affecting the public spaces and the town outlook (“façade renovation”) and not the private areas yet; there are many complaints like “the hotel was insulated and the working dormitories weren’t”, “the façade was refurbished but the rooms were left as if in 1970s” and even “the best food is given to the tourists whereas the miners cannot get fresh vegetables or dairy products”. In addition to that, every townsman of Barentsburg seems to have his own professional opinion on how the modernization should be performed: what materials should be used, which songs should be sung etc. — quite a common situation in the Russian-speaking communities.

In general, the attitudes towards the town modernization correlate strongly to the respondents’ age: the younger people (aged 25–40) support the modernization, the elder ones (aged 40+) oppose it. Such division is also directly linked to the perceptions of future: the elder people tend to follow the aforementioned strategy of preserving the coal extraction as the main activity, the younger ones are
more likely to support its reorientation towards tourism and research. This discrepancy causes heated discussions inside the community (though not the open conflicts yet); it’s evident that the generations born before 1975 have some nostalgic affection towards the old model of living and do not wish to change anything in their lifestyles, whereas the younger people who have already experienced the modern standards of living would like to see the mainland quality of life in Barentsburg.

To sum up the description of changes brought to Barentsburg in the recent years by the development of tourism, we should say that these are changes in both the infrastructure and lifestyle. The “real”, material changes are backed up by the powerful ideology created by the new tourism management team, and these changes, having obviously made a small revolution in the tourism business, also affect the everyday life of the town. Even though the changes haven’t been accepted by everyone, Barentsburg today is absolutely different compared to the two-years-ago state.

Conclusion

The main objective of this paper is the ethnographic description of the Barentsburg modernization and the place the tourism activities have in it. However, to conclude this study, we would like to compare the Norwegian and Russian strategies of Svalbard modernization briefly, highlighting their most important distinctive features.

The paths chosen by both states are similar in general, with the main difference being the objectives of modernization imposed by the governing bodies: Norway attempts to decrease the coal production in order to minimize the environmental impact, whereas the Russia tries to do both things at the same time, i.e. keep the coal extraction running to secure fuel for the town, and develop the new profitable businesses like tourism and research.

The Norwegian operators have put much effort into developing the tourism in the archipelago, having created various touristic products very popular among visitors. Moving in the same direction, the Russians attempt to become included into this general context of Svalbard perceived as Mecca of the Arctic tourism; as a part of this attempt, the Trust Arcticugol tourism office is thriving to cease to be just a place for visit and become a full-scale actor of the touristic activities, a mature provider of the touristic services, and also have its voice in the general Svalbard touristic ideology planning.

Finally, one should note the important place of the perceptions of the future in the Arctic politics in general. Both Norway and Russia have certain plans concerning Svalbard, and there are also certain political goals there for the governments of both states. Developing and using tourism in certain contexts, including actualization of certain cultural and/or historical traditions (e.g. Pomor one), can
play an important role in the international politics. It is now beyond doubt that this aspect of tourism development is directly controlled by both states and used in the public discourse, which additionally reinforces the efforts made by tour operators in Svalbard itself.

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Sámi people in decision-making processes – Analyzing Sámi people’s possibilities to participate and influence on decision-making processes in Finland, Sweden and Norway

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Abstract
The world is constantly going through rapid changes. The political situation in the world is rather complex, climate change is causing drastic changes to our environment, economical competition is getting more intense and nobody on this planet can escape that. The competition is increasing as well at the state level as at the private sector. In this kind of situation it is crucial that we put an effort to the building of regional resilience also in the Arctic region. In this paper I introduce my upcoming research on Sámi people’s possibilities to participate and influence on decision-making processes in Finland, Sweden and Norway. I concentrate on observing the role of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage when building resilience in the Northern Scandinavia and Finland. In this region lives the only officially recognized indigenous peoples’ group in the European Union – the Sámi people. I will introduce shortly how Sámi people are engaged to the process of building resilience at the state - and regional level in their homeland region. Indigenous people’s voice is still often unheard at the higher level decision-making bodies and with my research I will react to that. Especially environmental and political aspects are highlighted in my research, since the environment is seen as one of the most crucial elements of the Sámi culture. It is also one of the most vulnerable resources which we still have managed to preserve relatively clean in this region.

Setting the frames
On 13th of March in 2015 the Sámi people in Finland had to face a bitter disappointment. Despite of the great expectations, the government of Finland did not ratify ILO Convention No. 169 (The Government of Finland, HE264/2014 vp). Also the reform concerning the 3rd section and the 2nd subsection of the Act on the Sámi Parliament was not accepted by the committee of the Finnish Parliament (Parliamentary document 2015). Two years of preparatory work turned out to be in vain. These decisions taken by the Finnish Parliament evoked a lot of political conversation in national and international fields. Both the official and unofficial stand of the Sámi people were clearly stated in media; The Sámi people feel that they are not empowered to take part in decision-making processes concerning their own issues (Lehtola & Valkonen 2015). Also the trust on the State of Finland was
gone (Kansan Uutiset 25.5.2015). On 27th of April in 2015 Tiina Sanila-Aikio, the president of the Sámi Parliament in Finland, addressed her concern on the Finland’s situation concerning indigenous peoples’ rights in the United Nations Forum on indigenous peoples. She also asked for international community’s help in convincing Finnish state to ratify ILO Convention No. 169 (United Nations 27.4.2015).

The course of events in Finnish politics during the spring 2015 concerning the only indigenous people’s group living in the area of the country inspired me with the research question in this conference paper and with the topic of the first article of my doctoral dissertation. This conference paper concentrates on introducing my upcoming research on Sámi people’s possibilities to take part in decision-making processes in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Sámi people claim that their voices stay often unheard at the higher level decision-making bodies. In my research I ask whether or not this is the case? The research questions are; *which kind of possibilities Sámi people have to participate and influence on decision-making processes in national and regional level? And how big their influence is in reality?*

This paper also introduces the methods and the theoretical background of my research. The analysis will be done by using comparative political analysis. Thus the aim is to: 1) find similarities and differences from legislation and political statements and cluster them, and after that to: 2) compare the situation in Finland, Sweden and Norway. The theoretical framework of the research is based on international relations’ security studies. I approach the research question from the perspective of human security and the whole discourse is built around the pre-assumption that the restriction of the participation and silencing the voices of Sámi people pose a threat to the human security in Sápmi. In the end I will present some preliminary conclusions on the outcomes of my research.

**Methodological premises and material for the research**

As the title of my conference paper and my upcoming article “*Sámi people in decision-making processes – Analyzing Sámi people’s possibilities to participate and influence on decision-making processes in Finland, Sweden and Norway*” indicates, this research will study Sámi people’s situation in three different countries with comparative methods. The research material consists of legislative documents in Finland, Norway and Sweden. It includes also the political statements and documents of the Finnish and Swedish (Riksdag) parliaments and Norwegian stortinget which concern the Sámi people’s possibilities to influence on decision-making. In addition to the official and legal documents also the interviews with the presidents of the three Sámi parliaments and news articles dealing with the situation will be added. By doing comparative political analysis I aim to define differences and

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3 Sámi people’s homeland area in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia.
similarities in the documents listed above and compare and analyze how those reverberate to the situation in practice.

Comparative political analysis is used as a method in this research since it is a tool to analyze political phenomena within state, society, country and political system (Lim 2010, 3). In this case Sámi people’s possibilities to participate and influence in decision-making in the society are seen as such phenomena. One of the goals is to define differences and similarities pointed out from the research material, but as in comparative political analysis in general, this is not the main purpose of the study. The aim is to gain in-depth understanding on the situation in these three Nordic countries and use these differences and similarities as a certain kind of control variables which can be used in comparison. (See Lim 2010, 19-20.) Through comparative method I also want to observe more closely a relationship among research variables particularly in this research among legislation, political documents, statements and practice (Lijphart 1971, 683).

The emphasis of comparative political analysis has changed throughout its history. In the beginning it was strongly a state-oriented descriptive method, but in the 1960’s and 1970’s it was influenced by the discourses of structural-functionalism. In the 1980’s it returned to the more state-centric approach again and nowadays it is a complex mix of all of those. (Kamrava 1995, 1-22.) I am fascinated by the approach introduced by Mehran Kamrava (1995) in his book “Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis” in which politics analyzed is not understood only as a political or social phenomena, but it is a great and complex structure influenced by numerous factors. (Kamrava 1995, 32.) In the framework of this approach the variety of the societal structures are taken in consideration. State and society are seen as separate, but closely connected to each other. Interaction between the state and the society happens through numerous institutions which can be found from both. State institutions such as legislation are quite concrete and easier to define, whereas the institutions of society are more abstract such as ethnic lineage or religion. (Kamrava 1995, 32-40.)

Even though I look critically on Kamrava’s clear distinction between state and society, in this research this kind of division is rather obvious. State and its many institutions can be clearly considered to be separate from the “institution” created by Sámi people as an indigenous people’s group based on ethnicity. In fact as a preliminary assumption it could be argued that the rhetorical argumentation used by Sámi media and politicians is even encouraging this distinction. However also in this study

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4 See for example Veli-Pekka Lehtola’s (2015) Saamelaiskiista: Sortaoko Suomi alkuperäiskansaansa? which provides a great general overview on the so called “Sámi conflict” in Finnish Lapland.
the interaction between the three states and the society is crucial and is the basis for the whole analytical framework.

**Human security as a core of the analysis**

The theoretical framework of this research is built around the discourse of human security. This discourse is broader than the one in traditional state-centric view of security (Barnett et al. 2009, 8). Instead of states, the human beings and the societal and economical structures around them are seen as a referent object of security (Thomas 2001, 161). This approach emphasizes the importance of those elements which are crucial in maintaining the human life and dignity in society (Barnett et al. 2009, 9). It is in many ways inspired and rooted from the year’s 1994 Human Development Report in which the concept of human security was defined more accurately than before (UNDP 1994, 22).

Even though human security brings the theoretical conversation around security concerns away from traditional security threats such as military threats, its meaning should not be understood as identical to security of individual. It does not intend to emphasize individualistic liberal approach to the world, but rather to increase the understanding of the conditions necessary for existence of human beings. More precisely referring to the basic material needs which should be met and to that kind of living conditions in which human beings can preserve their dignity. (Thomas 2001, 161.) It is at the core of this approach that level of national security does not always necessarily correlate with the security of people (Barnett et al. 2009, 7).

In the case of Sámi people in Finland, Norway and Sweden the situation viewed from human security perspective is rather complex. If for example a meaningful participation in the life of the community is seen as one of the crucial conditions for human dignity to be realized (Thomas 2001, 161.), the state of human security in for example Finnish Sápmi region is relatively poor according to the recent public discussions in media. The actions taken by the Finnish parliament concerning the rights and the position of the Sámi people, and in the other hand the Sámi people’s statements of distrust for the state of Finland speak on their behalf. The reasons behind these actions, which will be elaborated more in the next chapter, are deep in the structures and interactions among the state’s and society’s institutions. I presuppose that the fear of threats to human security is the reason behind the recent development in Finland. Both the state authorities and the Sámi people are afraid to lose their right to fulfill one of human’s basic needs – to be heard and seen by others and society.

**What is going on in Sápmi?**

Before continuing to the preliminary conclusions of my research the main concepts and general situation concerning Sámi people’s status/position in societal structures will be elaborated more. At this point it is also important to define to whom I refer when using the term indigenous people. Even
the United Nations has not been able to find one sufficient official definition of “indigenous” because of their diversity in the world. When starting a research, the researchers dealing with indigenous studies around the world go through this discussion. Different “working definitions” are available for example in the United Nations\(^5\), World Bank\(^6\) and in International Labour Organization’s documents\(^7\). However in this paper I emphasize the criteria that Leena Heinämäki (2010) listed as a sum of various different definitions. Indigenous people have their distinct culture in relation to the majority of the population.

“Such a culture can comprise different elements: for example, a distinct language, religion, specific customs and traditions, as well as specific uses of territory and resources. Furthermore self-identification as a subjective criterion is fundamental. Self-identification consist of two elements: the group-consciousness of persons who believe they belong to a certain indigenous group, and the group’s acceptance the individuals in question are a part of their community.” (Heinämäki 2010, 3.)

In addition to this I see that also the historical connection to the land and territory that they inhabit and have inhabited throughout the history should be taken in consideration.

Defining who the Sámi people are has recently become a strongly political question especially in Finland and has divided politicians, researchers and also the Sámi people to two different “camps”.

The official definitions according to which the person can be included to the electoral roll of the Sámi

\(^{5}\)”This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the present of one or more of the following factors: a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); d)Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language); e)Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; f)Other relevant factors.”(United Nations 1987, paras 379-380.)

\(^{6}\)”For purpose of this policy, the term “Indigenous Peoples” is used in a generic sense to refer to a distinct, vulnerable, social and cultural group possessing the following characteristics in varying degrees: a) self-identification as members of a distinct indigenous cultural group and recognition of this identity by others; b) collective attachment to geographically distinct habitats or ancestral territories in the project area and to the natural resources in these habitats and territories; c) customary cultural, social, or political institutions that are separate from those of the dominant society and culture; and d) an indigenous language, often different from the official language of the country or region.”(World Bank 2005.)

\(^{7}\)ILO Convention No. 169 1989, article 1.
parliaments in Finland\textsuperscript{8}, Sweden\textsuperscript{9} and Norway\textsuperscript{10} have different nuances. However the common features in all definitions are; the self-identification as a Sámi; the language basis; and that a parent of a person is, has been or could have been registered in the Sámi electoral register. The Sámi parliament electoral roll is in many cases mistakenly understood to be an official register of the Sámi people which it is not.

In 2012 in Finland the Sámi parliament delivered a report of the needs for changes in the Act on the Sámi parliament to the ministry of justice (Ministry of Justice 2012). In this report it was emphasized that changes for example to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} subsection of the definition of a Sámi were needed. According to this subsection if a person identifies himself as a Sámi and “[…] is a descendent of a person who has been entered in a land, taxation or population register as a mountain, forest or fishing Lapp” (Act on the Sámi Parliament 1995, Section 3 Definition of a Sámi, subsection 2.) he or she is considered as a Sámi for the purpose of the Act. This subsection is criticized. From the Sámi perspective it does not define who is ethnically Sámi and does not support Sámi people’s traditional way to identify by themselves the people who are Sámi. In the other hand it gives a possibility for those people who might be excluded from the register according to group identification principle, to get to the electoral roll. (See for example Koivurova et. al. 2014. See also Joona 2012 & Valkonen 2009.)

Despite of the opinion of the Sámi parliament the Finnish parliament decided to keep the 2\textsuperscript{nd} subsection of the Sámi definition in the Act on the Sámi Parliament without changes and as a consequence the new Act did not come in to operation. This for one lead to the critical situation in which the Finnish Sámi people are now. On the 30\textsuperscript{th} of September 2015 Finnish Supreme administrative court gave its decision that 93 people could enter to the Sámi electoral roll against the will of the Sámi parliament (KHO 30.9.2015). After the decision the discussion has started to heat up again and the Sámi people see this as a proof of their

\textsuperscript{8} “For the purpose of this Act, a Sámi means a person who considers himself a Sámi, provided: (1) That he himself or at least one of his parents or grandparents has learnt Sámi as his first language; (2) That he is a descendent of a person who has been entered in a land, taxation or population register as a mountain, forest or fishing Lapp; or (3) That at least one of his parents has or could have been registered as an elector for an election to the Sámi Delegation or the Sámi Parliament.” (Act on the Sámi Parliament 1995, Section 3 Definition of a Sámi.)

\textsuperscript{9} In this Act, Sami refers to a person who considers him/herself to be Sami and 1 ensures that he or she has or have had the Sami language spoken at home, or 2 ensures that any of his or her parents or grandparents have or have had the Sami language spoken at home, or 3 has a parent who is or has been listed on the electoral roll of the Sami Parliament. What is mentioned in Item 3 first paragraph is not applicable if the County Administration has decided that the parent should not be listed on the electoral roll on the basis that the parent is not a Sami. Act (2006:803). (Sami Parliament Act 1992, Chapter 1 Introductory provisions, Section 2.)

\textsuperscript{10} All persons who make a declaration to the effect that they consider themselves to be Sami, and who either a. have Sami as their domestic language, or b. have or have had a parent, grandparent or great-grandparent with Sami as his or her domestic language, or c. are the child of a person who is or has been registered in the Sami electoral register may demand to be included in a separate register of Sami electors in their municipality of residence. (The Sámi Act 1987, Chapter 2, Section 2-6.)
forced assimilation into the Finnish people (YLE 30.9.2015 & YLE 1.10.2015). The situation tells also something about the Sámi people’s possibilities to participate and influence in decision-making processes.

In addition to the new formation of the Act on the Sámi Parliament the Finnish parliament did not ratify the ILO Convention No. 169. ILO Convention No. 169 (ILO Convention No. 169. 1989.) is a legally binding convention created in 1989 as a revised version of the ILO Convention No. 107 (ILO Convention No. 107 1957). The convention deals with indigenous and tribal people’s rights and it has been so far ratified by 22 countries. Since Finland did not manage to ratify ILO Convention No. 169, Norway is at the moment the only country in Sápmi region which has ratified it. It is seen as a crucial element when preserving the culture of the indigenous people and in this case especially the Sámi people. It also provides articles dealing with indigenous people’s rights to be involved in to the decision-making processes (Heinämäki 2004). I see this convention to be an important element also in making Sámi people’s voices heard when building environmental resilience in Sápmi region. The traditional knowledge that indigenous people have is often in non-written form but has helped to sustain nature throughout the history.

Reasons behind the decisions of Finland and Sweden to not to ratify ILO Convention No. 169 can be discussed. In the public and also scientific conversations the article 14\textsuperscript{11} of ILO Convention No. 169, which deals with the land right issues of the indigenous people is often seen as a main obstacle for the ratification (See Heinämäki 2004, 244 & Joona 2012). It has been argued that if this convention would be ratified it might challenge the sovereignty of the state concerned to some extent (See Joona 2012, 27, Heinämäki 2004, Heinämäki 2009 & Lenzerini 2006,179). The doctrine of state sovereignty is in some cases contradictory to the human rights of indigenous people (Heinämäki 2009, 221-222), and it is one of the reasons why indigenous people are engaged for example to the decision-making processes and granted self-determination only to a certain extent (See Heinämäki 2009, Hossain 2013 & Lenzerini 2006). However it has been also stated by many legal scholars, that despite of the fact that ILO Convention No. 169 emphasizes rights of the indigenous people, it has been formulated so that the interpretation of the convention is not so black and white. (See for

\footnote{11 The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized. In addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this respect. 2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession. 3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned. (ILO Convention No.169 1989, Article 14.)}
example Joona 2012, 27). It talks about participatory rights which according to Lenzerini (2006) “are ultimately subject to the supreme authority of the territorial government” (Lenzerini 2006, 179)\(^\text{12}\).

**Sámi people in decision-making structure**

In previous chapters I have elaborated more on few important concepts and issues which are so called “hot topics” in Sápmi at the moment. Next I will introduce shortly through which kind of mechanisms Sámi people are included to decision-making processes. The most obvious mechanisms and ways to engage Sámi people to the political decision-making processes are the national Sámi parliaments\(^\text{13}\) and national legislations dealing with the parliaments such as the Act on Sámi parliament mentioned before (See for example Josefsen 2010). In Norway, Sweden and Finland people registered to the Sámi parliaments’ electoral roll can vote their presentative to the parliaments. The mandates of the parliaments have small differences, but in principle they are elected political bodies for the Sámi people, which contribute to the development and safeguarding of their languages, cultures and way of living (Anaya 2011, 6-9)\(^\text{14}\).

In addition to these national institutions, the Sámi people have two principal pan-Sámi institutions in Sápmi region – The Sámi Council and the Sámi parliamentary council. The Sámi council is a non-governmental organization promoting the rights of Sámi people across borders, and the Sámi parliamentary council focuses more on languages, education and economic development and coordinates the Sámi voice for example at the United Nations. (Anaya 2011, 5.) There is also a drafting process of the Nordic Sámi Convention going on in Finland, Sweden and Norway, and negotiations are supposed to finish by the end of the year 2015. The convention would help Sámi people in safeguarding and developing their culture in Sápmi so that the national borders would effect on that as little as possible (Josefsen 2010, 9). The Sámi people are also presented in the Arctic Council through Sámi Council which is a permanent participant in the Arctic Council. They can contribute to the decision-making processes in the Council, and the status of the Sámi council in the Arctic Council is even higher than for example the status of non-Arctic observer states (Hossain 2013, 325. See also Ottawa Declaration 1996).

**Preliminary conclusions of my research**

I am at a really early stage of this research thus I do not have any official conclusions yet. Nevertheless after living over a year amongst the Sámi community in Inari, Finland and after a lot of

\(^{12}\) See also Heinämäki 2004, 244.

\(^{13}\) Sámetinget in Norway and Sweden, Sámediggi in Finland.

\(^{14}\) See also The Sámi Act 1987, article 110(a), The Sami Parliament Act 1992 , Chapter 2, section 1, & the Sámi Parliamentary Act 1995 Chapter 2, Section 5.
reading and listening to people I might present some preliminary assumptions about the role of the Sámi people's cultural heritage when building resilience in the Northern Scandinavia and especially in Finland. When observing national legislations and for example Sámi council's position at the Arctic Council as a permanent participant, it could be argued that they have managed to achieve relatively good position in decision-making processes (See also Hossain 2013). Their culture is highly visible in Sámi Council's work, therefore it reflects also to the documents created by the Arctic Council.

In the other hand while observing the public discussions in the news and different sources of media, it could be argued that at least the Sámi people by themselves are not happy with the situation. At this point of my research I dare to present my preliminary conclusion that despite of the well-developed legislation concerning the rights of the Sámi people, there are hidden elements in societal structures which hinder Sámi people's position in decision-making processes. These structures manifest themselves for example in the case of the Act on the Sámi parliament in Finland, in which the parliament of Finland did not accept the new formulation of the Sámi definition. Another example would be the case of the ILO Convention 169, which is a crucial convention improving indigenous peoples' rights.

However the case of ILO Convention 169 is more complicate than it seems to be at the first sight. Pretty obvious and easy assumption could be done by comparing the situation in Finland and Sweden to the situation in Norway. Norway is the only country from these three countries which has ratified the Convention already in 1990, thus the situation there should be better. Also by following the media and public conversations this looks obvious. Norway has adopted the Act of Finnmark (Finnmark Act 2005) and established the Finnmark Commission to investigate the rights of use and ownership to the land in the county of Finnmark (See Finnmark Act 2005, Section 29.), which is an important section of Sápmi in Norway (Ravna 2011, 423). The purpose is to investigate how to ensure that the rights concerning the use and ownership of land would be consistent with the ILO Convention 169 article 14 (ILO 2015a). In practice this means that the investigations are still in progress but there is still a lack of real legislative advancement in this regard (ILO 2015b).

So finally there remains a question, how much the ratification of ILO Convention No. 169 has improved the position of the Sámi people in Norway in practice? Without a doubt it has improved the situation and the symbolic value of the ratification is remarkable, but some of the administrative structures created to implement the convention might also debilitate the position of the Sámi people in decision-making processes.

There are also other this kind of structures such as Sámi people's position in the decision-making process at the European Union, which will be an interesting case for my research as well. The Sámi
people are presented at the European Union only through the national institutions, and this affects straight to their possibilities to participate and influence on decisions made at that level. Those decisions often concern also Sámi people, but their voice disappears to the wheels of bureaucracy.

Conclusion

In this paper I have introduced my upcoming research topic, theoretical approach, methodology and some preliminary assumptions. Few of the main issues which are dominating the discussion on politics concerning the Sámi people are elaborated to give a general overview of the starting-point situation of my research. The theoretical approach of human security will be present throughout my research, since the possibility to participate and influence on decision-making is seen as one of the core elements of human security. After observing the situation in Sápmi, it is obvious that it affects to the people’s feeling of security. It affects to the human security for example through causing tensions between state’s and society’s institution, but also between different society’s institutions locally and regionally. In theory the Sámi people’s possibilities to influence on decision-making processes seem to be relatively good, but in practice the amount of protest voices is increasing all the time. With this research I aim to react to the concern arousing amongst the people, and try to fill the lack of research on this specific topic.

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The recognition of Arctic communities in the EU seal regime

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When standing on a seal hunting vessel, looking into the rough sea one might be inclined to forget that in spite of its remoteness and somewhat self-contained social systems, Arctic and sub-Arctic communities are subject to significant legal and political developments elsewhere that impact community sustainability and cultural survival. Especially through the avenues of global trade, small communities in the north benefit or are put under pressure in response to fluctuating markets.

Particularly seal hunting communities in the Canadian Arctic and the sub-Arctic island of Newfoundland feel these repercussions (Dahl 2000; Sellheim 2015a). With the adoption of the EU ban on trade in seal products, markets and trade in seal products have declined significantly, impacting the social fabric and community sustenance for local people.

This paper examines to which degree the negative effects of the seal regime on sealing communities were taken into consideration during the legislative process. Reference is made to three distinct notions of ‘recognition’: first, the political recognition, meaning the political processes of recognising sealing communities; second, the legal recognition, meaning how communities are reflected in the law itself; and third, the empirical recognition, meaning in how far, in light of the legal and political ways of recognition, sealing communities are affected and which avenues exist for them to buffer adverse effects.

The EU seal regime

The subject of this paper is the European Union’s ban on trade in seal products. The idea of a trade ban on seal products in the EU is not of recent origin: already in 1983 the then-European Communities adopted a ban on products stemming from harp and hooded seal pups, the ‘Seal Pups Directive’, which had severe effects on Inuit semi-subsistent and commercial sealing communities alike (Malouf 1986; Wenzel 1991). In 2006, the European Parliament issued a declaration in which it requested the European Commission to draft a regulation that bans the trade in seal products: Pivotal for this request were concerns over animal welfare in the Eastern Canadian commercial seal hunts. In September 2009, Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products (basic regulation) was

As stipulated in article 3 of the basic regulation, three derogations from the blanket nature of the trade ban exist: first, when seal products stem from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities (‘IC exception’); second, when they are in the personal property of travelers or their families; third, when they are by-products of marine resource management initiatives, albeit on a non-profit basis (‘MRM exception’). Article 3 of the implementing regulation further clarifies that the IC exception is valid only when indigenous communities have a tradition of seal hunting; when their products are at least partly used, consumed or processed in the community; and when the hunts contribute to the subsistence of the community (Sellheim 2013; Wegge 2013).

Political recognition of Inuit and other indigenous communities
Throughout the legislative process, the recognition of Inuit and other indigenous communities has been a common political narrative. Already in the 2006 Parliamentary Declaration the exemption of Inuit from any trade measure is highlighted (European Parliament 2006: para. H.2). No hints for a potential challenge of the Inuit seal hunts can be found throughout the drafting process and Inuit were consulted as well as invited to stakeholder meetings (Sellheim 2015b). However, the degree of recognition appears to be limited and trumped by the overall will to end trade in seal products. This observation stems from the fact that already with the Seal Pups Directive, which held an, albeit less sophisticated, Inuit exemption, the impacts on Inuit communities were drastic (Wenzel 1991). Not surprisingly, therefore, Inuit voiced their opposition to the adoption of yet another trade ban (see for example ITK/ICC 2009). However, these concerns by Inuit were ignored in order to follow the incentive of limiting the seal hunt.

The political recognition of Inuit concerns and the wellbeing of Inuit as a reason not to adopt a ban in the first place was furthermore weakened by the fact that also the Impact Assessment that was conducted prior to the adoption of the basic regulation warned that “policy measures that have adverse impacts on the image of seal skins and other seal products will have a negative impact on the Inuit population anyway” (COWI 2008: 117). In other words, the ramifications of the EU seal regime on Inuit communities were known prior to its adoption. Given this knowledge, sparing Inuit from any harm became a secondary objective. This is further underlined by the dispute settlement procedure before the World Trade Organization when Canada and Norway challenged the EU seal regime based on international trade law (see for example Perišin 2013). Here, the Appellate Body clearly identified the primary objective of the regime to “address EU public moral concerns regarding seal welfare, while accommodating IC [indigenous communities] and other interests so as to mitigate
the impact of the measure on those interests” (WTO 2014: para. 5.167). And indeed, the EU argued that “Inuit sealing communities would be better off absent any regulation of the placing on the EU market of seal products” while the “IC exception seeks to mitigate the necessarily adverse impact” of the regime on Inuit communities (ibid. 2.102).

It seems fair to say that politically the wellbeing of Inuit communities is not as highly regarded as the objective to end the seal hunt. Whether or not moral opposition is a determining factor that justifies this will not be discussed here.

**Legal recognition of Inuit and other indigenous communities**

Through the insertion of the IC exception into the seal regime, the interests of Inuit and other indigenous communities are legally recognized. In Recital 14 of the basic regulation, reference is made to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 (United Nations 2007), which explicitly refers to the protection of indigenous identity and culture. The seal hunt, the utilization of seal products and the subsistence economy deriving from the seal hunt are considered part of the identity and culture of particularly Inuit. As a consequence, the prevention of adverse effects on Inuit and other indigenous communities necessitates the IC exception, thus reflecting a legal recognition of Arctic indigenous communities. Interestingly, however, the legally binding Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, ILO Convention 169 (ILO 1989), is neither in the legislative process nor in the final regime made reference to. A possible, however shaky, explanation for this gap is Denmark’s status as a party to the ILO Convention, having to actively foster Greenlandic seal hunts and the marketing of the products, making it difficult to adhere to its obligations under the EU seal regime. Notwithstanding, however, in its Resolution on a Sustainable High North Policy the European Parliament “stresses the need to adopt special measures to safeguard the culture, language and land rights of indigenous peoples in the way defined in ILO Convention 169” (European Parliament 2011: para. 34).

**Empirical recognition of Inuit and other indigenous communities**

While a political will was to some degree prevalent in the legislative process to spare Inuit from adverse effects and while the legal recognition of the indigenous communities has occurred via an exemption in accordance with international law, no mechanisms are in place that keep harm from the Inuit as regards tangible effects of a trade ban.

Problematic in the empirical dimension of the IC exception is the EU’s neglect of the modern nature of Inuit seal trade. As already stipulated in a report by the Government of Nunavut (2012), the pathways of trade between Inuit and non-Inuit, commercial seal hunters are interlinked. As a consequence, any reduction of commercial trade inevitably affects the ways Inuit seal products are
marketed. Furthermore, in absence of a labelling scheme which marks seal products of Inuit origin, buyers abstain from buying seal products in general. As a consequence, both Inuit and non-Inuit products are no longer purchased. Additionally, it can be argued, that the understanding of the concept of ‘subsistence’, as applied in the legislative process, was outdated (Hossain 2013), indicating that EU policy-makers were not aware of the links between the community and market spheres of exchange (Gudeman 2001) in Inuit communities. Given the wording in the IC exception, however, this claim cannot be held upright in full confidence as the products are to be “at least partly used, consumed or processed within the communities (own emphasis; Implementing Regulation, art. 3 (b)), indicating another sphere of exchange than community-based. Moreover, if Inuit hunts were to be understood as purely exchanged in the community sphere without market access, an IC exception in a European Union trade measure would not be necessary in the first place.

The adverse effects on Inuit communities triggered several proceedings before the European General Court and Court of Justice. In cooperation with seal traders, individual hunters and others, the Canadian Inuit organization, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, launched several attempts to overturn the seal regime (see for example Beqiraj 2013). While politically recognized as stakeholders and empirically affected by the trade measure, Inuit are not considered addressees of the regime and thus do not enjoy legal standing before the courts. Crucial in this regard is art. 1 of the basic regulation which limits the scope of the regulation as establishing “harmonized rules concerning the placing on the market of seal products.” It is thus only those that are engaged in the placing on the market which are legally considered affected by the regime and not those who experience potential secondary effects from it (Sellheim 2015c). To this end, albeit empirically affected by the EU seal regime, Inuit have little chance of overturning it. Merely a potential challenge under a human rights framework could enable success (see also Cambou 2013).

Lastly, market access of Inuit seal products is aggravated by the provisions stipulated in art. 6 of the implementing regulation which requires ‘recognized bodies’ to monitor and attest the conditions for the IC as well as MRM exception. As of October 2015, only three recognized bodies have been identified that monitor and attest MRM hunts in Sweden as well as the IC hunts in Greenland and Nunavut. Especially the latter two occurred only in April 2013 and July 2015 respectively. This means that before the identification of the recognized bodies the IC exception was de facto ineffective. Yet, with the adoption of an amendment of the seal regime in September 2015 which removes the MRM exception entirely and introduces requirements that make animal welfare a crucial conditions for market access, Inuit will face increasing difficulties to have their seal products sold on the EU market (European Parliament 2015). In how far the animal welfare requirements are framed and monitored,
given that a labelling scheme was dismissed as unfeasible during the legislative process of the regime, cannot be ascertained (Sellheim 2013).

The blind spot: the recognition of non-indigenous sealing communities

While politically and legally Inuit and other indigenous communities are, at least to some degree, recognized, this cannot be said about those communities that are not indigenous and that base potentially large amounts of their annual income on sealing: the so-called ‘commercial’ seal hunters and the seal processing industry.

Throughout the legislative process of the EU seal regime, non-indigenous sealing communities are by and large ignored and a ‘necessity’-claim neglected. In other words, while the Seal Pups Directive in its Chapeau still considers the seal hunt a “natural and legitimate occupation and in certain areas of the world [that] forms an important part of the traditional way of life and economy,” no such provision can be found in the seal regime nor any hint towards a recognition of non-indigenous sealers as being in need of the financial revenues stemming from the seal hunt or seal product processing. To the contrary, the Impact Assessment clearly states that “[t]he targeting [of a trade ban] will hurt the economy where it is supposed to hurt” (COWI 2008: 99). It can thus be argued that the reduction of the size of economic benefit from the seal hunt is not the primary aim, but rather to cripple any market and economic structure based on the seal hunt. At the same time, knowledge concerning the socio-economic conditions is by and large non-existent and the impact assessment noted that “any policies have to be based on limited information” (COWI 2008: 114). Especially during the drafting of the implementing regulation the lack of knowledge was highlighted in a second impact assessment, which noted that “there is need to gain more knowledge of factors relevant for trade in seal products, including knowledge of seal hunting communities seal products and the necessary measures to apply the conditions of the Regulation” (COWI 2010: 75).

Although the gap in knowledge was known and had been communicated, this did not find any reflection in the political discourse surrounding seal hunting and no attempts were made to understand the socio-economic conditions in a sealing community, in how far a trade ban affects the social fabric as well as the cultural environment in those communities in which seal hunting plays an elevated role. Instead, it is argued that given the short time in which the seal hunt occurs, it does not contribute largely to the annual income of sealers. This is already shown in the EU Parliamentary Declaration which notes that “on average, sealers receive less than 5% of their income from sealing, which provides only a few days’ work each year” (European Parliament 2006: para. C). While COWI notes that up to 15–35% of the annual income derive from sealing (COWI 2008: 24), ethnographic research has shown that up to 50% may stem from the seal hunt in hunting communities, yet varying
to a great deal from year to year. Reason for these variations are the fluctuations in the markets for seal products as well as fluctuations in the fisheries and crab markets, which, taken together, constitute a sealer’s annual income. Consequently, with strong seal product markets and weak fish and crab markets, the contribution of the seal hunt to the annual income rises proportionally (Sellheim 2015a). Throughout the parliamentary debate before the final text of the basic regulation was approved by the European Parliament, only one MEP noted that a trade ban would affect seal hunting communities and business opportunities drastically. Others, however, did not refer to non-indigenous sealing communities (European Parliament 2009).

The lack of knowledge on sealing communities is further aggravated as it is only the annual income of sealers that is considered in the impact assessment and the – albeit marginal – recognition of the political discourse. The web of socio-economic linkages that has evolved over the maritime businesses in fishing and sealing communities, the socio-economic fabric, is neither considered in the legislative process nor in the regime itself. This means that the importance of the seal hunt within the overall maritime activities is not considered to the detriment of the locals and local business owners who usually benefit from the vessel owners equipping their ships, buying supplies for their crews and preparing their gear for the impending hunt. With smaller hunts due to declining markets, this spending which directly flows into the local economy decreases, thus impacting the economic wellbeing of small business owners other than those engaging in the seal hunt directly. The interaction between the community and market spheres of exchange and the inevitably close links between decisions taken elsewhere regarding the seal hunt become obvious in this context (Sellheim 2015a; Gudeman 2001).

While it is recognized that there is a lack of knowledge on seal hunting communities and the effect of a European trade ban on seal products, the processing industry and the effects of the ban on the workers’ wellbeing does neither find any mentioning in the preparatory process nor in the regime itself. It can be argued that the EU seal regime does not affect workers as after all transit, warehousing and processing are as such not affected by the regime (Sellheim 2015d). However, empirical data suggests that there is a strong link between the EU ban, its cascading effect on other regions where further trade bans were put in place, the markets and ultimately the employment opportunities for workers in the processing sector. Given the flagging fish and crab processing sectors in Newfoundland, the processing of seals becomes ever more important. Since many workers in the sealing sector were employed in the fish or crab sector before, a declining sealing sector leaves them to face unemployment or relocation to the Canadian main land in search of employment (Sellheim 2015c).
While neither politically nor legally communities dependent on the processing sector for seal products are considered, in theory the factual circumstance of the processing and trading sectors being the same entity plays into their hands. This is because that seal traders are addressees of the EU seal regime as they are engaged in the placing of seal products on the EU markets. The last remaining seal processing plant in Newfoundland is operated by Carino Ltd., a subdivision of the Norwegian company GC Rieber Skinn, thus actively engaged in the processing as well as marketing of their seal products. To this end, processing communities indirectly enjoy legal standing before the European courts and therefore directly benefit from a potential proof of ‘direct and individual concern’ as defined in EU law (Sellheim 2015c). While this may be theoretically true, the European Court of Justice has, as a final judgement in the cases to annul the EU seal regime, dismissed any appeal as being partly inadmissible and partly unfounded (ECJ 2015).

The difference: why recognise one and not the other?

As shown above, the political recognition of Inuit communities had been an uncontested element of the preparatory process of the EU seal regime. The question that emerges is why Inuit seal hunts are, at least theoretically, recognized and non-indigenous hunts are not considered at all. In order to answer this question a look at the information that is being used within the preparatory process is helpful.

In general can be said that the lack of empirical knowledge on the seal hunt, and especially the non-indigenous seal hunt in Newfoundland and the Magdalen Islands, paired with a biased perception of the seal hunt in general. An inherently ethnicity-based discourse was followed that labelled the Inuit or indigenous seal hunts as ‘good’ while non-indigenous hunts were considered ‘bad’. This stems from several narratives that were, and still are, attached to the terms ‘indigenous’, equating with ‘subsistence’, and ‘non-indigenous’, which in this context equates with ‘commercial’.

Narrating the Inuit subsistence seal hunt

The primary understanding of the subsistence seal hunt relates to it being carried out by indigenous communities that follow primarily self-sustenance incentives. The hunt is therefore perceived as being small-scale and with little commercial intent. Traditional hunting methods are applied which are not located within animal welfare or conservation contexts. This is underlined by the European Commission’s request to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to carry out an assessment on the animal welfare in the seal hunts as one element of the preparatory process. The focus of this assessment, however, were not all applied hunting methods, but merely “the animal welfare aspects of the methods currently being used, particularly non-traditional” (own emphasis; EFSA 2007: 10). The exclusion of Inuit hunts in the EFSA report is further emphasized by the fact that animal welfare
aspects rely on non-conclusive observer reports from primarily the Canadian and Namibian ‘commercial’ seal hunts. This in turn means that while little knowledge exists on the Inuit and other seal hunting communities, no knowledge is produced or made reference to which would equally consider indigenous and non-indigenous seal hunts through an animal welfare lens. This underlines the perceived ‘goodness’ of the Inuit hunts.

Additionally, and rightfully so, Inuit seal hunts are perceived as being an inherent part of the Inuit culture and livelihoods. To this end, and in line with international law – as explained above – EU policy makers did not take Inuit seal hunts under closer scrutiny. The treatment of the Inuit, however, was perceived as paternalistic with backward-oriented connotations. It is thus that prominent Inuit lawyer Aaju Peter (2010: 7) notes: “Inuit are not frozen in time, but must pursue economic opportunities just like everyone else in Canada or Europe.”

Narrating the non-Inuit commercial seal hunt

Contrary to the Inuit seal hunts, no attempts have been made to locate the non-Inuit hunts on the Canadian East Coast into a cultural context. Instead, it has been labelled as inherently bad due to the cruelty of the hunting methods and the primarily commercial incentives for the hunt. However, there are significant parallels between the Inuit and non-Inuit seal hunts and the commercial incentive, meaning the earning of money to be able to sustain family life in remote communities, can be found in both hunts. At the same time, also local processing, food production and seal utilization can be noted (Sellheim 2014).

Instead, the alleged cruelty of the hunt has been repeatedly documented by anti-sealing organizations and videos documenting this claim were used as proof in the preparatory process. In how far an unbiased approach has occurred remains therefore questionable (Sellheim 2013). Given the seemingly low economic contribution to the annual income, the hunts are furthermore considered ‘unnecessary’. However, even if a higher economic yield could be documented, it seems fair to say that the cruelty-claim trumps that of any economic benefit stemming from the hunt. After all, it is no longer considered a legitimate occupation.

Conclusion

While Inuit have experienced some degree of political and legal recognition, non-Inuit sealers, communities and those employed in the processing sector have not been considered during the preparatory process of the EU seal regime nor in the regime itself. Despite the Inuit exemption, Inuit communities have nevertheless been adversely affected by the EU seal regime due to the links between Inuit and non-Inuit pathways of commerce. It comes therefore not as a surprise that also Inuit resisted the adoption of the ban from the very beginning and the lack of knowledge together
with a stereotypical understanding of Arctic livelihoods has led to a regime which does not recognize Inuit communities to a degree that could make an indigenous exemption work efficiently.

At the same time, the same stereotypical understandings as well as an even greater lack of knowledge exist for the non-indigenous, ‘commercial’, seal hunts. Despite this blind spot, the EU seal regime was adopted, taking into account significant adverse effects on sealers, their communities and workers in the processing sector. Only the factual link between seal processors and traders as being the same entity enabled plant workers to be legally recognized before the EU courts.

The EU seal regime and its adoption process have unveiled significant issues of importance for the EU as an Arctic actor. In light of the EU’s aspirations in the Arctic and the will to gain more knowledge on Arctic living conditions and increased communication with Arctic indigenous and non-indigenous communities, the lack of consideration of sealing and processing communities unveils a fundamental problem in the EU’s approach towards the Arctic: the role of value and how livelihoods are perceived. For European policy-makers it seemed, and still seems, contradictory to European values to have a commercial element to the hunt for seals. An open letter of 100 MEPs underlines this (Sellheim 2015b: 11). This contradiction of values thus justifies a neglect of negative impacts of an EU policy on small and ultimately vulnerable communities – both indigenous and non-indigenous.

The amended seal regime, as adopted in September 2015, further underlines the opposition to the commercial element in the seal hunts. As art. 3.5. of the amended basic regulation clarifies: “If there is evidence that a seal hunt is conducted primarily for commercial reasons, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 4a in order to prohibit the placing on the market or limit the quantity that may be placed on the market of seal products resulting from the hunt concerned” (European Parliament 2015). In how far the insertion of animal welfare standards into the Inuit seal hunts can be justified, assessed and monitored, especially in light of the exclusion of ‘traditional’ hunting methods in the EFSA report, remains in the dark.

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The Arctic Council was established “as a high level forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic” (Arctic Council, 1996). The work of the Council, over the past 20 years, offers an interesting and unexplored case study of international boundary management between policy makers, scientific communities and indigenous organizations in the circumpolar region. In fact, by many accounts, the Council’s notable success can be attributed to the production of high quality policy products, including the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2005), the Arctic Human Development Reports (2014; 2004), and the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment Report (2013) – all of which meet the criteria of “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989).

This paper will focus on introducing the concept of the boundary organization and making the case that our understanding of the Arctic Council is enhanced through the application of this analytical frame. In particular, this paper seeks to answer the questions:

- How does the boundary organization concept inform our understanding of the Arctic Council?
- How does this concept inform our understanding of what makes the Arctic Council a credible, salient and legitimate institution in the circumpolar region?

This paper is supported by data collected from September 2014 to March 2015 through 60 in-person, semi-structured interviews with those involved with the Arctic Council and other Arctic institutions and from observing meetings and discussions of those involved in Arctic environmental and sustainable development research and policy.
Boundary Management: The concept

The concept of a “boundary” was first introduced in Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) to refer to how scientists distinguish science from politics, religion and other systems of knowledge (Gieryn 1983). This literature proposes that scientists create and maintain boundaries with other knowledge holders to differentiate how knowledge is generated and to protect their cognitive authority (Gieryn 1995, 1999). This concept was extended within the S&TS literature with the introduction of the concept of boundary work to facilitate an analysis of the interactions between communities of science and policy, which was recognized to be a reality of modern science and policy decision making (Miller 2001, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2015).

The “boundary organization” was introduced to acknowledge institutions that bring together actors from both scientific and political communities. Organizations that internalize the negotiation process that continually takes place between these two very different social worlds and seeks to establish processes and governance mechanisms by which mutual understanding and the co-creation of knowledge can take place. ‘The boundary organization thus gives both the producers and the consumers of research an opportunity to construct the boundary between their enterprises in a way favourable to their own perspectives’ (Guston 2001, 405). Boundary organizations provide important mechanisms for the flow of ideas, concepts, information and skills between social worlds (Fujimura 1992). Furthermore, analyzing the means by which knowledge is co-produced across boundaries has the potential to provide a framework for analyzing an important feature of the policy making process and those governance features that support effective policy-making (Jasanoff 1990).

Guston (1999, 2001) proposes that these types of organizations meet three criteria: 1) they involve actors from both sides of the boundary, 2) they provide an opportunity, and even an incentive, to work across the different social worlds of politics and science, and 3) they maintain distinct lines of responsibility and accountability to their respective social worlds. Boundary organizations do work that is useful to actors on both sides and, as a result of the process they adopt for knowledge creation, they play a distinctive role that actors on either side of the boundary are unlikely to have the credibility or legitimacy to perform unilaterally (Scott, 2000). Boundary organizations gain stability by being accountable and responsive to actors on both sides of the boundary. Through boundary work, both the producers and consumers of research have an opportunity to frame their work in a way that meets their respective needs and interests.

Inherent in the concept of the boundary organization is the idea that the processes and products of boundary work will have an impact on both science and politics. The outputs from these types of organizations can take many forms – assessments, models, reviews, and policy recommendations.
These different products are commonly referred to as boundary objects because they are designed to be used, hold a purpose and maintain an identity in both social worlds (Cash et al., 2003; Guston, 2001; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Clearly the level of impact that boundary work will have on both sides of the boundary will vary. In some cases, boundary objects may be treated as one small contribution in a mountain of information that informs research or policy decision-making; however, at the other end of the continuum, these products may have the ability to alter practices on both sides of the boundary – introducing the idea that boundary organizations may alter not only knowledge, but the actions of stakeholders.

The concepts of boundary work and the boundary organization have been most developed and applied at the domestic level to explore policy areas such as the environment, agriculture and sustainable development in the American context (include citations). At the international and transnational levels, the nature and role of boundary organizations is less developed and has been limited to institutions involved in environmental policy areas – In particular, the IPCC, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the CBD-SBSTTA (Cash 2001; Franks 2010; Hoppe et al. 2013; Koetz et al. 2009, Lee et al. 2014 Miller 2001;).

Miller (2001) argues that the study of boundary organizations at the international level requires a “refocusing” of the concept to consider the complex and dynamic nature of the transnational governance environment in which international boundary organizations must operate. He also argues that is important to consider what this different context means for the role these types of organizations are best positioned to play and the governance features that best support the co-production of knowledge.

The value and relevance of the boundary organization concept to the International Relations literature is still contested. As a heuristic concept, the boundary organization is not seen to provide enhanced explanatory power over established concepts, such as epistemic communities (Adler and Bernstein 2005; Haas 1992), which has provided a leading theory about influence of expert communities on international politics. However, the concept of boundary work appears to have more acceptance as a means to articulate and analyze a function within the policy making process.

In this context, an analysis of a boundary organization is focused on analyzing how an institution is designed to engage different social worlds to facilitate knowledge generation in support of policy making. Furthermore, it provides a lens by which to engage in a normative assessment of how to achieve better policymaking and explore how the governance features of an institution can be best designed to support boundary work. Attention is placed on how an institution is designed to find a
balance between science and policy and how cooperation is facilitated between different actors and social worlds. It places the focus on the organization and its design rather than on actors or networks. For example, Cash et al. (2003) propose that by creating mechanisms that facilitate communication and translation across boundaries, the knowledge generated provides the institution with increased credibility, legitimacy and saliency. For the purposes of this dissertation it is the latter interpretation of the concept that is considered of value to the Arctic Council case study. This framing is directly relevance to the Arctic Council because it provides the explanatory power to understand how the Council works and the means to more carefully assess the past and present effectiveness of the Council.

More recently, the boundary work concept has been used to acknowledge and consider institutions that facilitate the integration of other forms of knowledge -- other social worlds -- such as indigenous traditional knowledge (include citations). These analyses stem from a recognition that multiple social worlds exist to be reconciled and that the co-creation of knowledge and the solutions to the world’s many complex issues requires the ideas, buy in and efforts of many diverse actors. Given the importance placed on the role of indigenous organizations in the Arctic Council, the integration the social worlds of indigenous communities further enhances the potential value of this concept to inform our understanding of how the Arctic Council works.

The Arctic Council as a Boundary Organization

The Arctic Council is a case study that benefits from the explanatory power of the concepts of boundary work and boundary organizations. The application of the boundary work frame highlights some of the unique features of the Council and this concept also provides important insight into how the Arctic Council works. The Arctic Council was designed to meet the classic need to bridge the boundary between science and policy “on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection” (1996). However, from its inception, it was also explicitly tasked with bridging the gap between traditional, state-dominated international relations and the interests and perspectives of the indigenous peoples of the region. In the early years of the Arctic Council’s work, this translated into an implicit need to manage the boundary between Western scientific forms of knowledge and indigenous forms of knowledge simply because of the actors involved and the priorities that the Arctic Council established. More recently, the need to manage the boundary between Western science and indigenous forms of knowledge has become more explicit to the point where, in 2015, the Arctic Council released Recommendations for the Integration of Traditional and Local Knowledge in the Work of the Arctic Council (2015) that specifically recognizes the importance of traditional knowledge in its work and establishes a process for ensuring its place in the projects undertaken by the Arctic Council. In other words, an important governance
A key feature of the Arctic Council is the mechanism it has established to manage the boundaries between technical experts, policy decision-makers and Arctic indigenous peoples (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Managing the boundaries between technical experts, policy decision-makers, and indigenous organizations.

Figure 2. Multiple stages of boundary management within the Arctic Council.

Technical Experts (Arctic and non-Arctic states, academia, NGOs, IGOs)

Arctic Indigenous Peoples (Permanent Participants organizations, NGOs)

Policy Decision-Makers (Arctic states)
Figure 2 seeks to highlight that, in fact, there are multiple boundaries that must be managed at different levels within the Arctic Council. Furthermore, the nature of the boundaries that must be managed vary depending on the policy issue being discussed and its stage in the policy process.

By many accounts, the Arctic Council has exceeded expectations and the Council’s notable success has been attributed to the production of high quality reports that meet the definition of boundary objects (English, 2013; Griffiths, 2011; Lamb, 2012; Spence, 2013). In fact, recent accounts in the academic and popular literature recognize the Arctic Council as the preeminent policy forum in the region. Of course, success and growing attention also prompts discussions and commentary about how the effectiveness of the Arctic Council could be improved. It is evident that that the Arctic Council is facing endogenous and exogenous pressures to change. The following section will consider how the Arctic Council experience informs and further advances our understanding of what makes a boundary organization effective.

**Assessing the Effectiveness of a Boundary Organization**

It is the question of the effectiveness of boundary organizations that Cash et al. systematically explore in their article, *Knowledge Systems for Sustainable Development* (2003). Cash et al’s article begins by proposing that boundary organizations, and the boundary objects that they produce, must have three tightly coupled attributes in order to be effective. First, the work must be *credible* to relevant actors. Secondly, the work of a boundary organization must be *salient*. And finally, the authors emphasize the importance of the *legitimacy* of the organization and the work that it does. This paper will now consider what the Arctic Council experience tells us about how these attributes have been defined.

**Credibility**

In assessing the *credibility* of a boundary organization or its boundary objects, Cash et al. directly link credibility to scientific adequacy; however, using the Arctic Council experience as a case study, it is useful to broaden the measure(s) or sources of credibility to include a link to how a broader spectrum of relevant actors perceive the quality of the products and an organization’s work. For example, in the context of the Arctic Council, the sources of credibility extend beyond a focus on scientific data or analysis to ensure the inclusion of traditional and local perspectives. The Arctic is an interesting region because its indigenous peoples have maintained a strong traditional knowledge base and have fought hard on many policy fronts to have that knowledge recognized and incorporated into policy decision-making process (English, 2013; Griffiths, 2012; Koivurova & Heinämäki, 2006; Lamb, 2012) – from wildlife management, to the changing nature of ice, to assessing the impacts of climate change, or to land and water transportation routes – the region’s
indigenous peoples have thousands of years of knowledge that can be incorporated to lend credibility to policy decision-making in the region. The work done to establish the Arctic Council recognized the importance of including these voices in the process and the knowledge of these peoples in the work that the Council set out to undertake (Griffiths, 2012; Lamb, 2012). This is what led to the special role of permanent participants in the Arctic Council.

Furthermore, in 2013, the Arctic Council announced its intention to establish a Circumpolar Business Forum (Government of Canada, 2013) to ensure that the knowledge and interests of Arctic businesses would also inform the work of the Council. During interviews, those people that conceived of, and supported, the inclusion of business actors consistently took the position that the credibility of the Arctic Council and its work were weakened or brought into question by the absence of business interests and perspectives. Alternatively, others interviewed focused more on how the credibility of the Arctic Council would be enhanced or further strengthened by the inclusion of business. What the Arctic Council experience illustrates is that the source(s) of credibility of a boundary organization can ultimately be defined by a more complex mix of factors than scientific adequacy, including: the issues being addressed, the resulting pools of relevant knowledge (e.g. scientific, indigenous, business), and the actors that see themselves as having the right to assess or comment on the credibility of the organization.

**Saliency**

Cash et al. propose that the saliency of a boundary organization emphasizes that the work produced must be relevant to the needs of decision makers. However, defining salience in this way implies that boundary objects are confined to meeting the articulated or conscious needs of decision makers; whereas, the experience of the Arctic Council would suggest that the flow of influence may not be contained to the articulated needs of decision makers and the flow of influence may be less direct. By many accounts, when the Arctic Council was created in 1996, it was of little interest to the eight Arctic states that committed to its creation (Griffiths, 2012; Lamb, 2010, 2012; Young, 2013). From the perspective of governments, it was a symbolic gesture that was intended to signal a new cooperative working environment in the region at the end of the Cold War and provided a platform to discuss certain specific environmental issues of concern, such as marine pollution. In other words, the Arctic Council was given a mandate to work in the areas of environmental management and sustainable development *before* participating governments seriously recognized the importance of having a transboundary institution to perform this function – decision-makers did not see the saliency of the Arctic Council’s work.
The path that led to the recognized saliency of the Arctic Council was less direct. It was the release of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (2005) and the attention it received from the U.S. media that shot the work of the Arctic Council to global prominence. Scientists in various fora had been sounding the climate change alarm bell for well over a decade with very limited popular (and by extension political) traction; however, the very graphic and credible evidence of climate change that the ACIA provided and the active promotion of this report by the region’s indigenous peoples facilitated a new level of public concern (English, 2013; Young, 2013). It was after the global recognition of the saliency of this Arctic Council product that the Council, and some might go so far as to argue the issue of climate change, was launched onto the radar screens of Arctic government decision-makers. All this to emphasize that the process by which saliency is determined and who has the power to determine what is salient can be more complex – making the transition from knowledge to action more amorphous and also a process that can happen within a boundary organization, but may also draw on actors and influences outside the organization.

**Legitimacy**

The final attribute explored by Cash et al. is *legitimacy*. In their work, the authors focus on the internal process of legitimizing a boundary organization’s work – the perception that the process of generating boundary objects is unbiased, respectful of different values and beliefs, and fairly treats opposing views and interests. The authors focus on how these are important factors to ensure the internal stability of the organization; however, the experience of the Arctic Council highlights that the perceived legitimacy of a boundary organization by external actors can also be an important factor in determining the perceived effectiveness of that organization by its members. In interviews with representatives of Arctic Council states, permanent participants and observers, there was a significant number of references to how the Arctic Council enjoys a unique level of legitimacy because of the meaningful governance role established for the region’s indigenous peoples. This enhanced legitimacy, for many interviewees, is linked to the “moral authority” that the permanent participants hold and lend to the Arctic Council by participating in its work.

Issues of the Arctic Council’s legitimacy were also raised by some interviewees to explain the importance of efforts to include business. In these cases, interviewees focused on the fact that policy actions in the region can have a significant impact on the region’s businesses; therefore, using and integrating the knowledge and considering their interests in the knowledge generation process ultimately supports the success of policy actions. For example, safe shipping policies in the Arctic can focus on standards for ship construction, regulations that guide ship operation, or penalties for negative environmental impacts. All of these are viable policy options from a government perspective; however, business may be able to contribute information to inform these policy options.
that makes some options more attractive, while others may be exposed to by challenging to implement, monitor or enforce.

Again, this suggests that the sources of legitimacy of a boundary organization or a specific boundary object is shaped by a much more complex combination of factors, including the nature the issue, the process by which knowledge is generated and who is involved. Furthermore, it highlights that often actors involved in the Arctic Council look for external validation to confirm the legitimacy of the Council and its work.

Overall, what this brief analysis highlights is that the Arctic Council is perceived as effective in its role and this analysis also confirms that, using broadened definitions, this success is directly linked to its credibility, saliency and legitimacy as a boundary organization. The perceived effectiveness of the Arctic Council helps to explain why the Arctic Council has risen up in the global consciousness as the policy forum in the Arctic region, and why a growing number of non-Arctic states, IGOs and NGOs are knocking at the door to gain access and participate in the Council. However, this success has also increased interest and expectations regarding what the Arctic Council can do. With its growing prominence, the Arctic Council has also faced increasing criticism as a slow, opaque “talk shop.” There are a growing number of calls for the Arctic Council to “grow teeth” and focus on creating and implementing binding policy – the Arctic Council is being pushed to be an organization of action.

Pressures for Action in the Arctic Council

In addition to identifying the relevant attributes of an effective boundary organization, Cash et al. conclude that a boundary organization effectiveness must ultimately be measured based on its ability to influence “the evolution of social responses to public issues” (Cash et al, 2003, 8086) -- In other words, a boundary organization’s ability to provide an effective bridge between the production of knowledge and policy action. This leads the authors to consider the relationship that exists between knowledge and action in boundary organizations. The work by Cash et al. indicates that the attributes of credibility, saliency and legitimacy are tightly coupled and they propose there are trade-offs to be made between these attributes in order to maintain the effectiveness of a boundary organization in fulfilling the role of translating knowledge into action. Ultimately, Cash et al. conclude that knowledge produced through a process that is perceived to be credible, salient, and legitimate is more likely to be influential. As a result, they argue that a boundary organization’s success depends on paying close attention to its boundary management functions, in particular facilitating communication, translation and mediation across boundaries (Cash et al., 2003).

In other words, while the work of Cash et al. clearly demonstrates that these types of organizations can play an important role in effectively linking knowledge to action; questions are also raised about
whether there are limits to the role that a boundary organization can play in policy action. Can the Arctic Council make the shift from decision-shaping to decision-making as a boundary organization? The boundary organization literature emphasizes that the success of boundary organizations depends on “institutionalizing accountability” on both sides of the knowledge-action boundary (Cash et al 2003). By definition, this suggests that actors on either side of a boundary must continue to feel they can justify the Arctic Council’s work and support and feel responsible for the knowledge that is being generated, how it is translated and what it is translated into. In reality, what we see is that efforts to “strengthen” the Arctic Council have weakened the systems that facilitate communication, translation and mediation across the boundaries within the Arctic Council.

Presumably, these recent developments can be addressed by concerted effort to reinvigorate the communication, translation and mediation functions necessary to support effective boundary management. What seems like a more significant hurdle to overcome is reconciling the attributes identified for an effective boundary organization toward measuring the success of the Arctic Council as it is experiencing increasing pressure to be more action-oriented. In particular, how credibility, saliency and legitimacy are defined for boundary organizations places an emphasis on the process for generating knowledge and policy advice. By extension, the measures of effectiveness are process-oriented – who is involved and how? However, in an organization focused heavily on policy action, it becomes necessary to consider outcome-oriented measures of credibility, saliency and legitimacy – What decision was taken? When will it be implemented and by whom?

In fact, the Arctic Council experience, with its increasing focus on action, highlights that other attributes may need to be introduced to assess its effectiveness. For example, the success of the Arctic Council depends on its authority to make and implement policy decisions. The boundary organization literature is silent on considering the importance of authority or how the relevant sources of authority might change in the transition from knowledge generation to action. In the case of the Arctic Council, it is not surprising to observe that pressure to shift to decision-making results in member states assuming a more central place in the discussions. Although other actors in the Arctic have the authority to commit themselves to certain projects or decisions, our Westphalian system means that only states have been vested with the authority to make public policy decisions for their citizens. As a result, in observing Arctic Council meetings, we see less space being created for boundary negotiation and mediation. The legitimacy of a policy decision is not defined by shared knowledge or co-creation. A state must focus its attention on ensuring that the commitment fits within its existing legislative and policy framework or assess the consequences of making a transboundary commitment that will result in domestic changes that may require legislative approval.
For example, in the process of preparing the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), the moral or technical legitimacy and credibility that indigenous and scientific representatives contribute to the Arctic Council and its work becomes less relevant; therefore, for particular actions or decisions, there is evidence of states seeking to contain the nature or level of boundary negotiation and in some cases they are not open to any boundary negotiation. For example, in 2013 the Arctic Council began work on black carbon emissions standards. It is not insignificant that states agreed to initiate this discussion; however, it is important to note the careful language used and deference that ultimately needed to be showed to officials representing member states in the negotiation of this language. There is no question that science and indigenous interests were critical in bringing this issue to the table; however, the authority of states and their ultimate responsibility to deliver on the commitments that were made meant that there was little room for negotiation of the substance.

Guston (2001) points out that boundary objects by definition require the consent of actors on both sides of a boundary. By extension, I would argue that the Arctic Council can only maintain the credibility, saliency and legitimacy assumed by a boundary organization as long as actors on each side of the existing boundaries consent to participate in its work and continue to provide their support. This is what instils the organization with legitimacy and credibility. What this suggests is that the pressure for action that the Arctic Council is facing may push it away from its roots as a boundary organization. The decision to maintain processes of boundary communication, translation and mediation in an action-oriented Arctic Council now rests heavily with Arctic states, which means that they have the ability to determine what issues and when in the process other actors can play a meaningful role. The balance of power has shifted significantly and there are early signs that, in some cases, this is making it hard for technical experts and indigenous organizations to maintain the lines of responsibility and accountability to their respective social worlds.

Furthermore, if we consider those actors that have the authority to make and implement policy decisions, non-Arctic states and businesses have the potential to assume an elevated position in the work of the Arctic Council. In the lead up to the U.S. Chairmanship, the United States and other Arctic States consistently called on observer states to demonstrate their support for Arctic Council work by taking appropriate actions domestically and by supporting relevant international laws and policies – recent efforts to get Arctic Council observer states to support a fishing ban in Arctic international waters being a case in point. Those businesses involved in the recently formed Arctic Economic Council are also very aware of the potential authority they hold collectively to establish and enforce standards within their respective industries – whether it is resource extraction, transportation or tourism. Several interviewees from this emerging group proposed that under the
right conditions and with the appropriate opportunities to influence Arctic policy that they would be willing to draw on that authority to support the policy decisions of the Arctic Council.

Conclusion

Although the analysis of one case, the Arctic Council, cannot conclusively confirm what the limits are to the role that boundary organizations can play in policy action, it does suggest that a boundary organization that is pushed towards policy action will need to consider the impact on the relevant sources of credibility, saliency and legitimacy and assess what other governance attributes, such as authority, may be relevant to measure the organizations effectiveness. Furthermore, it is reasonable to point out that the pressures the Arctic Council is experiencing are applicable to other regions and policy areas. This would suggest that further research to consider the generalizability of this analysis to other organizations could be a valuable contribution to the boundary organization literature.

A future line of inquiry that could benefit the Arctic region is to come back to an observation by Cash et al. that knowledge systems can be supported by multiple organizations; therefore, perhaps it is more useful to focus on the boundary management functions (2003, p. 8090). This logic could be extended to encourage analysis of the broader network of institutions in the Arctic that support the full policy cycle – from policy development to implementation, monitoring, enforcement and evaluation. What other fora in the region provide spaces for boundary management or policy implementation? How does this network of institutions work together (or not) to support environmental management and sustainable development? This is another rich area for future research that could further advance the boundary organization literature.

References


1st Plenary: Cultural heritage and human resources as part of ‘industrial civilization’ - case studies of para-diplomacy and Indigenous / local knowledge

Rapporteur: Nikolas Sellheim, PhD Candidate, University of Lapland

In the first plenary of the Trans-Arctic Agenda, 6 presentations on the theme “Cultural heritage and human resources as part of ‘industrial civilization’ - case studies of para-diplomacy and Indigenous / local knowledge” were heard. The first presentation by Maria Ackrén focused on the Thule airbase and particularly the role it could have economically and therefore politically for Greenland. A particular note of interest relates to the ultimately unsuccessful ‘Project Iceworm’ in which the US aimed to test the feasibility of a nuclear missile site under the ice, but which was spoiled by changing ice conditions.

The second presentation by Andrian Vlakhov dealt with tourism in Svalbard and what different strategies were taken by Russian and Norway to deal with the unprofitability of mining. Especially the role of tourism as having the potential to be a blessing as well as a curse for the socio-ecological constructs on Svalbard needs to be highlighted.

The third presentation was by Kristinn Schramm on different narratives on the coast, as a provider of building material in the form of driftwood, as a sphere of mystery and even fear, unravelling different gender perspectives on the coast. Schramm concluded that “whatever washes ashore has local and global significance in representation of the north and its people.”

During the discussions it was asked about the degree of cooperation between Russia and Norway in Svalbard to overcome the difficulties in the mining sector. Vlakhov responded that indeed cooperation is the key, but the difficult political situation and the bad images produced of both countries in the respective national media has negatively affected cooperation. With regard to so-called ‘backlash tourism,’ meaning tourism becoming a driving economic force, for instance in Longyearbyen, tourism-related issues constitute already 1/3 of the work force. And although also in Barentsburg tourism has developed late, there are tendencies for similar developments.

Ackrén showed, as regards the impacts of forced relocation of Greenlanders during the construction of the airbase, that these were drastic: people lost their hunting and fishing grounds and had to completely adapt to a new environment. Regarding the degree to which the Thule airbase plays a
role in the sovereignty debate, it is rather part of economic debates, such as the Greenlandic service providers in Thule, rather than the ‘hot’ sovereignty debate as such but that it is a question which still occupies politicians.

Questions for Schramm were manifold, yet the role of whales needs highlighting: whaling is closely related to the Icelandic shore and constitutes an internationalisation of Iceland, e.g. through the establishment of illegal whaling stations on the Icelandic shore, drastically impacting the cultural environment. Also the current debate links international discourse with local culture. Schramm showed how differently strategies by e.g. Greenpeace have been: they fought to warn Icelanders that if they continue whaling tourists would be driven away. Now whale meat is being presented to tourists as representing Icelandic heritage and tradition. Conservation groups thus attempt to make tourists stop eating whale so Icelanders stop hunting them.

The second half of the first plenary was opened by Tok Thompson who presented the importance of salmon for Alaska natives. Thompson showed that salmon constitutes a lifeline for them. But there are numerous threats putting the sustainability of the salmon and thus the sustainability of Alaskan native cultures at risk. They are only able to exist as long as the salmon returns to its rivers.

Laura Olsén showed how the Sámi in the Nordic countries struggle with different security threats. Olsén reminded that generally the situation in the Sámi homeland is good, but that in situ research unveils difficulties in implementing Sámi rights or increasing exploitation of natural resources in the Sámi homeland.

The final presentation was given by Heather Nicol who engaged in a discussion on the politicisation of sustainable development and in how far sovereignty issues and economic development may contradict each other. She pointed out how governmental control in essence decreases by strengthening neoliberal forces and weakening co-management bodies.

During the discussions Olsén clarified that it is rather political than legal avenues that Sámi pursue in order to impact and change current legislation. Thompson remarked that in Alaska it is the other way round although the playing field is inherently unjust because of the power of the different stakeholders and litigants. Thompson further remarked that although there is a divide between Alaskan natives as to the benefits of the industry, in general there is a consensus amongst all natives that native cultures are more likely to sustain for another 1,000 years than the capitalist model. No corporation would plan ahead for a 1,000 years.

Nicol exposed the flawed logic of the conservative’s decision-making in the Arctic as it is creating conditions of loss of control by creating a corporate landscape. She in return asked: How can they get
control back if they’re creating conditions for even greater lack of control? She left on a more positive note stating that if the conservative government does continue the continuance of a broken system will be seen. If a new government comes the sustainable development debate is likely to increase.
2nd Plenary: Representation of Arctic stakeholders and their internal communication

Rapporteurs: Laura Olsén, PhD Candidate, University of Lapland / Arctic Centre; and Andrian Vlakhov, PhD Candidate, European University at St. Petersburg

The Second Plenary session on the 15th of October was chaired by Alyson Bailes. This session concentrated on non-state actors in the Arctic, which are extremely important to take into consideration while formulating the politics of the region. In this session there were three presentations given by Ásđur H Ingólfsdóttir, Sigurjón Baldur Hafsteinsson and Nikolas Sellheim.

Ms. Ingólfsdóttir was first to give her presentation Arctic Voices: The relevance of local stories for a global problem, which concentrated on her ongoing research. With her research Ms. Ingólfsdóttir wants to enhance the link between global issues and local consequences. She aims to bring a bottom-up feminist approach to the discussions concerning climate change. She claimed that current dominant political discussions dealing with climate change concentrate on technical information and are often based on so-called “masculine” and hard values.

Climate change is often raised up as a security threat at the global level, but according to Ms. Ingólfsdóttir this is not always the case at the local level. She referred to her field-work trip in Iceland which shows that hardly any of the interviewed locals mentioned climate change as a threat. Instead, more concrete issues were raised up among her informants. In the end Ms. Ingólfsdóttir emphasized that if this bottom-up approach was taken into consideration, it would definitely change dominant narratives in discussions dealing with climate change issues. During the discussions Ms. Ingólfsdóttir got many questions about her research dealing with her theoretical premises and possible risks that the feminist approach might set for her research.

The second speaker of the session was Mr. Hafsteinsson. His presentation: The Mandate of Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (APTN) dealt with indigenous people’s television
network in Canada. Mr. Hafsteinsson sees media and television as a good channel to bring up local voices. He claimed that nowadays the role of NGO’s and non-state actors is increasing and their activities affect to the global governance and also national level governance for example, in this case, by forcing to take indigenous peoples in consideration.

In his presentation Mr. Hafsteinsson introduced us an Aboriginal peoples television network (APTN), which could be a great channel to enhance democracy, but framework for its’ actions is defined by the national television network CRTC. This in turn affects negatively to APTN’s possibilities to have those positive impacts that it could have for instance in keeping aboriginal culture alive.

The third presentation Recognition of Arctic Communities in the EU seal regime was given by Nikolas Sellheim. Mr. Sellheim spoke about EU’s seal regime by which he refers to EU’s regulation that bans trade in all seal products and to its implementation. He concentrated on the impacts of this regime to the local Arctic Communities. In his presentation Mr. Sellheim emphasized especially those negative impacts that this regime has had for local traditional livelihoods for both indigenous and non-indigenous people.

In many cases it seems that the importance of animal welfare overcomes the wellbeing of human beings. While formulating this regime it was not clearly fully understood what it would mean in practice for local’s livelihoods and in this case study for people in Newfoundland. However, according to Mr. Sellheim indigenous peoples’ seal hunt is not seen as bad as non-indigenous people’s commercial seal hunting, but by reducing the trade with non-indigenous people, EU indirectly hinders also the position of seal hunters who are indigenous people.

Also Mr. Hafsteinsson’s and Mr. Sellheim’s presentations evoked a lot of conversation and interesting questions rose up such as a question concerning the lack of maximum sustainable yield when it comes to seals.

The second part of the session continued the animated discussion of various encounters found in the Arctic, both on global and local level. There were three highly relevant presentations in this session, delivered by Dearbhla Doyle, Marc Lanteigne and Malgorzata Smieszek. It should be noted that all these presentations had deep connection to one another and also to other presentations of the day,
indicating that the problems discussed during the session are both important and topical for the Arctic research in general.

The first presentation of the session, delivered by Dearbhla Doyle, EEAS Arctic Representative, contained a description of the official framework of the European Union policies in the Arctic. It featured a good overview of the steps already taken by the Union in various areas and a thorough description of programs undertaken and opportunities offered by the EU. Ms. Doyle noted the importance of the EU’s focus on the challenges that Arctic is facing, with the most emphasis on climate change, environmental pollution and resources extraction.

It should be also noted that the EU clearly aims to be coherent in its strategies, trying to conform to the Union’s common policies in other areas and regions, focusing on the sustainable development of the Arctic. Another interesting point of Dearbhla’s presentation is that a clear Arctic strategy it so be developed, and it’s highly important that multiple actors are to be listened to — at least presumably — when developing this strategy (including NGOs, indigenous groups, local communities, which was also reflected upon in the discussion). The general framework of the EU Arctic policy was coined by Ms. Doyle as “evolution, not revolution”, with notable emphasis on research and innovation and also on international cooperation.

The second presentation by Marc Lanteigne from NUPI dealt with the construction and deconstruction of the Chinese Arctic identity. Marc has pointed out that the identity of China as the “Near-Arctic state” is obviously being constructed by conscious and deliberate steps taken by various actors: government, business, science etc. He has then outlined three important aspects of the identity-building for China, these being the science diplomacy, economic issues, and legal and organizational aspects. Mr. Lanteigne has also elaborated on the role of climate change for China and the development of resource extraction; he noted that these are global processes affecting the Chinese policies, and China itself also affects the global development.

The Arctic identity of China, to Marc’s opinion, is being constructed not only by itself but by other actors as well. Answering Alyson Bailes’s remark, he emphasized that China should be taken into account in the long-term planning, leaving the question whether China will want a new role in the Arctic open.

The third presentation delivered by Malgorzata Smieszek from the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland focused on the Arctic Council chairmanship. Malgorzata has provided a useful insight into the theoretical background on decision-making, collective action and formal leadership, and presented a thorough analysis of possible failures and ways of avoiding them. The important factors of these processes include the design of the institution, formal and informal rules, and other issues.
This theoretical background was applied to the real situation — the Arctic Council Chairmanship. The talk featured a historical analysis of the development of the chairmanship and the approaches used by different chairs of the AC. Ms. Smieszek also presented an insight into the future, attempting to forecast what can be the possible path for the development of these processes during the US chairmanship in the AC.

In general, the overarching thing which seems to be crucial for this discussion is the multitude of voices found in the Arctic and beyond its boundaries. This can be found in all the presentation of the session: Ms. Doyle has specifically emphasized that the EU is going to take all the possible actors into account, listening to what they have to say and what interests they have, especially the local and indigenous communities mentioned by Alexandra Melinkovitch in her question. Mr. Lanteigne has highlighted how the different actors present their own opinions concerning the Arctic issues (including China, Russia, Arctic Coastal States, other Asian states etc., which was also brought up in the question about negative attitudes to Chinese development, and in the question about the manifold Russian-Chinese relations involving their cultural aspect). Ms. Smieszek has analyzed how the Arctic Council serves as a playground for discussing various actors’ interests, how these interest can collide and interact and how different actors learn to listen to each other and negotiate these issues.

Such emphasis put on the multitude of voices links this session with its first part, where it was discussed how the voices of different communities are being heard (or not heard) in the public and political discourse. This also creates links between the session and the general research question of the forum: how do the various stakeholders participate in the building of the Arctic futures, and how does this building of the futures influence the other actors in the region. There are multiple actors directly affected by the results of the global processes happening in the Arctic; and on every level of the Arctic development, one can hear the voices of these actors. It seems that they ought to be not only heard but also carefully listened to by both policy-makers and researchers.
3rd Plenary: The interplay between science diplomacy, material and immaterial values: How can the Arctic be a space for peace, sustainability and innovation?

Rapporteur: Jennifer Spence, PhD Candidate, Carleton University

This final plenary session, chaired by Kristinn Schram, built effectively on the first two sessions by looking at the broader Arctic and its place as a case study, a model and even a global metaphor for regional governance. The plenary brought together five presenters that introduced issues and questions about the state of Arctic governance and the dynamic environment stakeholders must navigate.

The first presentation by Teemu Polosaari set out to explore the “Arctic Paradox.” He pointed to a growing literature that establishes a connection between climate change and increasing conflict. He introduced the puzzle that the Arctic is experiencing some of the greatest impacts of climate change and yet there has not been conflict. He proposed that this can be partly explained by the fact that the region enjoys a strong history of negative peace through a system of governance and a tradition of cooperation that began in the early 1990s. Palosaari went on to propose that evidence of positive peace is more challenging to confirm given the human and environmental security concerns that currently face the region. As a result of the peace that the Arctic enjoys, the effects of ongoing climate change in the region leads to a potential for more development, which in turn will generate more climate change – a self-perpetuating cycle. This, of course, raises questions about what should be done with the resources that become available.

In this context, Palosaari proposes that the framing of the issues, or the storyline adopted, brings out different ethical undertones, which translate into different approaches to solving the Arctic paradox. For example, is stopping access to resources framed as a “moratorium” or “mummification”? Is allowing access to the resources framed as the “new north” or “BPing the Arctic”? Palosaari concludes that the Arctic Paradox must therefore be resolved hand-in-hand with a systematic review of global climate change ethics.

Robert Wheelerburg’s presentation provided an equally thought provoking look at who owns traditional knowledge. In order to tackle this question, he began by proposing that there are clear
examples of where traditional knowledge has been or has the potential to be important, including for global health issues like cancer. However, Wheelerburg then demonstrates the magnitude of the challenge of answering this question. He begins with a recognition that what traditional knowledge is and who produces it has not been clearly defined. He illustrates this issue using the Arctic as a case in point, where the term traditional knowledge is commonly used interchangeably with indigenous knowledge and the knowledge of the original inhabitants. Not only are none of these terms defined, it raises questions about the value of the knowledge of people who live in the Arctic who are “non-original,” “non-traditional” or “non-indigenous.”

Wheelerburg then turned his attention to the systems in place to protect intellectual property globally. He demonstrated that the processes for establishing intellectual property rights are highly complex and technical, including tools such as patents, copyright, and trademarks. Furthermore, these systems have been designed to protect commercial and privately owned intellectual property, which is poorly aligned with most forms of traditional knowledge that is communally held. Wheelerburg concludes by recommending that more work is needed to better define traditional knowledge and develop protocols for its use.

The third presentation by Rasmus Bertelsen focused on the role of science diplomacy in the Arctic. He began by arguing that we are currently living in a period of power transition as some states become less powerful and others become more powerful. He focused specifically on the shift in power taking place between the United States and China. He suggested that these periods of power transition can be very dangerous moments in history and they can often generate conflict. He proposed that the cooperative nature of the governance in the Arctic offers alternatives approaches that could serve to inform a peaceful transition of power.

Bertelsen proposed that the place that the Arctic plays in the globe is becoming a more prominent area of study, which is supported by initiatives such as the GlobalArctic Project. In this context, he argued that science in the Arctic plays an important role in managing the power transition that is taking place. Whereas direct investment in the Arctic by China is often met with suspicion; scientific engagement is welcomed and serves to establish more harmonious relationships. In particular, he considered how science enables Arctic communities to understand global interests (Global/Arctic Knowledge), facilitates the outside world’s understanding the Arctic (Global/Arctic Knowledge), and is used to build shared knowledge between communities inside and outside the Arctic (Global/Arctic Knowledge).

Egill Þór Níelsson was the fourth presenter and he also considered the importance of scientific diplomacy through an analysis of Iceland-China scientific cooperation. Níelsson indicated that
science has always been an important factor in the Arctic (in comparison with business) because science offers outside stakeholders a legitimate means to engage in the Arctic. He pointed out that 60% of the world’s population is in Asia, while the Arctic has very few people. He encouraged us to consider what this means for how the Arctic is perceived from a Chinese perspective. Nielsson then went on to analyze China-Iceland Arctic cooperation, which has been very active since 2011. He emphasized that there is a continuity to the scientific partnerships that have been developed and the projects being undertaken are often extremely practical and concrete. He proposed that these partnerships serve as a model for constructive cooperation on Arctic issues irrespective of the stakeholders (inside-out/big-small). Scientific cooperation provides an important means for information sharing and cultural exchange that enables productive relationships.

The session concluded with a final presentation by Lassi Heininen, where he considered the role of the scientific community in the Arctic. He argued that it is important to recognize the subjectivity of science and the active role that this community has played in Arctic high stability. Heininen emphasized that the scientific community is not an observer in the Arctic, rather this community is an active participant that plays an important role in the region’s governance. He pointed out that there are many soft ways that science can influence policy and it is important that the maintenance of peace in the Arctic not be left to politicians. Heininen observed that the post-cold war era has now come to a close and we can see a shift from regionalism to the internationalization of the Arctic. In this context, he argued that a classical geopolitical analysis is too narrow to understand the dynamics at play and he proposed that the approach of the GlobalArctic could provide new methods to understand the region. This new analytical frame provides a space for non-state actors and stakeholders from outside the region. It emphasizes the social relevance of science, which promotes and strengthens inter- and trans-disciplinary research between a diverse set of stakeholders. He proposed that the Arctic offers an important case study for governance and security because of the high stability it has maintained, while facing dramatic and urgent change.
Appendices

Appendix 1. Scientific Highlights of the Discussions in the Seminar

- An important precondition for, whether it is possible of slowing down and stopping fossil fuel-based development, particularly when it comes to offshore-drilling, is to redefine cultural heritage, including Indigenous / local (environmental) knowledge, and ‘paradiplomacy’, as part of ‘industrial civilization’. It should also be included ‘sustainable development’, which has lost a part of its credibility as being interpreted as synonymous with economic growth. Instead ‘resilience’ is more valid and flexible meaning situations where institutions are capable of learning and fixing problems by themselves as problems emerge;

- There are multiple actors, including extremely important non-state local and regional ones (e.g., the scientific community), directly affected by the results of regional and global processes happening in the Arctic. On every level of the Arctic development, one can hear the voices of these actors, and this multitude of voices found in the Arctic and beyond is crucial. The question is how the voices of different communities are being heard, or not heard, in the public and political discussions. As well as, how do the various stakeholders, such as scholars and scientists, participate in the building of the Arctic futures, and how does this building influence the other actors in the region. It seems that various stakeholders ought to be not only heard, but also carefully listened to by both policy-makers and researchers, and thus, they will participate in the future building;

- It is important, even critical, to maintain and further develop the interplay between science and politics, that between scientific knowledge and Indigenous / local knowledge, as well as the interplay between material and immaterial things and values. This supports and promotes high political stability in the Arctic, which is beneficial for science and academia. And other way round, geopolitical stability is a “precondition for sustaining Arctic research”, as the Toyama Conference Statement (2015) states. Following from this, an open trans-discipline and inter-sectoral dialogue, where participants focus on issues, are committed to inclusivity and engage each other is valid and valuable, when there are grand challenges and wicked problems. Early career scientists, such as the NRF Young Researchers, and students are potential forerunners to apply this discourse and academic behaving, which is not necessarily new per se but much needed. Here the Arctic with high political stability can be (re)defined, or interpreted as a common ground or model for (peaceful) international relations, and a global metaphor for (environmental / human) security and regional governance.
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