Arctic Strategies and Policies

Inventory and Comparative Study

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Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study

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Introduction

In the early twenty-first century international attention and global interest in the northernmost regions of the globe are increasing, at the same time the geo-strategic importance of the Arctic is growing. Since the end of the Cold War international northern cooperation - both between the Arctic states and between them and non-state actors - has become more institutionalized and dynamic. On one hand there is multilateral international cooperation within the Arctic Council as well as cooperation with and between indigenous peoples’ organizations, other international organizations and forums, in addition to bilateral inter-state relations. On the other hand, cooperation is functional within certain fields, for example, between academic institutions on higher education, civilian organizations on environmental protection, and civil societies on regional development and culture.

The circumpolar North is changing rapidly with respect to environmental, geo-economic and geopolitical terms. Among the more relevant indicators of such change are those of climate change, the importance of energy security, the increased utilization of energy resources and related transport, and the possibility of new global sea routes. All eight Arctic states – Canada, Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA – are responding to these changes by (re)defining their northern policies and interests nationally, as well as their position and role in the Arctic region and northern cooperation. After Sweden launched its strategy for policy in the Arctic region in May 2011 all of them have adopted their specific national arctic strategies and policy papers, or a draft thereof. Interestingly, The Kingdom of Denmark launched its Strategy for the Arctic 2011 - 2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011), including Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, in August 2011.

With this in mind, it would be politically relevant and scientifically interesting to analyze the geopolitical situation and distinguish influential indicators, by indentifying key factors and dynamics, as well as mapping relationships between indicators. Furthermore, it is relevant to study the Arctic states and their policies, and to explore their changing position in a globalized world where the role of the Arctic has become increasingly important in world politics. Moreover, a careful analysis of the interrelations between the Arctic states and other important international actors, particularly Northern indigenous peoples’ organizations, and those between the Arctic interests, agendas and objectives, would be essential for such a study. Thus on one hand, an in-depth scientific multi- or interdisciplinary research effort, and the ability to transform scientific knowledge into decision-making is required (e.g. Segerståhl 2008). On the other hand, an open and issue-oriented dialogue between members of the research community and a wide range of stakeholders is needed, as is the creation of knowledge-based networks or ‘epistemic communities’ (e.g. Heininen 2008). This could be achieved by observing the accumulated experience such as in the work of the Arctic Council and its working groups; the processes of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR). Other examples would be those of the Arctic Parliamentarians and its conferences as well as in the open assemblies of the Northern Research Forum

The Northern Research Forum (NRF) and the University of the Arctic (UArctic) have put forth a tentative proposal to initiate a project concerning an “Inventory and Assessment on Arctic and Northern policies, and the Interplay between Science and Politics in Northern Issues” (see Tentative draft of November 2009). Such a project would be a (modest) step in support of the ambitious efforts mentioned above. Initially this would require the cooperation of the NRF, the UArctic and the Standing Committee for Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) - all of which have accepted the principle idea - but would later, hopefully, include both the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) and the International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA). One way of implementing this idea

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1 See also the tentative Implementation Plan on “Social Impact Assessment of Arctic Science” based on the work of ISCAPP WG11 – Arctic Science in the Public Interest which has been produced in cooperation between the NRF and the University of the Arctic (UArctic).
would be by organising issue specific joint sessions in conferences and other meetings of the Arctic Parliamentarians or those of the University of the Arctic, as well as in the Open Assemblies of the NRF. Furthermore, the joint Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security of the UArctic and the NRF would act as a springboard or scientific advisory board, and the Standing Committee for Arctic Parliamentarians as a political advisory board for this kind of project.

A logical first step toward a comprehensive study would be an inventory and comparative analysis of the strategies, policies and agendas of the Arctic states regarding the Arctic. Consequently, this paper presents such an inventory on, and comparative study of, the national arctic / northern strategies and policies, and priorities / priority areas and policy objectives of of the Arctic states as well as the emerging Arctic policy of the European Union; a draft version of this (Heininen 2011) was presented to the Standing Committee for Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in February 2011 in Tromsø, Norway. Were there to be enough interest and (financial) support, this could be followed through with, for example, an inventory on, and assessment of, policies and agendas of of the Arctic states as well as the emerging Arctic policy of Indigenous peoples’ organizations and other Arctic actors. Another method could include a survey and assessment of the interplay between science and politics in northern cooperation and policies, possibly including recommendations on how to further promote and strengthen such interplay.

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2 Like, for example, the 6th Open Assembly of the Northern Research Forum, which took place in Hveragerði, Iceland in September 2011.

3 Borlase pulled together a first draft of summaries of the strategies of Canada and Denmark/Greenland, and the 2006 Strategy of Norway (see also Borlase 2010), and Gunnarsson contributed a translation of the Icelandic Report into English.
Background

In the early twenty-first century international attention in the northernmost regions of the globe is increasing, at the same time the geo-strategic importance of the Arctic is growing (e.g. Heininen 2010a). Since the end of the Cold War international northern cooperation - largely through multilateral relations within the Arctic Council and between indigenous peoples’ organizations but also functionally between academic institutions on higher education, civilian organizations on environmental protection, and civil societies on regional development and culture, as well as other international organizations and forums - has become more institutionalized and dynamic. As a result there is increasing circumpolar cooperation amongst indigenous peoples’ organizations and renewed region-building with states as major actors. A new kind of relationship between the Arctic region and the outside world is emerging (Heininen 2004; also Östreng 1999). Consequently, the region is stable and peaceful without armed conflicts or the likelihood thereof.

In the Circumpolar north there are, however, also geopolitical and economic realities which correspond to real changes in the Arctic; the resource-rich region is under pressure for increasing utilization of its energy resources, as historically it has been for fish stocks and marine mammals. There are land claims by northern indigenous peoples which are linked to debates and conflicts over ownership and access. Its northern seas are the subject of maritime border disputes, particularly the boundaries between exclusive economic zones (EEZ) demarcating the continental shelves of the littoral states. These are subject to legal rights of the littoral states as posited by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for the establishment of exclusive economic zones, and for making submissions for sovereign rights to resources beyond exclusive economic zones.

Furthermore, there are two important perspectives that deserve more attention and enable us to approach arctic geopolitics beyond the familiar terms of conflict and cooperation, but which hinge to a large extent on the Arctic states and their arctic policies (Heininen 2010b). First, a significant and rapid environmental, geo-economic and geopolitical change has occurred in the Arctic. Among relevant indicators of this change are on one hand, globalization and global changes, particularly climate change, and on the other hand, the strategic importance of energy security, and consequently, an increase in utilization of oil and natural gas resources and related transport, as well as the potential for new global sea routes. However, due to the multifunctional nature of these changes and the resulting complex situation it is neither entirely clear what other indicators may exist, nor what is the specific nature of interrelations between these and the more obvious ones.

Admittedly climate change - with its severe impacts precipitating physical change such as the increased melting of sea ice and collapses of infrastructure in areas of permafrost - adds to the growing level of uncertainty that contributes to the vulnerability of the Arctic region. The severe socio-economic impacts of climate change endanger both environmental and human security as well as posing questions about the state sovereignty in Canada and Russia. Furthermore, rich energy resources of the Arctic, options to them, and highly potential global sea routes attract both the Arctic states and major powers from outside the region; these include China and South Korea in Asia, France and Germany in Europe and the European Union as a whole, all of which are already actively exploring their policy options for the Arctic.

Second, without a doubt the geo-strategic importance of the Arctic in world politics and the globalized world economy is increasing, and the region is playing a more important role. This is largely due to the highly strategic position of the region and continuing military-strategic importance to the major nuclear powers, the growing international interest in its energy resources and associated financial instruments, and the potential value of new

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4 Among potential key indicators and factors of change might be, an emphasis of state sovereignty and national security (particularly by littoral states), (new) options for utilization of natural resources on the shelf of the Arctic Ocean (by UNCLOS), a need of more advanced technology and different knowledge(s), (emerging) global environmental problems and fragmentation of international cooperation.
trans-Arctic global sea routes. Trans-Arctic navigation is becoming more accessible, not least the Northern Sea Route. This development mobilises a range of international interests positioning themselves in new ways around navigation and environmental issues. Furthermore, the region’s reputation of being a scientific ‘laboratory’ or ‘workshop for research’ amplifies the attention given to the environment and climate change, for example by the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

All of these factors above have placed the Arctic squarely on the world map. However, beyond these geo-strategic interests, knowledge practices and their implicit values, there is also an alternative point of view saying that the Arctic plays an important role in world politics because of its diverse natural and cultural environment, i.e. indigenous peoples (e.g. Heininen 2010b). This comes with the growing realisation that arctic ecosystems make a major contribution to biodiversity on Earth – the familiar idea of the Arctic as a barren wasteland is now discredited. This new epistemological attention to the Arctic is reflected to some extent in innovations in political and legal arrangements as the Arctic Human Development Report (2004, 229-242) has pointed out in its major findings. Finally, the region is becoming a ‘workshop’ for implementing and studying the interplay between knowledge(s), and that between science and politics.

Despite growing global strategic importance, the severe impacts of climate change endangering both environmental and human security or posing questions about state sovereignty, let us not forget that this region is in no way terra nullius. To the contrary, its territories are subject to national sovereignty with fixed national borders; most maritime boundaries have been agreed upon. Furthermore, within the region there is a considerably dynamic and institutionalized cooperation between states, with the Arctic Council being the most important soft-law instrument (e.g. Kivurova 2009). Recently there have been new additional arrangements of intergovernmental cooperation, such as the ministerial meetings of the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean. Finally, the Arctic states are still the major actors of the region and are a crucial source of regional political and social stability. This is achieved with intergovernmental cooperation through channels that do not significantly impinge on national sovereignty or strategic interests.

Indeed, there are several intergovernmental political organizations where the Arctic states are members. Among the most relevant ones are: The United Nations - all eight states are members; The European Union – Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members (Iceland has started the accession talks with the Union); The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the USA are members; The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) – all the Arctic states are involved, the NATO member-states as allies and the others as partner countries; Group7/8/20 – Canada and the USA are members of G7, these two and Russia are members of G8, and these three and the EU are members of G20; and The International Maritime Organization (IMO) - all the Arctic states are members with the Faroe Islands an associate member (see Table 1).

Here the European Union’s position as well as its policy is particularly interesting, since the Union “is inextricably tied to the Arctic Region ...by a unique combination of history, geography, economy and scientific achievements. Three Member States – Denmark (Greenland), Finland and Sweden – have territories in the Arctic. Two other Arctic states – Iceland and Norway – are members of the European Economic Area. Canada, Russia and the United States are strategic partners of the EU.” (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 2). Furthermore, Iceland, Norway and Russia are party to the EU’s Northern Dimension along with the Union, and Greenland has the status of Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union. Finally, Iceland has started its accession talks with the Union.

There are also intergovernmental associations and areas of economic integration, for the promotion of free trade, which are present and influential in the Arctic region: The European Economic Area (EEA) – Iceland and Norway, and the EU and its member-states are the parties; The European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) – Iceland and Norway are members; and The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) - Canada and the USA are members (see Table 2).

The Arctic states are also members in several regional, intergovernmental organizations and involved in regional cooperative forums or arrangements. Among those are, first of all: The Arctic Council (AC) (and its predecessor the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, AEPS) - all eight Arctic states are members, and through Denmark both Greenland and the Faroe Islands are involved; the ministerial meetings of the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean (Iilulissat) – Canada, Denmark and Greenland, Norway, Russia and the USA have attended these meetings; The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) – all the Arctic states are members; The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) as well as The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) – the European Arctic states and the EU are members; The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCMs) – the five Nordic countries, and Greenland and the Faroe Islands are members; and the EU’s Northern Dimension – Iceland, Norway and Russia, and the EU are parties (through the Union the EU member-states are involved), and Greenland through the ND Arctic Window6 (see Table 3).

Here the Nordic Council of Ministers is structurally interesting, since not only the five Nordic states are members, but Greenland and the Faroe Islands (as well as the Åland Islands) are also institutionally involved in the cooperation, in their status of autonomous regions.

In addition to these intergovernmental organizations there are also Arctic-relevant international agreements and treaties which the Arctic states have signed and ratified. Among those are: The United Nation’s Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) - all the eight states except the USA have ratified the Convention; The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention of 1972) – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the USA are parties to the Convention; The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) - all the Arctic states have ratified the Convention; The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) – all the Arctic states, except Russia and the USA have ratified the Convention (Denmark has ratified it “with a territorial exclusion in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland”); The Kyoto Protocol – all the Arctic states, except the USA, have ratified the Protocol (Denmark with the territorial exclusion of the Faroe Islands); The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) – all the Arctic states, except Iceland, are members of the Treaty; Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA are consultative members, and Norway has made claims on the territory; and The International Whaling Commission (IWC) – all the Arctic states are members, except Canada (see Table 4).

Of particular importance is the UNCLOS convention which all eight Arctic states have signed; all except the USA have ratified the convention. There are other additional international agreements or treaties and bodies dealing with the Arctic region. For example, the ILO Convention 169 – ratified by Denmark and Norway; The International Treaty on Spitzbergen - all Arctic states are members; The International Agreement on Polar Bears – Canada, Denmark on behalf of Greenland, Norway (because of Svalbard), Russia and the USA on behalf of Alaska are parties to the Agreement; The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) – Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Norway and Russia, and the EU, are contracting parties, and Canada is a non-contracting party; The North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) – Canada, Denmark (in respect of Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Iceland, Norway, Russia and the USA, and the EU, are member states of the Organization; and the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) – Norway, Russia and the USA are parties (see Table 5).

Nevertheless, the position of the Arctic states is changing. More strategic emphasis is now placed on sovereignty and national interests linked to climate change or energy security. There is evidence that the littoral states are using all legal rights available to them in the

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5 Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden are included in rotations of the chairmanship of the BEAC

6 It is not clear, if the Faroe Islands is officially involved in the EU’s Northern Dimension or not, at least it is not mentioned.
UNCLOS to make submissions for sovereign rights to resources on the main basin of the Arctic Ocean. This new position is best illustrated by the ministerial meetings of the five Arctic Ocean littoral states that took place in May 2008 and in March 2010 (e.g. Ilulissat Declaration 2008; Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2010). The three nations without the High Arctic coastlines and continental shelves of the Arctic Ocean - Finland, Iceland and Sweden - as well as the six Permanent Participants, i.e. Indigenous Peoples’ organizations took exception to being excluded from such important discussions. This led commentators more generally to ask whether this might jeopardise or marginalise the Arctic Council itself. The counter-argument is that because the Arctic Council is a soft-law instrument, it has avoided issues dealing with industrial-scale exploitation of natural resources (oil, natural gas, and marine mammals) and traditional security. Whether this signals a return to the politics of a more lasting and strident nationalism is unclear.

In summary, all the Arctic states - Sweden being the last one - have recently approved their national priorities and policy objectives in the Arctic and on northern issues. This is a response to changes in the position of the Arctic states and the significant and multifunctional geopolitical changes that have already taken place.

Importantly, the Arctic states are not alone in their remapping of the Arctic and (re)formulations of agendas or policies. Northern indigenous peoples’ organizations, as Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, have their own agendas and priorities, participating in discussions concerning the future of the Arctic, as is indicated by the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat. A particularly strong voice is “A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic” adopted by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in April 2009 (Inuit Circumpolar Council 2009). The Nordic Council of Ministers has been actively discussing and launching programs for the Arctic region during the 2000s, such as the recent project of “Megatrends in the Arctic”. As mentioned earlier, the European Union is in the process of formulating and approving an Arctic policy, which is already emerging. Furthermore, the Assembly of Western European Union in its 55th session discussed Arctic institutional and legal frameworks as well the as security situation in the North, based on the report on Europe’s Northern Security dimension (European Security and Defence Assembly 2008). And Nato has discussed security prospects in the High North in an academic roundtable in January 2009, organized by the NATO Defence College.

Finally, non-Arctic states both in Europe - such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom (e.g. Plouffe 2011) - and in Asia - such as China (e.g. Jakobson 2010), Japan and South Korea - have clearly shown, and partly defined, their interest in the Arctic, although these states have not approved their Arctic strategies, yet.

The present paper is an inventory on and comparative study of, the Arctic and northern strategies, state policies, priorities and objectives of Canada, The Kingdom of Denmark including Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA, as well as the emerging Arctic policy of the European Union. Although each of the Arctic states have rather recently approved their national strategy or policy on Arctic and northern affairs there have been earlier northern agendas and dimensions - policies even - with national approaches concerning Arctic related issues and northern affairs, by Arctic states. These included themes such as “Arctic ambience and identity, sovereignty and security, indigenous peoples, natural resources and research” (Heininen 1997, 219). Thus, the present paper is not exactly the first - though more comprehensive and systematic - comparative study of northern approaches, agendas and policies of the Arctic states, but rather continuity to a previous study of mine, “National ap

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7 However, Iceland has made it clear that it does define itself as a coastal state and is “firmly against” these meetings (Minister for Foreign Affairs 2010), as I will discuss later.

8 Academically, this is very interesting and fruitful, but also hectic and demanding, since the process of these launches of national strategies and state policies – both draft and final ones – seems to be almost endless.

9 The Declaration was followed by “A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat”.

10 Among others these Asian states as well as the European Union have applied for the status of observer to the Arctic Council. However, a decision regarding their applications was not reached during the ministerial meeting of the Council in May 2011, as the meeting only adopted recommendations “on the role and criteria for observers to the Arctic Council” (Nuuk Declaration 2011, 2).
proaches to the Arctic" which covers Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Heininen 1992; also Heininen 1997)11.

11 The 1992 study was a part of the TAPRI Workshop on Alternative Development and Security in the Arctic Region, an international research project run by the Tampere Peace Research Institute in 1987-1993 (e.g. Vulnerable Arctic need for an Alternative Orientation, ed. by Jyrki Käkönen, 1992. This was followed by the 1997 study covering all the Arctic states based on my presentation in the conference Barents Region Today: Dreams and Realities, where the Finnish Prime Minister launched an initiative for a Northern Dimension of the European Union (for more details see, Europe's Northern Dimension: the BEAR meets the south, eds. by Lassi Heininen and Richard Langlais, 1997).
Inventory on Arctic Strategies and State Policies

As mentioned earlier Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland12, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA have recently approved their agendas and strategies depicting national priorities, priority areas and policy objectives both locally and in the circumpolar Arctic region as a whole. Furthermore, the European Union is in the process of approving its emerging policy paper with priorities in the Arctic region through the EU Commission’s Communication on Arctic issues.

This chapter consists of an inventory of the Arctic strategies and state policies of the eight Arctic states (in alphabetical order) and the communication of the EU (see Heininen 2011, the DRAFT version of the Inventory, February 2011). The main content and the priorities or priority areas of each of them are summarized and followed by a discussion on interesting and relevant findings. In the very beginning of each sub-chapter there is a brief introduction and background to the history of each country’s Arctic/northern policy or agenda.

1. Canada

Canada’s Northern Strategy “Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future” was released on July 2009 in Gatineau Quebec (Government of Canada 2009) by the Government of Canada. It was followed by “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” (Government of Canada 2010) which was launched on August 2010. Here the Strategy and the Statement are viewed and analyzed as one document.

The priority areas of the Strategy, which the Statement fully promotes, are the following:

- first, exercising our Arctic sovereignty;
- second, promoting social and economic development;
- third, protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and
- fourth, improving and devolving northern governance.

Background

The Canadian Government has been active in international northern and Arctic discussions and cooperation during the last decades, such as in proposing and promoting the establishment of the Arctic Council in the early-1990s (Canadian Arctic Resource Committee 1991), and later in the 1990s pushing sustainable development and human security as the focus of circumpolar cooperation (e.g. Heininen 1997, 230-233). Furthermore, already in the 1970s Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) to protect its marine environment in its Arctic archipelago. It was an early and unique environmental prevention act, though it did not wholly manage to convince other states that the Northwest Passage is Canada’s internal waters (e.g. Heininen 1992). The AWPPA was extended from 100 to 200 nautical miles in 2009 (Government of Canada 2010, 16).

In dealing with its Northern region, Canada has been somewhat ambivalent. On one hand, it has approved strategies or policies at the local and regional circumpolar level, such as through the Northern Dimension of Canada’s foreign policy (see Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2000), and on the other hand, the Canadian Government has a history of institutional neglect when it comes to its Northern region, and the way in which it could become better incorporated and developed (Borlase 2010, 83-92).

In 2006 the Liberal Party of Canada launched Canada’s Northern Dimension, which policy had ambitious goals in terms of a national and foreign policy directive (e.g. Heininen and Nicol 2007). The government, however, failed to pursue these objectives prior to its fall (up to 2007) and adopted a defensive stance following the Russian expedition to the shelf under the North Pole in August 2007. This shifted the debate towards an emphasis on sovereignty and national defence. Although

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12 The Icelandic foreign ministry has published a relevant report on the High North which is considered here as a national strategy.
there are a few on-going disputes concerning northern waters, particularly the Northwest Passage (e.g. Byers 2009), these are largely diplomatic and political disputes, the most challenging of which is the status of the Northwest Passage as internal waters, with the USA. They are not, however, conflicts which constitute a real threat to Canadian sovereignty in the High North.

In spite of this, no other country reflects the complexity of geopolitical change(s) in the Arctic as well as Canada. More recently, the Conservative Party of Canada and Prime Minister Stephen Harper have taken a considerably more direct interest in the North and “made the Arctic a major political platform” (Globe and Mail (Metro) National News, 2011-01-25, A12), also emphasizing Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. Harper’s conservative Government has also initiated a number of projects aimed at bolstering the state, and thus Government’s impact on the territory of Canada’s North and in its communities. These projects were compounded into Canada’s Northern Strategy which was released in the summer of 2009. Though the government had expressed its intention on developing a strategy in advance, the release of the Strategy was also met with criticism for failing to properly consult with northern indigenous organizations and northern communities as well as the academic community. The Government has, however, continued on this track and launched “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” in August 2010 to promote the Strategy and be the “government’s Arctic foreign policy statement” (Cannon 2010).

Summary of Canada’s Arctic Strategy

The Strategy starts with the preamble from Chuck Strahl, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, “Canada is a Northern nation. The North is a fundamental part of our heritage and our national identity, and it is vital to our future”. It continues with the statement that “Our government recognizes the tremendous opportunities – as well as the many challenges – that exist in the North today. That is why we are allocating more resources and attention to Northern issues than at any time in our country’s history.” (Government of Canada 2010, 3)

Both the Strategy and the Statement emphasize that the North / the Arctic is central and fundamental to Canada’s character and national identity, and “to secure the future of Canada’s North, for the benefit of all Canadians”. Furthermore, that exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North is “our number one Arctic Foreign policy priority” (Government of Canada 2010, 2-3). The Canadian North is about people, including the Inuit peoples. And finally, that the Government has a clear vision for “Our True North”.

Arctic strategies and policies
The Strategy has four priority areas: 1) “Exercising our Arctic sovereignty”; 2) “Promoting social and economic development”; 3) “Protecting our environmental heritage”; and 4) “Improving and devolving northern governance” 13.

The first priority “Exercising our Arctic Sovereignty” states that Canada’s sovereignty in the North is longstanding and based on historical title which is founded on the presence of the Inuit peoples. Implementation would first of all mean the strengthening of Canada’s presence in the Arctic by “... asserting its presence in the North” through improving land, sea and air capability and capacity14. It also means enhancing stewardship by “taking concrete measures to protect our Arctic waters by introducing new ballast water control regulations”, to amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Act to 200 nautical miles, to establish new regulations under Canadian Shipping Act 2001 to require reporting to the Coast Guard prior to entering Canadian waterways, and to improve search and rescue needs for communities. Further, it means defining Canada’s domain and advancing knowledge of the Arctic through the continued use of UNCLOS in defining maximum outer seabed limits15. In regard to Hans Island, the Beaufort Sea, the Northwest Passage and the Lincoln Sea, where Canada’s sovereignty is disputed, “these disagreements are well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defence challenges for Canada. In fact, they have had no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and cooperatively with the United States, Denmark or other Arctic neighbours on issues of real significance and importance.”

Canada will continue to manage these discrete disputes and may seek to resolve them in the future, in accordance with international law” (ibid, 13);

Finally, it means emphasizing and promoting a human dimension in the North.

The second priority, “Promoting Social and Economic Development” is a vision to create a method that ensures the sustainable use of Arctic potential, is inclusive and geared towards improving both self-sufficiency and the health of northern communities. Implementing this priority means first of all, supporting economic development by establishing effective institutions and transparent rules, promoting development and protection of the environment16; it also requires addressing critical infrastructural needs as modern infrastructure will contribute to a stronger economy, cleaner environment, and increasingly prosperous communities17. Finally, it requires supporting healthy and vibrant communities and human well-being in the north18.

The third priority “Protecting our Environmental Heritage” entails a commitment towards ensuring the safeguarding of northern ecosystems for future generations. Implementing this priority means on one hand, a global leadership in Arctic sciences which are an important foundation for the priorities presented

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13 The Strategy is 40 pages including photos and the Statement itself.
14 Through using the following concrete ways: i) Developing an army training centre in Resolute Bay; ii) Expanding and modernising the Northern Rangers; iii) Creating a deep water berthing and fuelling station in Nanisivik; iv) Constructing a new polar icebreaker; v) Investing in new patrol ships with annual icebreaking capabilities; vi) Developing RADARSAT II; and vii) Undertaking training exercises like Operation Nanook, conducting regular patrols for surveillance and security and continuing NORAD operations.
15 “This process, while lengthy, is not adversarial and it is not a race. Rather, it is a collaborative process based on a shared commitment to international law. Canada is working with Denmark, Russia, Norway and the United States to undertake this scientific work.” (p.12)
16 This will be done through: i) Improving development regulations for new development projects, ii) Constructing a new economic development agency to deliver on the Strategic Investments in Northern Economic Development Program, iii) Mining activities and other major projects like the Mackenzie Gas Pipeline which are cornerstones to economic development and key to building communities, iv) Commitment towards Beaufort exploration and support for Aboriginal Pipeline Group, v) Investments in geo-mapping (Geo-Mapping for Energy and Minerals) to build understanding and potential of northern geology, and vi) Increased funding for tourism as well as community cultural and heritage institutions (ex. cultural facility in Clyde river).
17 This will be implemented by: i) Tailoring needs specific to communities and territories, ii) Continued development of the commercial fisheries harbour in Pangnirtung, and iii) Investing in infrastructure programs like broadband internet connections and green infrastructure.
18 This will be implemented through: i) Monetary commitment of 22.5 billion annually to territories through Territorial Formula Financing for schools, hospitals and social services, ii) Other targeted investments in housing, skills development and infrastructure, iii) Continued support for the Aboriginal Skills and Employment Partnership which provides sustainable employment opportunities in resource industries; iv) Increased commitment towards Canada Social Transfer to improve social programs; v) Continued direct territorial support with investments based on their specific social needs; vi) Making health care more responsive to northern needs, including reduced reliance on external medical assistance and travel for patients; vii) Improvements in promoting awareness of general health and diseases and cost-effective provision of food for isolated communities; and viii) Establishing annual graduate scholarships regarding Canada’s role in the Circumpolar world.
in the Strategy as well providing guidance for decision-makers. This will be achieved by establishing a world-class research station in the High Arctic to serve as the hub for scientific activity, and by providing for similar investments through the recently established Arctic Research Infrastructure Fund. On the other hand, it means protection of Northern lands and waters with a comprehensive approach to protecting natural environments. This will be achieved by i) constructing two new national parks and expanding the Nahanni National Park Reserve; ii) establishing three new wildlife reserves in Nunavut with consultation from Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated; iii) establishing a national marine conservation area around Lancaster Sound; iv) continuing community support from Transport Canada for response systems to marine pollution; and v) committing to cleaning-up and repairing former industry sites and to pre-development environmental impacts assessments.

The fourth and final priority “Improving and Devolving Northern Governance”, in general terms means that Northerners have a greater say in their own destinies; in practise, progress should be made towards devolving management of resources and responsibility of developments to the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, as well as establishing rules for devolution and a protocol for future generations, in cooperation with Nunavut. To implement this means “Made-in-the North policies and strategies”, since “Canada’s North is home to some of the most innovative, consultative approaches to government in Canada and the world” (ibid 30) when it comes to land claims, self-government agreements and models for governance. Furthermore, it means “Providing the right tools”, i.e. Canada will continue to implement past and new land claims agreements in accordance with individual needs as well as provide more territorial financing.

Subsequent to the section on priority areas in the Strategy there is a short chapter on international cooperation under the title “The International Dimension of our North Strategy”. In this chapter the Arctic Council as well as Canada’s Arctic partners - the USA, Russia and the Nordic countries, and UK as a non-Arctic state - are mentioned; there is nothing about the Ilulissat meeting of the five littoral states in May of 2008.

Although the Statement also talks of the Arctic states as close partners of Canada, unlike the Strategy it also mentions the second Foreign Ministers' meeting of the five Arctic Ocean states in March of 2010 in Chelsea, Quebec (see Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2010). Furthermore, in its last chapter, “The Way Forward” the Statement also mentions the Arctic Council contending that it “needs to be strengthened to ensure that it is equipped to address tomorrow’s challenges” (Government of Canada 2010, 25).

Relevant and interesting findings

In the Strategy Canada is defined as a “Northern nation”; the North is central to Canada’s character and national identity. The term “Our North, our Heritage” refers geographically to Canada’s Far North which is included in the definition of Canada’s heritage and future, even “central to the Canadian national identity” (Government of Canada 2009, 3). Further, Canada’s North is said to be “first and foremost about people — the Inuit, other Aboriginal peoples and Northerners” (ibid 3). However, neither (indigenous) peoples nor the human dimension are among the priorities of the Strategy, although “Empowering the Peoples of the North” is included in the Statement’s four priorities (Government of Canada 2010, 22-24).

Second, both the Strategy and the Statement emphasize Canada’s “Arctic (maritime) Sovereignty” as a first priority. It is manifested to be “our number one Arctic Foreign policy priority” (Government of Canada 2010, 3). According to the Munk School/Gordon Foundation survey of public opinion (University of Toronto and Munk School of Global Affairs 2011) almost 60% of Northern Canadians agree that security of the Canadian Arctic is “extremely important and we should be putting more military resources in the area”. Also emphasised is the importance of strengthening Canada’s presence in the Arctic by, for example, exerting rights based on the historical presence of the Inuit, and with the aim of strengthening military presence and control in the Arctic through the establishment of an
Army Training Centre (= military aspect) and the construction of a power icebreaker (= control).

The Strategy refers to existing disagreements, for example between Canada and the USA, contending that Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic lands and islands is “undisputed”. It however says explicitly that there are neither conflicts nor a “race” and consequently, according to the Statement, Canada is seeking to resolve these boundary issues. This does not change the position of the Northwest Passage, except that it has been recently renamed the Canadian North-West Passage (Borlase 2010, 94), and the application of the AWPPA has been extended from 100 to 200 nautical miles, in accordance with the UN-CLOS).

Third, despite reference to the AWPPA in terms of activities an emphasis of the Strategy is much on Arctic Science and the International Polar Year (IPY), with two key priority areas: climate change impacts, and health and well-being. Through its big investments into the IPY Canada has become, and is, very much a global leader in Arctic science. Now it seeks to secure that position by establishing a new world-class research station, and thus trying to become a hub for scientific activities, an image of apparent importance to Canada.

Fourth, economic development, including the exploration and utilization of natural resources (e.g. Geo-Mapping for Energy and Minerals), is a high priority with the Canadian Government whereas transportation appears less so. Indigenous groups are included in processes leading up to mega-projects regarding the utilization of natural resources (e.g. Mackenzie Gas Project). This is tied in with indigenous ownership and land claim negotiations, and is thus an indication of devolution. Health and well-being are also mentioned. An interesting point in the Statement is the implementation of a free trade agreement with EFTA member countries, as an avenue to enhancing trading relations with other Arctic states.

Fifth, though the Strategy includes a short chapter on international cooperation – it mentions the Arctic Council and Canada’s Arctic partners but excludes the Northern Dimension of Canada’s foreign policy - it is not really concerned with foreign policy. Obviously, it is rather geared for a domestic audience and a part of internal politics. Therefore, the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy was launched to promote the Strategy and be the “government’s Arctic foreign policy statement” (Cannon 2010).

Finally, all in all, in spite of its criticism within Canada the Strategy includes a vision about, and for, the North in the context of the entire country. Both the Strategy and the Statement can be seen as a reflection, a response even, to the ongoing significant and multi-functional changes in the High North.

2. The Kingdom of Denmark

The Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020” was adopted by the Government of Denmark, the Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Greenland. It was launched by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2011.

According to the Strategy document, the Kingdom of Denmark “in an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish Realm” - Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands - will work for “A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic; with self-sustaining growth and development; with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate; and in close cooperation with our international partners” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2011, 10-11).

Based on the above-mentioned four main aims and the entire content of the Strategy I interpret that the priority areas / main tasks of the Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic are the following ones:

1) To enhance maritime safety, and enforce sovereignty and surveillance;

2) To exploit mineral resources and new economic opportunities, and use renewable en-
ergy sources, maintain a leading role in Arctic research, and promote Arctic cooperation on human health and social sustainability;

3) To pursue knowledge building on climate change, and manage the Arctic nature based on the best scientific knowledge; and

4) To prioritize global cooperation, and enhance cooperation in the Arctic Council and under the ‘Arctic 5’, and with the EU as well as the Nordic countries.

Background

The joint draft strategy of Denmark and Greenland “Arktis i en brydningstid: Forslag til strategi for aktiviteter i det arktiske område” (The Arctic at a Time of Transition: Draft Strategy for Activities in the Arctic Region) was published in May 2008 (Namminersornerrullitik Qqartussat, Udenrigsministeriet, Maj 2008). It contains a series of objectives for the work, which broadly fall within two categories: first, supporting and strengthening Greenland’s development towards increased autonomy; and second, maintaining the Kingdom’s (Denmark) position as a major player in the Arctic. The draft strategy was based on the work of the joint Greenlandic-Danish “Working Group for an Arctic Strategy” initiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Møller and the Minister Member for Finance and Foreign Affairs, Motzfeldt in August 2006 (ibid, 43). The draft Strategy was published in Danish, but there was an unofficial English translation of it which I used in my 2011 study on Arctic strategies and state policies (Heininen 2011).

Possibly there is a connection between the content and release of the draft Strategy on one hand and Denmark’s/Greenland’s hosting of the Polar Sea Conference in May 2008 in Ilulissat, Greenland on the other: The Ilulissat Declaration signed during that meeting provides an indication (at least publicly) of how the Arctic coastal states intend to pursue their interests as well as their willingness for cooperation (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). The declaration can thus be considered a success in relations between the littoral states and a milestone in Arctic cooperation. The subsequent draft Strategy released more or less at the same time supports the Ilulissat Declaration’s statement of cooperation. Both the 2008 draft strategy and subsequent reports from the Danish Foreign Ministry illustrate that the Declaration, and particularly Denmark’s leading role as host, has solidified its - namely The Kingdom of Denmark’s - position as a permanent Arctic player, albeit despite power sharing with Greenland. This point of view is strongly present in the final Strategy document.

The draft Strategy document - a first time for a Greenlandic-Danish involvement concerning the Arctic – clearly emphasises the domestic model through which Denmark and Greenland will share these interests and duties. The idea for a comprehensive and active strategy came from the need to balance Greenland’s emerging autonomy and stronger legal status with the stresses placed on it from outside sources. Indeed, based on a national referendum in Greenland in November 2008 Greenland achieved in 2009 a stronger legal status of Self-Government. This made the Home Rule Government of Greenland, established in 1979, a unique form of governance with a growing level of self-determination (see Loukacheva 2008).

Already in 1985 the status of the Home Rule Government was strong enough to authorize a referendum by which Greenland withdrew from the European Union (which it joined in 1973 along with Denmark). Following the withdrawal from the EU Greenland was granted the status of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) (e.g. Airoldi 2008, 93-96). From that time relations between the Union and Greenland have been strained particularly due to disagreements concerning sealing and trade in arctic wildlife products, but also climate change and international climate policy, and exploitation of hydrocarbons. However, the EU has recognized Greenland as a relevant Arctic actor through, for example, the Greenlandic initiative on the ‘Arctic Window’ within the EU’s Northern Dimension policy and the Commission’s proposal for enhancing “Arctic-related cooperation with Greenland” in its Communication on the Arctic Region (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 12).

The Kingdom of Denmark’s chairmanship of
the Arctic Council in 2009-2011 – highlighting peoples (of the Arctic), the IPY legacy, climate change, biodiversity, megatrends (in the Arctic), integrated resource management, operational co-operation and the AC in a “new geopolitical framework” - likely focuses on making sure that its position as an important international actor will not be changed. (The Kingdom of Denmark’s Chairmanship, 29.4.2009). Further, to ensure that Greenland’s evolution to territorial autonomy will be recognized globally for its accomplishments towards indigenous rights, rather than an exit from the Arctic arena.

Parallel to this, the process of finalising a strategy on the Arctic region continued, as was indicated by information received from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2010, stating that the Kingdom of Denmark will in the near future formulate an Arctic strategy with objectives, including Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland (Udenrigsministeriet 28.9.2010). This happened in August 2011, when the Foreign Ministry launched The Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 with the purpose of focusing “attention on the Kingdom’s strategic priorities for future development in the Arctic towards 2020” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 11). To secure implementation the Kingdom will form a cross-disciplinary steering committee for the Strategy, make a middle-term evaluation of the Strategy and start preparing an updated version (in 2018-2019).

Summary of Denmark & Greenland’s Strategy

The Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011 strategy is described “first and foremost” as a “a strategy for development that benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 10), and its main aim is said “to strengthen the Kingdom’s status as a global player in the Arctic” (ibid, 11). The chapters of the Strategy, each of which has a certain number of mentioned tasks, are according to the above-mentioned four aims of the strategy: “A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic”; “Self-sustaining growth and development”; “Respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate”; and “Close cooperation with our international partners”. In each chapter the Strategy also takes into consideration the three parts of the Danish Realm, greatly emphasizing the positions and roles of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, particularly the new status of Greenland, as the northern-most parts of the Danish Realm.

The primary focus of the 2011 Strategy, as
was already that of the 2008 draft Strategy, is indeed on Copenhagen’s relations with Greenland and the devolution of responsibilities and authority. The “Terms of Reference” of the Danish-Greenlandic “Working Group for an Arctic Strategy” determines priority issues, as posited by the ministers, to be the Northwest Passage; Greenland, globalization, and trade; EU partnership; Joint Committee; Continental shelf; the Arctic Council and the Kingdom of Denmark’s chairmanship of the Council 2009-2011; and International Polar Year 2007-2009.

In the first chapter, “A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic” the following three goals are discussed: to resolve maritime boundary disputes in accordance with international law, to enhance maritime safety, and to enforce sovereignty and surveillance.

The Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy clearly indicates an importance of international law, particularly the UN’s Convention of the Law of the Sea, and that of peaceful (international) cooperation in, and for, the development of the Arctic, which is defined as the first task of this chapter. Maritime safety is explicitly mentioned in the Strategy with an urgent need to improve infrastructure and implement preventive safety measures. The strategy also mentions several tasks dealing with maritime safety, such as “to introduce binding global rules and standards for navigation in the Arctic” (ibid, 18). It includes the priority (and task) of enforcement of sovereignty exercised “by the armed forces through a visible presence in the region where surveillance is central” (ibid, 20). “The long-term political agreement on defence” with four overriding initiatives, such as the establishment of an Arctic Response Force, and to carry out “a comprehensive analysis of the armed forces future tasks in the Arctic” (ibid, 20), is mentioned. A more sophisticated picture is revealed through emphasizing the importance of sovereignty and national security as the strategy highlights a linkage between the importance of security and for protecting the economic base of Greenland’s economy.

The list of tasks in the second chapter, “Self-sustaining growth and development” is long including the following ones: To exploit mineral resources under the highest international standards; To increase the use of renewable energy sources; To harvest living resources in sustainable ways (including consideration of indigenous peoples’ rights); To exploit new economic opportunities in the Arctic in close cooperation with industry; To maintain a leading role internationally in a number of research fields reach concerning the Arctic and; To promote Arctic cooperation on human health and social sustainability.

The Strategy has indeed a strong emphasis on “new” economic activities and industries in the Arctic in addition to fisheries, which is traditionally the most important one. These include hydropower, mining, tourism, oil exploration, and that of other minerals. Exploration of off-shore fossil fuels and other energy resources are viewed as critical to development in Greenland. Shipping and transport on new sea routes receive less attention than other priorities or objectives. Here the Strategy goes further in drawing attention to the need for a stronger integration in international trade.

At the same time, however, high standards for the exploitation as well as the use of renewable (marine) resources are emphasized. The rhetoric in the Danish strategy concerning “the use of renewable energy resources” and that living resources “shall be harvested in a sustainable manner based on sound science” (ibid, 23) indicates a more comprehensive and sophisticated method of linking the utilization to sustainable use of natural resources, as well as to environmental protection. Here, whaling is described as a somewhat unique economic activity as the Kingdom’s three parts “each have their own whaling policy” (ibid, 33).

Growth and development is described as knowledge-based and consequently, international cooperation in science and research as well as is Greenland’s prominent role in such cooperation is highlighted. Thus, the Kingdom will strive, for example, “to maintain its leading role internationally in a number of research fields reach concerning the Arctic”, particularly global and regional impacts of climate change, and “to promote the participation of Danish, Greenlandic and Faroese
academic and scientific institutions in international research and monitoring activities”. Research must, however, “also help to support the cultural, social, economic and commercial development”. (ibid, 36) Finally, the Kingdom of Denmark’s strategy emphasizes Arctic cooperation on human health and social coherence.

The third chapter, “Development with respect for the Arctic’s vulnerable climate, environment and nature” includes the following two tasks: first, to pursue knowledge building on climate change and its global and regional impacts and reinforce research; and second, to manage the Arctic nature based on the best scientific knowledge and standards.

The Kingdom of Denmark’s strategy mentions the Arctic’s fragile climate and Arctic pollution as a priority through pursuing knowledge and knowledge building on climate change and its impacts in order to improve understanding of the consequences of global, regional and local impacts of climate change. Here again, the strategy emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, as well as the reinforcement of “the rights of indigenous peoples in negotiations towards a new international climate agreement by promoting the visibility of indigenous peoples’ situation” (ibid, 44). Further, it includes a discussion on the protection of the environment and biodiversity, and the managing of the Arctic nature “based on the best possible scientific knowledge and standards for protection” (ibid, 43).

The main tasks included in the final chapter, “Close cooperation with our international partners” are the following ones: To prioritize global cooperation in fields relevant to the Arctic including a focus on climate change, protection of the environment, strict global maritime rules, and giving high priority to indigenous peoples’ rights; To enhance cooperation in the Arctic Council, as well as with the EU and the Nordic countries, and emphasizing the ‘Arctic 5’ as an essential regional forum and; To upgrade bilateral cooperation and dialogue (regarding the Arctic) with established and new partners.

The final chapter includes a sub-title, “Global solutions to global challenges” (ibid, 49), which is a smart slogan but also indicates the aim to prioritize global cooperation in fields relevant to the Arctic. This clear global dimension of the Strategy as well as the Kingdom’s global policy is materialized through a long list of world-wide organizations or initiatives including the UN, such as the UNFCCC, UNEP, the Convention on Biological Diversity, IMO and WTO. Furthermore, the UN’s Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is emphasized.

When it comes to (enhanced) regional cooperation the Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy emphasizes the fact that Denmark and Greenland arranged the Polar Sea Conference in May 2008 for the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean and its (Ilulissat) Declaration. Here the Kingdom “will retain the ‘Arctic 5’”. Also mentioned are the Arctic Council and the goal of strengthening cooperation within the Council and “to ensure a future-oriented Arctic Council”; the EU and Greenland’s good relations with the Union (the Northern Dimension and the Arctic Window are not mentioned as was done in the joint strategy); the Nordic Council of Ministers; and cooperation through sub-regional organisations - such as the North Atlantic Cooperation, NORA and West Nordic Cooperation - and through sector organisations such as NAMMCO.

When it comes to sovereignty and defence the Danish Strategy is the only one emphasizing the importance of NATO and the cooperation between the ‘Arctic 5’. Cooperation with the USA receives less attention than was evident in the joint draft strategy. As regards indigenous peoples, the United Nations, its Human Rights Council and the Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples Affairs are mentioned, and the Kingdom of Denmark has ratified the ILO Convention 169. ICES, NAMMCO, NAFO, NEAFC and IWC are mentioned in the context of fisheries and hunting; and the University of the Arctic in the context of knowledge-based development. Finally, in terms of bilateral cooperation the following are mentioned (in this order): Canada (particularly dealing with the continental shelf); USA (and the Joint Committee cooperation between Greenland, Denmark and the USA); Norway and Iceland; Finland and Sweden; Russia; the EU; and China, Japan and South Korea.
The Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic is described as representing “an important milestone towards 2020 and beyond and aims to contribute to a sound foundation for positive development” (ibid, 57). To ensure implementation the Strategy document concludes with a short chapter including a statement of the intention to form a cross-disciplinary steering committee for the Arctic Strategy and its evaluation, meaning a middle-term (??) evaluation of the Strategy in 2014-2015. The role of the steering committee would further include the reinforcement of foreign policy coordination and cooperation between the three parts of the Danish Realm, and the intensification of public diplomacy regarding the Arctic. An updated strategy will likely be prepared in 2018-2019.

**Relevant and interesting findings**

First, the Kingdom of Denmark has recently had an active, effective and even impressive influence in the Arctic region, particularly Greenland. This was already apparent in the first joint Greenlandic-Danish (draft) strategy in 2008, and the approved Strategy of 2011 is comprehensive and includes all relevant sectors and fields in substantial detail. However, the draft of the Strategy may not have been adequately discussed within the Kingdom before its finalisation. The emphasis of the 2008 joint strategy was clearly the stronger self-government of Greenland and its new jurisdictional position and the redefinition of the interrelationship between Denmark and Greenland. Correspondingly, due to this new political and jurisdictional situation the objectives of the final Strategy is twofold: first, to react and respond to significant environmental and geopolitical change(s) in, and the growing global interest toward, the Arctic region; and second, to redefine a (new) position of the Kingdom of Denmark and strengthen its status as a player in the Arctic. Based on this it makes sense and legitimizes the use of the term “Kingdom of Denmark” rather than “Denmark” when it comes to Arctic affairs.

Second, in spite of old ‘skeletons in the closet’ the US-Danish Defence Agreement (of 1951) regarding US presence in Greenland was referred to in the 2008 joint strategy in terms of maintaining a visible presence of Greenland defence, and upgrading the Thule Radar Station according to the Danish-Greenlandic-US agreement from 2004. This is one aspect of an interesting development, where the Home Rule Government demanded to have its say in ‘hard’ issues. This was achieved ‘de facto’ when Copenhagen permitted the Home Rule Government to take the lead in negotiations on fisheries with the European Union, and when Greenland and Denmark jointly negotiated with the US on Thule (Olsen 2010). The Strategy emphasizes the importance of sovereignty and national security, as do the strategies of the other littoral states of the Arctic Ocean. It is the only one among the strategies of the Arctic states which emphasizes the importance of NATO and the cooperation between the ‘Arctic 5’ and it creates a linkage between security and economy in a more sophisticated fashion.

Third, in addition to fisheries the Strategy strongly emphasizes ‘new’ economic activities and industries in the Arctic including hydropower, mining, tourism and oil exploration and that of other minerals. Here the strategy can be seen as a means to attract industries to come, particularly to Greenland, and invest in these activities. Although the exploration of off-shore fossil fuels and other energy resources are viewed as critical to Greenland’s development, the use of renewable resources is also emphasized.

Fourth, the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2011 Strategy - in line with the joint Denmark/Greenland draft strategy - recognises a clear connection between climate change, increased accessibility and opportunities for exploration. Interestingly, it emphasizes the Arctic’s vulnerable climate whereas the draft strategy claimed that climate change “will increase accessibility and opportunities for exploration”. Here the final Strategy is somewhat more sophisticated, emphasizing knowledge and knowledge building concerning climate change and its impacts.

Fifth, the Arctic Council is mentioned in the Strategy with the goal of strengthening cooperation within the Council. Notably, the ‘Polar Sea Conference in 2008’ and the ‘Arctic
3. Finland

“Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region” was adopted by the Finnish Cabinet Committee on the European Union and launched in June 2010 (Prime Minister’s Office 2010). Here the Strategy is used as the main reference.

The Strategy defines Finland’s objectives in the following substantial sectors: first, the environment; second, economic activities and know-how; third, transport and infrastructure; and fourth, indigenous peoples. These are followed by a list of the different levels of means with which to reach these Arctic policy goals. Additionally there is a chapter on the European Union and the Arctic Region. Finally, the Strategy includes the principle conclusions and proposes further measures.

Background

Finland is a part of the circumpolar North and has been one of the eight Arctic states from the beginning of the current northern and arctic cooperation. Further, “Finland has a primordial interest toward Arctic issues. Our geography and history make us an Arctic state, and we have significant economic, political and security interests in the region.” (Mäkeläinen-Buhanist 2010) Finland is, however, an arctic country without access to the Arctic Ocean or its sub-seas after Finland lost the Petsenga area (the Petsamo Municipality) to the Soviet Union in the 2nd World War.

Finland has also had some sort of ‘de facto’ Arctic / Northern policy since the beginning of the 1990s based on two Finnish proposals: first, in 1989 Finland initiated international cooperation on environmental protection in the Arctic, based on the Murmansk Speech by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev; and second, in 1997 Finland initiated the Northern Dimension of the European Union (e.g. Heininen 2002a; also Lipponen 1997): The first initiative led to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, which was signed by ministers of the eight Arctic states in 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland. Correspondingly, the second one led to the EU’s Northern Dimension policy, approved in 2000, which brought northern issues on the political agenda of the EU (European Union Commission 2000). Further, the new Northern Dimension Framework Document (European Union Commission 2006), which was adopted in November 2006, has emerged as a common policy of the EU, the Russian Federation, Iceland and Norway in North Europe.

Despite the two successful initiatives Finland has neither shown interest at all times toward the entire circumpolar North nor been active in international arctic cooperation. This is due to its geopolitical situation and strong interests within the Baltic Sea region, being within the EU and neighbouring Russia, as the EU’s Northern Dimension indicates. In 2009, however, the Ministry of Finnish Foreign Affairs started a process of developing Finland’s Arctic agenda with the objective of creating a policy or strategy. An ambassador for Arctic

19 The Strategy was first published in Finnish in June (Valtioneuvosto 2010) and in English in September 2010.
issues was nominated as Finland’s “own northern envoy” in the summer of 2009. The Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb (2009) said in his keynote speech in Rovaniemi, September 2009 that “Finland needs a comprehensive and ambitious Arctic strategy of its own”20. Previously, the (East-25 Department at the) Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a confidential memorandum that served as foundation for a national debate and policy-statement on Arctic issues, made in July 2008 (Ulkoasiainministeriö 2008).

The Minister’s speech sparked a growing interest in Arctic issues within Finland, particularly as regards economic interests, in light of climate change. This emerging interest was especially evident among stakeholders in businesses and organisations involved in the pursuit of regional development, economics and trade (e.g. HS 27.11.2008, A8; 30.9.2009, B11; HS 22.2.2010, B3). This growing interest toward the High North was manifested and further supported by the statement “Finland and the Arctic regions” made by the Foreign Policy Committee of the Finnish Parliament as well as a general discussion regarding

20 Further, Minister Stubb (2009) proposed that at the first stage Finland’s Arctic policy would focus on the following key projects: first, to “strengthen the Arctic Council as a global forum for enhancing the international governance of Arctic issues”; second, to respond to a need for “a stronger European Arctic policy”; third, to work on enhancing and putting to use “the EU tools for concrete Arctic action; and fourth, “to explore the Nordic approaches to the Arctic issues”.

Finland’s increased activity at the Assembly of the Parliament in November 2009 (Ulkoasiainvaliokunta 2009). This parliamentary statement accelerated the activities of the Government and the Finnish MFA. Prior to this the first seminar of a Finnish research network on Northern Politics and Security Studies took place in September 2009 and the second one in Helsinki in February 2010 with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs21.

A couple of days later, the Prime Ministers’ Office appointed a working group of civil servants representing all the ministries that was “to prepare a report on Finland’s policy review for the Arctic region” (Mäkeläinen-Buhanist 2010; also Prime Minister’s Office 2010, 7). Furthermore, in April 2010, the Government appointed an Advisory Board on Arctic Affairs to follow-up on the Strategy and to support, monitor and harmonise Finland’s activities in the Arctic (Valtioneuvoston viestintäyksikkö 2010).

Finally, “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region” was adopted by the Finnish Cabinet Committee on the European Union in June 2010. It is based on proposals made by the above-mentioned working group of civil servants

21 Based on presentations of these seminars the book “Jäitä poltellessa. Suomi ja arktisen alueen tulevaisuus” (edited by Lassi Heininen ja Teemu Paliosaari, published by Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus TAPRI at University of Tampere) was published in May 2011.
from different ministries (appointed by the Prime Ministers’ Office). The issue re-emerged on the agenda of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Finnish Parliament in autumn 2010, when the Committee had its hearings and discussion on the Strategy.

Summary of the Finnish Strategy

At the very beginning the Strategy states that Finland is one of the northernmost states of the globe, and that "As an Arctic country, Finland is a natural actor in the Arctic region" (Prime Minister’s Office 2010, 7). Further, it states that there is a global interest toward the Arctic, and consequently the region has growing global significance. Although, the region is stable and peaceful, it is going through significant changes, such as climate change and increased transportation. Due to all this, a holistic evaluation on the current situation and circumstances is required, as is briefly touched on in the introduction. All in all, the Strategy is said to focus on external relations.

The Strategy defines Finland’s policy objectives and few concrete goals in the following substantial sectors: first, the environment, “Fragile Arctic Nature”; second, economy, “Economic Activities and Know-How”; third, “Transport and Infrastructure”; and fourth, “Indigenous Peoples”. These are followed by a list of means at different levels for reaching these Arctic policy goals. There is also a chapter on the European Union and the Arctic Region. Finally, the Strategy includes principle conclusions and proposes further measures, and additionally, 15 appendices, many of which are informative and illustrative, such as maps on population, melting of sea ice and northern sea routes.

Correspondingly, the main policy objectives in the four themes include, for example:

1) The first sector “Fragile Arctic nature” indicates that “The environmental perspective must be taken into account in all activities in the region” (ibid, 13) including climate change as one of the most serious challenges. Among

2) In the second sector “Economic activities and know-how” Finland’s objectives are first, to strengthen its role as an international expert on arctic issues; second, to make better use of Finnish technology-based expertise of winter shipping and transport, and ship-building; and third, to expand opportunities of Finnish companies to benefit from their arctic expertise and know-how in the large and mega-projects of the Barents Region. All this is summarised in the slogan “Finnish know-how must be utilised and supported.” (ibid, 18);

3) Finland’s objectives in transport and infrastructure are first, to improve business opportunities in the Arctic by developing transport, communication, logistical networks and border crossings; second, to develop transport routes in the Barents region; and third, to harmonise international regulations concerning the safety of shipping and environmental protection in the Arctic region;

4) The slogan of the fourth sector of the Strategy states that “Finland continues to work for the rights of indigenous peoples” (ibid 30). This will be realised through the following objectives: first, to ensure Indigenous peoples’ participation when dealing with their affairs; second, to safeguard the funding needed for efficient participation; and third, to strengthen the status of the Barents Region’s indigenous peoples within the work of the Arctic Council (AC) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC).

These four sectors and their objectives are followed by more general goals called Finland’s tools in arctic policy and international arctic cooperation. These objectives are as follows: first, to emphasise the Arctic Council as the primary cooperation forum on arctic issues; second, to strengthen the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in the European Union (EU) as the voice of regional actors; third, to strengthen Finland’s representation in the Russian North;
and fourth, to use the neighbouring area cooperation funds for Finland’s participation in arctic cooperation. Among the levels, and international agreements and inter-governmental organizations mentioned, are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) at the global level, and the AC, the BEAC and the Nordic Council of Ministers at the regional level.

As mentioned earlier the Strategy includes a special chapter on the European Union, which emphasizes both that “the EU has recognized the importance of the Arctic Region” (ibid, 45), and consequently, that the EU is accepted to be an Arctic player. Here Finland has the following three objectives: first, that the EU considers the special features of the Arctic in its various policy sectors and increases its contributions in the region; second, the EU will be approved as an observing member of the Arctic Council; and third, the EU’s Northern Dimension becomes a central tool for the EU’s (emerging) arctic policy in terms of external relations.

Finally, the conclusions of the Strategy include a summary of the objectives and proposals for action for the four sectors as well as international organisations, funding and the EU. It also gives three more general objectives for Finland’s policy in the Arctic - they are: first, “Cooperation based on international treaties lays the foundation for Finland’s activities in the Arctic region”; second, “Finland strives to increase international cooperation in Arctic issues at global and regional levels and in bilateral relations”; and third, “Finland considers it important that the EU develop its Arctic policy” (ibid, 52), and proposes to establish an EU Arctic Information Centre in Finland.

Relevant and interesting findings

First, the Strategy is comprehensive and ambitious. It reflects great efforts in preparing and outlining of Finland’s first arctic strategy, clearly asserting itself as an Arctic state while referring to the European Union as “a global Arctic player”. This reflects the fact that the document was prepared by a working group appointed by the Prime Minister’s Office which consisted of civil servants rather than a broader advisory board representing different stakeholders. Such a working group was appointed only two months later. However, the process was greatly accelerated by the Finnish Parliament and promoted through its Foreign Policy Committee’s statement23.

Second, the four substantial main sectors and related objectives are according to Finland’s long-term traditional, national, political and economic interests in the Arctic and generally in northern regions (they were also mentioned in the Statement by the Parliaments’ Foreign Policy Committee). However, it is not entirely clear if they are priorities or priority areas, or mostly objectives, and consequently, what in fact Finland’s main priorities are.

Based on the text of the main sectors and their objectives one can, however, deduce that the highest priorities of the Strategy are primarily economic interests generally, and those of marine transport, infrastructure and know-how, specifically. These contain concrete proposals for action. For example, it supports increasing marine traffic and transport and better infrastructure. Indeed, there is a perceived need to develop transport and other logistical networks in both the Barents region and North Finland. This is clearly indicated by a list of five transport networks and corridors of Northern Finland, which are under discussion (ibid, 26 and 74); in reality only one or two of those might properly be implemented24. On the other hand, some of the objectives, particularly those dealing with the drilling for oil and gas in the Barents Sea, can be seen rather as hopeful expectations rather than realistic goals, although at least one Finnish company is involved in the Stockman gas field project25. The same applied when the Snøhvit gas field in the Barents Sea was developed by the Norwegians; expectations among Finnish companies, particularly in North Finland, were high, but very little

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23 The Statement received great interest and cross-party support in general discussions on Finland’s interests at the Assembly of the Finnish Parliament in November 2009.

24 This was seen already in October 2010, when mining company Northland Resources decided to transport iron ore mined in Pajala, just beside the Finnish border, to the port of Narvik in Norway instead of the port of Kemi which is much closer (HS 18.10.2010, A11).

25 The company, Steel Done Group has signed a contract of 10 million euro with the Russians (HS 27.11.2008, A8).
was gained from that project.

Thus, the Strategy is business-oriented with a strong emphasis on economic activities, coupled with expertise, or know-how, particularly the utilization of natural resources, such as the oil and gas reserves of the Arctic region. To a certain extent, this is understandable, since this is a national report which reflects strong national interests and expectations of stakeholders in both business and organizations engaged in the pursuit of regional development and economic interests (e.g. HS 22.8.2010). This is also in line with a strategic point of view which emphasizes the importance of the High North security-politically, due to its high strategic position and (global) energy security, and economically, due to its rich natural resources and potential for transportation (new global sea and air routes).

Third, the Strategy reflects the desire to promote and strengthen Finland’s position as an international expert on arctic issues and know-how in several fields (e.g. technology-based knowledge on winter shipping, sea transport and ship-building, forest expertise, mining and metals industry, and cold-climate research). This sounds logical and sensible, and might be the case in terms of some fields of research, but is not necessarily the case when generally evaluating Finnish research in the context of international scientific cooperation26. Therefore, the proposal to launch a study program, with interdisciplinary and international cooperation on northern issues, is very welcome and needed;

Fourth, the Strategy also emphasizes the special features of and risks to fragile arctic ecosystems; importantly the term “fragile” has re-emerged, but of even greater importance is the protection of ecosystems. Climate change, pollution and biodiversity receive considerable attention. A need for safe navigation in the arctic sea is of great importance, both in terms of physical impacts of climate change and in terms of general increase in sea transports. Increasing sea transport is even defined as “the biggest threat to Arctic marine ecosystems” (ibid, 28), despite the fact that there are heavy impacts from long-range air and water pollution, and mass-scale oil drilling. Furthermore, it says that arctic research, regional climate models and long-term monitoring of the state of the environment should feed into decision-making processes, clearly indicating the importance of the interplay between science and politics. Interestingly the uncertainty related to climate change is not emphasized (as a challenge), but nuclear safety in the Kola Peninsula is, though this problem has been under control for a few years now.

Here the Strategy has an inner contradiction: It states that “(I)nteresting human activity in the region also raises the risk of environmental pollution” (ibid, 15), but then later in the text it states that “(F)rom the perspectives of Finnish – especially Northern Finnish – industry and employment, it is important that all types of economic activity increase both in large seaports and in land-based support areas of oil and gas fields in Norway and Russia” (ibid, 18). Which of these is a priority? Is there a greater emphasis on more strict environmental protection, or is it mass-scale utilization of natural resources?

Fifth, all this shows a somewhat short-sighted policy in a strategy claiming a focus “on external relations”, and where climate change is defined as one of the most severe challenges in the Arctic. Consequently, though somewhat abstract, it seems logical to give highest priority to protecting arctic ecosystems, which are threatened or at risk due to rapid climate change, for example by promoting and exporting Finnish know-how and expertise in environmental technology. Or, at the very least to identify more clearly linkages between the different sectors, i.e. the interactions of economic activities with both ecosystems and peoples, as is actually done later in the document when the ‘Arctic Window’ of the Northern Dimension is introduced (ibid, 49)27. This would establish a more global perspective and invite an alternative interpretation as to why the High North plays such an important role in world politics;

Sixth, the Strategy is at its best when empha-

26 The latest Finland’s Strategy on Arctic Research is created in April 1999 (Kauppa- ja teollisuusministeriö 1999).

27 The fragile natural environment, long distances, indigenous peoples and the economic potential of the regions are tied together as the first requested element of the Northern Dimension’s ‘Arctic Window’. 
sizing that the Arctic region is a stable and peaceful area - "High North – low tension", and that Finland supports "non-conflictual rules" (see Stubb 2010; Heininen 2010b). Further, in recognising that significant changes are taking place, when for example, the importance of the Arctic climate globally is obvious, and consequently, the global significance of the region is increased. This is a clear statement in support of both the main discourse of the Arctic being a stable and peaceful region in spite of its challenges, and a recent and emerging discourse on globalization (e.g. Globalization and the Circumpolar North 2010). In declaring that the Arctic Council is now, and should continue to be, the main forum on Arctic affairs and policy “Finland strives to increase international cooperation in the Arctic” at many levels and bilaterally (ibid, 52).

Seventh, the above-mentioned statement is both very important and timely. It is imperative that the mandate of the Council be renegotiated and broadened so that it may move away from its current state, which is some sort of political ‘inability’. Thus, there may be good cause to organize a Summit of the Arctic states, as Finland indeed has proposed (Stubb 2010; Halinen 2010), where challenges of the future, such as the interrelationship between the utilization of natural resources and the fragile environment, as well as the mandate of the AC and its further development will be discussed.

A necessary prerequisite would be enough political will among the eight arctic states to broaden the AC mandate and working methods to include discussion on the utilization of natural resources, security and security-policy (Heininen and Numminen 2011). Further, that the Arctic states are ready for a deeper cooperation with all relevant non-state northern actors, such as Indigenous peoples, academic institutions and NGOs. Moreover, to be willing to enhance interactions with non-arctic states interested in Arctic issues as well as with relevant inter-governmental organizations, i.e. the rest of the globe.

Eight, the Strategy includes objectives concerning Indigenous peoples, particularly those of the Barents Region such as the Saami, and their active participation in international cooperation. Absent, however, is a clear objective to ratify the ILO 169 Convention, although it is very timely and relevant for the Saami and their self-determination. Furthermore, Finland believes that UNCLOS is, and will be, a sufficient framework and tool to resolve arctic issues, and that there is no need for a new international, legally-binding agreement or regime. Albeit political realism, this is a rather traditional and narrow state-oriented approach, when the real challenges are comprehensive and global, and request the attention and participation of a global community, coupled with a desire to engage in new ways of thinking.

Ninth, the Strategy emphasizes the importance of the European Union’s arctic policy as well as its role in the Arctic region, referring to “The EU as a global Arctic player” (Prime Minister’s Office 2010, 45). It is also emphasised that the EU’s arctic policy should be further developed. This could be interpreted to mean that politics is a priority, trumping economics. Consequently, Finland could be seen to be claiming itself an advocate for, or defender of, the EU in arctic affairs. This sounds logical from Finland’s point of view, but may involve risks for Finland as a member country of the AC and generally in the context of multilateral arctic cooperation. Opinion regarding the role of the EU as an arctic actor varies significantly between the Arctic states and indigenous peoples, reflected in somewhat hesitant responses to the EU’s efforts.

Finally, all in all, the Finnish Strategy covers most features of a modern strategy adopting a holistic approach. It can also be seen as reflecting and responding to the recent significant and multi-functional (global) change in the Arctic Region. It does not have clear priorities or priority areas, though there is apparent preference of economic activities including transport, infrastructure and know-how as well as in its general objectives of international cooperation in Arctic issues, based on international treaties.
4. Iceland

The Report “Íslensk þróun í norðurslóðum” (”Iceland’s position and status in the Arctic”) on Iceland’s position and status in the Arctic was published by the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 2009 (Utanrikisraduneytið 2009). This report was followed by “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy” which was approved by the Icelandic Parliament, Althingi in March 2011 (Althingi 2011). I have used here the report and its summary (unofficial English translation) as the main references (Report on Sustainable Development in the Arctic 2009). I have also taken into consideration the Parliamentary Resolution as Iceland’s Arctic policy is to encompass its twelve principles.

The six highlights of the Report are: first, international cooperation; second, security through international cooperation; third, resource development and environmental protection; fourth, transportation; fifth, people and cultures; and sixth, international cooperation on research and monitoring.

The twelve principles of the Resolution greatly support all these, going even further by emphasizing the importance of securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state within the Arctic region on one hand, and on the other, the improvement of wellbeing of Arctic residents and their communities, and advancing Icelanders’ knowledge of Arctic issues.

Background

Iceland’s position has been described as ambivalent due to its geographic location between North America and Europe though being a clear part of Europe and the Northern European heritage. Indeed, the country was caught between the two fronts, placed at the centre of naval-fighting in the 2nd World War and then the maritime strategies of the Cold War. Iceland played a strategically important role in the development of the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea in the 1970s and 1980s as one of the leading countries in the negotiations. This was largely because the Icelandic economy at the time was entirely dependent on fisheries, as reflected in the events related to the Cod Wars of the 1970s between Iceland and Britain. Furthermore, the country played a special role in the issue of nuclear safety in Northern seas in the 1980s and early 1990s, as regards nuclear submarine accidents and radioactive wastes, and the connected risks. The main issue, and reason for concern, was fish and fisheries, but underlying were notions of the interplay between utilization of resources and environmental security, indicating a preference of comprehensive security.

Early 21st century Iceland is a small island nation with a unique geographical and geopolitical location in the North Atlantic. It is a Nordic country, with a clear European heritage and connections and significant contribution to European culture, such as through the Icelandic Sagas. There are however clear signs of American influences, such as the NATO membership, the 1951 Bilateral Defence Agreement with the USA and the US air and radar base at Keflavik which was dissolved in 2006. Among Icelanders there is a strong feeling of independence and an active civil society, as was reflected in heightened activity in 2008/2009 during the initial stages of the financial crisis.

Iceland is an active and influential northern country in international politics and relations, a founding member-state in NATO, the OECD and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA) as well as in the Nordic cooperation, the Arctic Council, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, even in the Council of Baltic Sea regional cooperation. Furthermore, Iceland has its own international cooperative region, the West-Norden with Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Norway. Iceland has recently applied for membership in the European Union, and negotiations are under way.

Iceland has also been very active in, and is one of the leading countries of, current international, and mostly multilateral, northern cooperation. Examples of this include: the first meeting of Parliamentarians of the Arctic took
place in Reykjavik; the offices of two working groups of the Arctic Council, CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna) and PAME (Protection of Arctic Marine Environment) are located in Iceland; the Northern Research Forum (NRF) is based on an Icelandic initiative and the NRF secretariat is located in Akureyri; Iceland’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council (in 2003-2004) was successful as is indicated through a launch of two important reports, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR)28, an International Polar Law LLM and M.A. program was established at the University of Akureyri; and finally, the University as well the Town of Akureyri have hosted several international conferences and meetings concerning northern issues.

According to the Report Iceland is the only country located entirely within the Arctic region, and indeed, its prosperity relies heavily on sustainable utilization of the regions’ natural resources.

Indeed, Iceland has recently (re)defined its geopolitical position in the High North. For example, there has been an emphasis on marine transportation in the High North through new trans-arctic sea routes as presented by the report “North meets North. Navigation and the Future of the Arctic” published by the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006). This trend was strengthened by the presentations and comments of foreign and Icelandic experts in an international conference on Arctic development and maritime transportation organized by the Icelandic Government in March 2007 (Government of Iceland 2007). The Chairman’s Summary includes many relevant aspects to take into consideration when planning transportation in trans-Arctic sea routes, such as the environment (e.g. decreasing ice), technology (e.g. new generation of double acting arctic ships), emergency response (e.g. capacity for emergency response should be increased), legal issues (e.g. move from guidelines towards mandatory rules has been slow), economic factors (e.g. need for increased transportation capacity between North Pacific and North Atlantic), research (e.g. more information is needed on ice conditions) and timeline (e.g. experimental trans-arctic voyages could start during summer season within 10-15 years). However, in this context the most interesting aspect is Iceland’s role here, and indeed, the general agreement was that “Iceland could play a role in the opening of a Trans-arctic Shipping Route, because its location in the middle of the Northern Atlantic”, and serve “as a leading hub for container traffic” (ibid, 26).

This growing interest towards the Arctic region can also be seen in the report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Icelandic Parliament in May 2010 where “Iceland’s interests in the High North” is one of the four areas emphasized. The main objectives as regards those interests are: first, to secure Iceland’s position as a coastal state (and thus achieving the same status as the so-called five littoral states) by for example, developing “legal and geographical arguments for Iceland’s role in international decision-making regarding the High North”; second, “to promote and strengthen the Arctic Council as the most important forum for circumpolar cooperation”, and to oppose the meetings of those five littoral states; third, to support international agreements, particularly UNCLOS, and contribute to establishing the Search and Rescue agreement; fourth, “to work against the militarization of the High North”; fifth, to increase cooperation between Iceland and Greenland within the energy sector; and finally, to support the rights of indigenous peoples (Minister for Foreign Affairs 2010, 3).

The policy of emphasizing northern cooperation has been part of mainstream Icelandic foreign policy for some time and appears successful. Furthermore, Iceland’s future policy will most probably continue along these lines, as is indicated by the Report “Iceland in the High North” by the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated in 2010 that preparations for an action on arctic issues are under way with “the goal to develop, for the first time, a further policy for Iceland on issues pertaining to the High North” (Minister for Foreign Affairs 2010, 4)29. This process is supported

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28 The project of the AHDR was coordinated by the Stefansson Arctic Institute in Akureyri, Iceland.

29 Based on the report by Óscar Skarphedinsson to the Parliament of Iceland in May 2010 among the main objectives of Iceland are to emphasize Iceland’s position as a coastal state, promote the Arctic Council, support international agreements (particularly UNCLOS), and increase cooperation between Iceland and Greenland (ibid).
by “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy” (Althingi 2011) which states that Iceland’s Arctic policy is to encompass the twelve principles of the Resolution.

Summary of the Icelandic Report

The “Iceland in the High North” report starts by emphasizing that Iceland is “the only country located entirely within the Arctic region and its prosperity relies heavily on sustainable utilization of the region’s nature resources”. Further, that Iceland is located “on the periphery of the Arctic in the centre of the North Atlantic Ocean”.

The Report consists of six substantial chapters, the titles of which are its highlights, and it does not have an action plan80. The highlights of the Report are as follows:

First, international cooperation with an emphasis on multi-laterality: International cooperation with neighboring countries within the Arctic region is of utmost importance for Iceland based on its immediate and long-term interests. The Arctic Council is the most important venue for cooperation of all the Arctic states with the participation of indigenous organizations, and focusing on sustainable development in the region. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) is also a priority as an important venue for cooperation in the Barents region covering the most densely populated areas of the Arctic region in northern parts of Scandinavia, Finland and Northwest Russia. Finally, increasing bilateral cooperation with Iceland’s neighbors within West Norden is mentioned;

Second, security through international cooperation, particularly environmental security: Interactions among the Arctic States have been characterized by peaceful cooperation since the end of the Cold War. There is a consensus that, in general, security in the Arctic is best served through close cooperation of all the states in the region based on international law. In addition there should be a focus on emergency response and environmental protection due to increasing sea traffic.

Transportation of oil and gas through Icelandic waters must be closely monitored and provisions made to protect the marine environment and spawning grounds of fish stocks. The growing number of inadequately equipped cruise ships in ice-infested areas is of great concern. It is a priority that the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) updates and makes mandatory application

80 The original Icelandic version of the report “Ísland á norðurlöðum” is 67 pages including pictures and maps; the Parliamentary Resolution is 11 pages.
of relevant parts of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters. Furthermore, cooperation with other countries on preparedness and response measures against accidents and environmental emergencies must be strengthened. The feasibility of establishing international monitoring and response centers in Iceland, in connection with resource development in the Arctic, and increased shipping traffic in the North-Atlantic should be explored;

Third, the environment and resources, emphasising both sustainable development and Iceland’s interests, particularly those of Iceland’s fishing industry: The utmost caution must be practiced in resource development in the Arctic region to protect its fragile environment and ecosystems. Resource development in the Arctic should not undermine sustainable development in the region. It must serve the interests of its inhabitants and communities contributing to long-term economic development, providing lasting benefits and improved living conditions. Care must be taken to protect Iceland’s interests in a rapidly changing situation where previously inaccessible resources are being developed on the ocean floor; new shipping routes are opening in the Arctic and fresh fishing grounds are emerging following the retreating ice.

The interests of Iceland’s fishing industry must be protected through fishery agreements with other states and regional fisheries management organizations, ensuring full share in sustainable fisheries activities even if fish stocks may shift between areas as a result of changing conditions in the marine environment. Iceland’s location on the periphery of the Arctic in the center of the North Atlantic Ocean is ideally suited for servicing resource development and shipping in the High North. There are indications of oil and gas in the Dreki field on the Jan Mayen Ridge and Iceland could play a role in the development of oil, gas and other minerals in East Greenland and further in the north. The utilization of renewable energy resources should be emphasized as long-term value is greater than that of fossil fuel resources, in spite of their high revenues;

Fourth, transportation; new shipping routes are expected to open between the Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans over the Central Arctic Ocean as a result of decreasing sea-ice and the introduction of a new generation of double-acting Arctic ships capable of year-round operations in both ice-covered and ice free waters. There are good conditions in Iceland for establishing a transshipment hub that could serve transportation between the continents of Europe and North America and Asia across the Central Arctic Ocean through transarctic sea routes. The Icelandic Government is monitoring these developments and will be introducing Iceland’s potential in this regard.

Increased interactions between Arctic communities have created the need for a regional aviation network where Iceland could play a role. Furthermore, Keflavik International Airport is well positioned to serve long distance flights between destinations in Asia, North America and Europe;

Fifth, people and cultures with unique cultural heritages: Arctic communities possess unique cultural heritages which should be preserved. Their cultural identity can be strengthened through increased cooperation, making use of modern technologies in a globalized world community. Iceland’s experience can be of relevance in this regard. The inhabitants of the Arctic can make use of various business opportunities connected to the region’s uniqueness through cooperation and marketing, including the promotion of sustainable tourism. Close cooperation with Iceland’s neighbors in Greenland and the Faroe Islands is of particular importance for Iceland in view of their proximity and interests, which coincide in many respects;

Sixth, international cooperation on research and monitoring: The strengthening of international cooperation on research and monitoring in the Arctic can turn science into an important tool for policy making in response to changing environmental and social conditions in the region.

The University of the Arctic – which most Icelandic institutions of higher education are members of – and the Northern Research Forum are mentioned as important platforms
for collaboration and cooperation in Arctic studies. The Arctic Portal (www.arcticportal.org) is an Icelandic initiative, which is playing an increasing role as an internet-based venue for communication and information sharing on Arctic affairs, research and monitoring. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has signed a partnership agreement with the University of Akureyri to develop an Arctic Centre in close collaboration with existing institutions situated at the University to provide, among other duties, expert advice on various Arctic issues to the Icelandic Government.

The twelve principles of the Parliamentary Resolution can be summarized and categorized, and highlighted as follows: first, to strengthen cooperation with other states, particularly with the Faroe Islands and Greenland, promote and strengthen the Arctic Council, and resolve differences on the basis of UNCLOS; second, “[S]ecuring Iceland’s position as a coastal State within the Arctic region” and “[P]romoting understanding of the fact that the Arctic region extends both to the North Pole area and the part of the North Atlantic Ocean...”; third, “to prevent human-induced climate change and its effects in order to improve the well-being of Arctic residents and their communities”, and preserve the unique cultures, life and rights of northern indigenous peoples; fourth, to safeguard “broadly defined security interests... through civilian means and working against any kind of militarisation of the Arctic”; and

fifth, to advance Icelanders’ knowledge of Arctic issues and the importance of the region, and promote “Iceland abroad as a venue for meetings, conferences and discussions on the Arctic region”.

Relevant and interesting findings

First, the clear emphasis of the Report is on international, multilateral cooperation, mostly referring to neighbouring countries, particularly Greenland and the Faroe Islands (as does the Parliamentary Resolution), but also including the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Arctic Council. Furthermore, the Report clearly indicates that there is a strong focus on the Arctic, or the High North31 in Iceland’s foreign policy and that it has become one of the key priority areas.

Also emphasised in Iceland’s foreign policy is to be involved in, and a member of international and intergovernmental organizations, such as the UNs, NATO and the Arctic Council, and particularly to be active in international, northern cooperation. The results of this policy have been evident in the UNCLOS process in regard to the extension of the Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nautical miles, which in no small part is because of Iceland’s influence.

Second, stability and security through international and scientific cooperation, even in terms of the safety of cruise ships, is greatly emphasized both in the Report and the Parliamentary Resolution. It is also said that one of the objectives of Iceland is “to work against the militarisation of the High North” (Minister of Foreign Affairs 2010, 3). Despite the US troops having only recently left Iceland, the importance of state sovereignty is not emphasized in the Report, as it is in the strategies of the five littoral states. There is no mention of the race for natural resources or emerging conflicts in the Report. This is probably due to the fact that Iceland has no outstanding territorial claims in the Arctic region, and the emphasis is rather on international and regional cooperation, safety and knowledge. This also seems to reflect the notion of comprehensive security and can be interpreted to be an adoption of environmental security, similar to the Icelandic position regarding nuclear safety in the 1980s.

Third, resource development, including renewable energy and the fishing industry, is of high importance in the protection of Iceland’s interests; higher even than environmental protection, which is barely mentioned. Further evidence of economic interests is strong visions of a new and global trans-arctic shipping route and the use of such a route for trade and cargo in the near future. Furthermore, the vision of Iceland playing an important

31 It is interesting to note that the report and some other recent documents of the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (e.g. Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2010) use the term “the High North” unlike the report of the international conference in March 2007 “Breaking the Ice” which uses the term “the Arctic”.
role in these developments and in becoming a trans-shipment hub for container traffic is evident and seen as logical in light of its central location in the Northern Atlantic. What is also interesting is that Iceland envisions a role in a new aviation network.

This vision of the prospect of the trans-arctic sea route is a new trend originally proposed and strongly promoted by Iceland. It was first proposed by the Icelandic MFA in the “North meets North” report of experts (Icelandic MFA 2005), and supported by the international conference on Arctic development and maritime transportation in 2007 organized by the Government of Iceland. After the economic crisis it has again been emphasized by President Grímsson (FT, March 10, 2010). Here Europe and Asia are coming together, as they have many common interests. No wonder then, that Iceland has invited China to become involved in the utilization of these new global sea routes (Barentsobserver.com 30.10.2010).

Fourth, the Report emphasizes that Iceland is “the only country” located both “entirely within the Arctic region” and “in the centre of the North Atlantic Ocean”. This is a strong response to the five (official) littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, and a statement against the legitimacy of their ministerial meetings in May 2008 and March 2010. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs states as Iceland’s objective “to side firmly against the so-called five states meetings”. This was made even more clear by the Parliament’s Resolution (in March 2011) through the objective of securing “Iceland’s position as a coastal State within the Arctic region”, promoting an interpretation of the Arctic that “should not be limited to a narrow geographical definition but rather be viewed as an extensive area when it comes to ecological, economic, political and security matters” (Althingi 2011, 1).

Accepting the above-mentioned report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs (to the Icelandic Parliament in May 2010) as a relevant indicator, the forth-coming Icelandic foreign policy strategy on the High North will most probably be a continuity to the Report and thus emphasize Iceland’s position as an Arctic coastal state, promote the Arctic Council, and emphasize an importance of the West Norden cooperation between Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.

Fifth, though it is not directly mentioned in the Report, Iceland’s EU membership would most probably be viewed as a positive development within North Europe and the Nordic Region. And further, that it might accelerate a similar process within Norway. From the point of view of the Arctic region and its international cooperation Iceland’s possible EU membership would not be such a significant development, since Iceland is already entirely involved and integrated in the current northern cooperation and its institutions. A more significant development would be were Iceland’s membership to cause a sort of a ‘domino effect’, i.e. that it will increase the likelihood of Norway joining the EU, or Greenland even, in the near future.

One reason for Iceland to join the EU is in terms of international cooperation as the EU would certainly provide a bigger stage for many activities, particularly if the EU launches its Arctic strategy. This would strengthen Iceland’s position in Arctic and North Atlantic cooperation, particularly in the West-Norden cooperation with Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Norway - all of which stand outside the EU.

Sixth, the importance of international, multilateral cooperation is also reflected in the way in which the Report strongly emphasizes international cooperation on research, monitoring and higher education. This is supported by the Parliamentary Resolution promoting Iceland “as a venue for meetings, conferences and discussions on the Arctic region”.

Finally, both the Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Resolution of March 2011 can be seen as reflections of and responses to changing conditions in the Arctic, or the High North.
5. Norway

Norway’s policy in the Arctic region and northern affairs has recently been defined by “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006), which was launched in December 2006 and focuses on long-term predictability and perspective as important features with the keywords of presence, activity and knowledge. Its follow-up and the latest version of the High North strategy, the “New Building Blocks in the North” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009) was launched in March 2009 and largely continues the chosen policy features but with a focus on business development, and on knowledge and the environment. Here both versions, the 2006 Strategy and the 2009 Strategy, are used as the principal references and, unless otherwise indicated, discussed as a whole.

According to the 2006 Strategy, the main political priorities for the Government’s High North strategy are: first, to exercise Norwegian authority in a credible, consistent and predictable way; second, to be internationally at the forefront in developing knowledge in and about the High North; third, to take a leading role in environmental issues and use of natural resources of the environment and natural resources in the High North; fourth, to provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea for the benefit of (North) Norway; fifth, to actively safeguard the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples; sixth, to further develop people-to-people cooperation (in the High North and the Barents Region); and seventh, to strengthen the cooperation with Russia and increase Russia’s engagement.

Correspondingly, in the 2009 Strategy the Norwegian Government presents a series of strategic areas, which continues the chosen policy lines and supports the seven main political priorities of the 2006 Strategy. The revised and advanced strategic priorities areas, also seven of them, are: first, to develop knowledge about climate change and the environment in the High North; second, to improve monitoring, emergency (and oil spill) response and maritime safety systems in northern waters; third, to promote sustainable use (and business activities) of off-shore petroleum and renewable marine resources; fourth, to promote on-shore business (and industry) development in the North; fifth, to further-develop the infrastructure in the North; sixth, to continue to exercise sovereignty firmly and strengthen cross-border cooperation (with Russia) in the North; and finally, to safeguard the cultures and livelihoods of indigenous peoples.

Background

Norway was the first country in the 21st century to release its Arctic strategy and policy, since in the early 2000s there was an expert report on Norway’s strategic interests and new policy in the High North, ”Mot nord! Utfordringer av muligheter i nordområde” (Statens forvaltningstjeneste Informasjonsforvaltning 2003). “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy” was launched in December 2006 by the Stoltenberg government. This is according to the policy of the current governmental coalition in maintaining a focus on the High North.

The 2006 Strategy explicitly sets out a directive for the High North to become the Norwegian Government’s main area of focus. The document itself is robust, with attention being placed on topics related to environment, humans, foreign policy, business, knowledge, and indigenous peoples. Within these sections are a number of policies, promises and intentions for the Government of Norway to follow. It is clear that the intention of making the High North the focal area of interest for the Government in the years to come requires a commitment from all levels and sectors of government and is thus an embrace from the country as a whole.

Perhaps the most progressive part of the text is Norway’s focus on Russia. At several points in the Strategy are references to how it plans on building and engaging its Russian partners. By focussing on Russia, Norway is clearly defining the importance of the relationship in terms of regional security, economic growth and environmental management. The text is progressive, even aggressive, at times in the
way that it calls on an active Russian participation in cooperation. Indeed, this ultimate aim gained some ground in September 2010, when Norway and Russia managed to reach an official agreement by their Treaty of Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 2010; also Boswell 2010).32

Evaluation of the Norwegian High North Strategy focuses on foreign affairs and international cooperation, which are the most relevant and interesting indicators from the point of view of this inventory. The foreword and summary also mention priorities from other sections, as well as the framework through which the 2006 Strategy will be implemented. Correspondingly, the 2009 Strategy, New Building Blocks in the North outlines a set of follow-ups and new suggestions of measures to be taken with the main political priority areas (of the 2006 Strategy). Therefore, its evaluation is limited here. This follow-up version of the Strategy also takes a broader view of the High North, to be more inclusive of the whole Circumpolar Arctic. Finally, the 2009 Strategy was updated and concretized with figures of allocated budget money through a status report in October 2010 (Utenriksdepartementet 2010).

Summary of the Norwegian High North Strategy

The 2006 Strategy starts by saying that “[O]ne of the Government’s most important priorities in the years ahead will be to take advantage of the opportunities in the High North”, where “we are seeing the most rapid developments in our neighbourhood” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 5). This is followed by the five objectives of Norway in the High North: first, to continue building friendly relations with Russia; second, to continue to combat illegal fishing and create a sustainable industry for future generations; third, to develop the Barents Sea’s energy resources; fourth, to make environmental and climate considerations apparent at all levels of decision-making; and fifth, to improve the living conditions of northerners and safeguard the rights of indigenous peoples.

“...The main purpose of the Government’s High North strategy is to coordinate efforts in all fields relating to the development of the High North. We have mobilised the whole government apparatus in order to give our overall policy a clearer and more coherent High North focus. Ministries and government agencies have focused

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32 The Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Norway and Russia was approved on the 8th of February 2011 by the Storting of Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press release 8.2.2011).
The 2006 Strategy consists of nine parts and a follow-up, and it is rather long. The main political priorities for the Norwegian High North Strategy are said to be the following ones:

First, an exercise of the Norwegian authority in a credible, consistent and predictable way: By exercising its authority and maintaining its sovereignty, Norway is making it clear that it takes its national and international obligations seriously. Presence of armed forces, police and prosecuting authorities is imperative to this priority. Armed Forces are also crucial for meeting national security needs and maintaining crisis management capabilities;

Second, to be internationally at the forefront in developing knowledge in and about the High North: This priority is linked to resource development, and environmental protection, and is an important factor in seizing opportunities and dealing with challenges;

Third, to take a leading role in environmental issues and natural resources in the High North: It will promote value creation around use and exploitation of natural resources while maintaining natural ecosystems. Strict environmental standards for all activities in the High North are emphasised. Further, the Government’s fundamental aim is that “the management of living marine resources is to be based on the rights and duties set out in Law of the Sea, and that it is to ensure the maximum sustainable yield from these resources” (ibid, 8);

Fourth, to provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, seeking to ensure that these activities boost competence in (North) Norway and foster local and regional business activity: Authorities will make sure that natural resource development is beneficial to local communities by promoting spin-off opportunities;

Fifth, safeguarding the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples: Norway intends the High North Strategy to safeguard the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of its indigenous peoples, particularly for Sami settlement patterns and to safeguard the Sami culture;

Sixth, further developing people-to-people cooperation: Norway will further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North and the Barents Region; and

Seventh, strengthening the cooperation with Russia and increase Russia’s engagement: Norway will seek to strengthen its cooperation with Russia, which is undergoing rapid economic development and big changes in the country’s economy, society and politics. This does not affect the objectives of Norway’s policy towards Russia, since it is based on pragmatism, interests and cooperation.

The Government intends to implement and follow-up on these political priorities by 22 specific action points, which can be taken as concrete goals of the 2006 Strategy. Among those are to: engage in dialogue-building with its neighbours and allies; further develop a licensing policy for petroleum activities and develop a proposal for economic and industrial zone in the border regions of the High North; improve border crossing and cultural cooperation with Russia; examine the need for ice-class research vessel; strengthen knowledge building; increase maritime safety around Svalbard; strengthen cooperation with Russia on illegal fishing activities; intensify its capabilities for monitoring changes due to climate change; engage in efforts related to nuclear safety; increase research and environmental technology; engage in international recruit-
ment for qualified jobs; and carry out an analysis of the existing transport infrastructure and future needs of, and commercial basis for, new transportation solutions, such as a railway from Nikel to Kirkenes and new flights within the High North.

The focus of this new dimension of Norwegian foreign policy will be on predictability and long-term perspective, two hallmarks of Norway’s past foreign policy directions. Consistent approach means increased stability within the region; firmness in exercising control over sovereignty and responsibility towards natural resource use, but also openness to cooperation for problem-solving.

“Norwegian resource management combines active use of national regulatory authority with credible enforcement of legislation and international cooperation. Under current international law there is a wide range of instruments that Norway can apply in its efforts to develop knowledge- and performance-based resource management.” (ibid, 15)

When it comes to the issue of transparency and the future of cooperation it is stated that:

“Norway will continue to fulfil its responsibility in a transparent and predictable way. We expect other actors to comply with national and international rules and regulations. The High North is at the top of our foreign policy agenda, and we will seek the support of our allies and partners to ensure that Norway is able to address the real challenges we are facing in the High North.” (ibid, 17)

Regarding Norway’s submission to the UNCLOS Commission the Strategy states that “The delimitation of the continental shelf and the 200-mile zones in the Barents Sea is an essential basis for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum deposits in the area of overlapping claims” (ibid, 16). It prefers an agreement on the matter, which will make it possible to establish the necessary predictable framework and cross-border cooperation schemes in the petroleum sector. However, the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Barents Sea can only be resolved from cooperation with Russia and resolving the dispute would open up valuable new opportunities, as it happened.

This is based on a statement concerning Norway’s cooperation with Russia, in claiming Norway’s support of Russia’s introduction to global and European bodies, welcoming the developments since the Cold War. Yet, there
remains uncertainty of how Russia will develop, and what principles of governance it will choose to follow. Norway will, however “maintain a candid dialogue with Russia and will be clear about Norway’s views on human rights”. The premise of this is the fact that “Norway’s policy towards Russia is based on pragmatism, interests and cooperation”. (ibid, 18)

Here the text is quite progressive, since it directly deals with a specific country and ambitiously aims to develop close cooperation with Russia on exploitation of the petroleum resources, as well as advocate strict environmental goals in the Barents Sea. The text continues by showing steps that Norway will take to ensure that environmental protection is met within the Barents Sea based upon a cooperative model so that it ensures the health of the natural and other environments of the region. Norway also mentions the importance of utilizing a relationship with Russia for developing future petroleum sites in the Barents Sea. Here the Government’s ambition is to develop close cooperation with Russia, and it has accepted “President Putin’s invitation to forge a strategic partnership between Norway and Russia in the north” (ibid, 19).

Finally, regarding the presence of Norwegian Armed Forces it is contended that changes in the High North are also changing the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces in terms of security and protection. Here the keyword is military presence, in order “both to enable Norway to exercise its sovereignty and authority and to ensure that it can maintain its role in resource management”…which “increases predictability and stability…in the High North.” (ibid, 19). Defence cooperation with Russia is not in conflict with this, but rather geared towards building mutual trust and making joint problem-solving possible, such as in the Kursk and Elektron incidents.

Correspondingly, the 2009 Strategy starts by the words of Prime Minister Stoltenberg: “[T]he High North is Norway’s most important strategic priority area….The need to develop our High North Strategy is greater than ever. This is apparent when we look at how the world around us is changing.” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 3)

In the 2009 Strategy the Norwegian Government presents a series of strategic areas, which support and improve on the main political priorities of the 2006 Strategy35. The revised and advanced strategic priority areas (again seven of them) are as follows:

First, developing knowledge about climate change and the environment in the High North; to “make Norway attractive as a base for international research activities” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 8) through strategic investments, such as developing a centre for climate and environmental research in Tromsø and establishing an Arctic earth observing system in Svalbard;

Second, improving monitoring, emergency (and oil spill) response and maritime safety systems in northern waters; to prepare for the melting of sea ice and the consequent increase in maritime traffic and fossil fuel extraction Norway will establish an integrated monitoring and notification system, further develop the Coastal Administration’s maritime safety expertise, and strengthen oil spill response;

Third, promoting sustainable use of off-shore petroleum and renewable marine resources; in order to secure the utilization of renewable marine resources and at the same time “to facilitate the use of new resources and development of new products” (ibid, 18) the Government will develop marine industries and business activities. This will particularly include petroleum-based industry – “the High North as a petroleum province” (ibid, 18) – but also a national initiative for cod farming, combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, developing Norwegian ports for the potential new sea routes, and encouraging “regional ripple effects from petroleum activities in the north” (ibid, 24);

Fourth, promoting onshore business development in the North; the Government’s intention is to make better use of Northern Norway’s (onshore) natural advantages by developing tourism, mineral-based industries, and expertise and business activity based on Arctic conditions, and strengthening innovation and development capacity;

35 The 2009 version of the Norwegian High North Strategy has two parts and is 92 pages long.
Fifth, further developing the infrastructure in the North; since the fisheries and tourism industries as well as the realization of the above-mentioned objectives “are dependent on good roads and reliable air connections”, maintenance and further development of infrastructure are needed. Therefore, the Government intends to develop the knowledge infrastructure, the transport network and space-related infrastructure, and upgrade electric power infrastructure and security of supply;

Sixth, continuing to firmly exercise sovereignty and strengthen cross-border cooperation in the North; based on the complexity of security and a wide range of risk factors in the North the Government intends to increase activities of the Coast Guard, further develop border control and civilian border surveillance and control (in the Norwegian-Russian border). Furthermore, to strengthen competence-building cooperation with Russia and develop cultural cooperation.

Seventh, safeguarding the cultures and livelihoods of indigenous peoples; the objective to “safeguard the language, culture, livelihoods and way of life of the indigenous peoples of the region” (ibid, 42) is implemented by documenting traditional Sami knowledge, developing a programme for cultural industries, ethical guidelines for economic activities and digital infrastructure for indigenous languages, as well as strengthening the capacity and competence of Sami institutions.

This substantial description of the strategic areas is followed by Part II “The High North - Challenges and Opportunities” which consists of five chapters36. Finally, the 22 specific action points of the 2006 High North Strategy are listed with the information that most of them were either implemented or started by March 2009.

The chapter on “Cooperation in the High North” consists of themes of international cooperation in the High North, or the Arctic including different international interests, the international order, regional organisations and Arctic strategies (such as the Norwegian High North one). It includes a discussion concerning the presence of the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian defence Armed Forces as well as the neighbourly relationship with Russia in terms of cooperation between peoples and cultures, collaborative projects and exchange.

The next chapter, “The Region of Opportunity” focuses on wealth creation, such as marine bio-prospecting, promoting innovations and outdoor adventures for sale; better transport and mobility for example through improving the road system and expanding railway capacity. The next chapter “Wealth Creation from Oil and Gas” continues to emphasise wealth creation and focus on the development of the South Barents Sea, a new European energy province as reflected in the opening of the Snøhvit gas field. Correspondingly, the chapter on “Environment, Livelihoods and Fisheries” focuses on sustainable use of marine and land resources through nature conservation (e.g. in the Barents Sea and Lofoten), promoting sustainable fishing and safety at sea.

The final chapter “Knowledge paves the Way” highlights the importance of the first strategic area, knowledge, “[T]he key industries of the future will be knowledge-based, and without new knowledge the problems will not be solved” (ibid, 81). This will be achieved by allocating more funds for arctic research, strengthening educational institutions and establishing a Centre for Ice, Climate & Ecosystems. In knowledge-building climate research is highlighted and special attention is given to Svalbard which allows for a “unique access to the Arctic” (ibid, 85).

All in all, the Norwegian High North Strategy is focussed on long-term predictability and perspective as important features of Norway’s High North policy. The keywords of the Strategy are: Presence, Activity and Knowledge. Presence means supporting settlements and being physically present in all areas of Norway’s jurisdiction. The second goal is Norway’s leadership in key areas of Activity, including fisheries, tourism, bio-prospecting, etc. Knowledge refers to becoming a driver in

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36 Those chapters are entitled as follows: “Cooperation in the High North”, “The Region of Opportunity”, “Wealth Creation from Oil and Gas”, “Environment, Livelihoods and Fisheries” and “Knowledge paves the Way”.

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**Arctic strategies and policies**
scientific understanding of the North, as well as improving the capacity-building of northern communities through a strengthened educational system. Knowledge also refers to national interests internationally, since “[O]ur focus on knowledge will include further developing our capacity to safeguard Norway’s foreign policy interests in the High North” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 6).

The High North is also seen as an opportunity for the international community, both public and private, to become increasingly involved in these ventures, and is open to new endeavours therein: “The overall objectives of the Government’s policy is to create sustainable growth and development in the High North” (ibid, 7). And at the same time, to develop petroleum-based activities and other maritime industries so that local communities will be the primary beneficiaries, since they are seen to “play a crucial role in ensuring welfare and employment in the north” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 24). Finally, the Norwegian High North Strategy also focuses on improved and extended international cooperation in the areas of environmental management, natural resources and research.

**Relevant and interesting findings**

First, the Norwegian High North Strategy is comprehensive and includes many fields of politics, issues and strategic areas with concrete goals of both internal and external affairs. Actually, it is more so than is usual in foreign policy; an advanced strategy with a follow-up system to further long-term Norwegian policy in the North, particularly by the (current) government coalition. Furthermore, the High North is given a place “at the top” as the most important strategic priority area of Norway with a growing recognition of the importance of the High North for Norway as a whole. Consequently, the High North Strategy with its main political priorities plays an important role.

Second, the Strategy uses consistently and stubbornly the term, “the High North”. In the 2006 Strategy the High North is described as a “broad concept both geographically and politically” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 13), though it really refers to the Barents Sea and the surrounding areas, including Svalbard. Although the 2009 Strategy claims that ‘the High North’ is without a precise definition in the Norwegian political debate, the term is “broader than Northern Norway and Svalbard since Norway has major interests to safeguard in a greater region”. This is claimed to be “really a Norwegian perspective”. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 50).

Third, the Norwegian Government has built its High North Strategy on the general perception that the main feature of the geopolitics of the Arctic region at the early 21st century is stability and peaceful cooperation; neither ‘race’ of energy resources nor emerging conflicts or “the return to a cold war”, although Russia has increased its military activities in the Arctic (e.g. Faremo 2010). Therefore, it makes great sense to emphasize the development of knowledge, to promote sustainable use of natural resources and business, and to maintain state sovereignty by strengthening cross-border cooperation (with Russia) in the North.

Fourth, based on and followed from this, it is not surprising that perhaps the most progressive part of the High North Strategy, particularly in the 2006 version, is Norway’s focus on Russia and cooperation with Russia. Objectives in that regard are numerous, ambitious and concrete. In several places, for example, references are made to how Norway plans on building and engaging its Russian partners. The text is almost aggressive at times in the way it calls on an active Russian participation in cooperation. As mentioned earlier, much was gained in achieving this objective when in September 2010 Norway and Russia managed to reach an agreement on where to draw an offshore boundary line in the Barents Sea.

This indicates the significant shift in the Norwegian foreign policy in the early 1990s - after the end of the Cold War period and the collapse of the Soviet Union - towards decreasing military tension and increasing stability in the European North. This objective has 37 It is also said that “the High North is gradually becoming more synonymous with the Arctic” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 50).
been implemented on one hand, by establishing the Barents Euro-Arctic Region between the Nordic countries and Russia, and on the other hand, by starting bilateral functional cooperation with Russia. As a consequence, keen relations and a new kind of confidence has been built between the former enemies and the ultimate goal has largely been achieved. This can be viewed as a success story in international politics (e.g. Heininen 2010a, 282-284).

A consequence of this strong Russia focus is that other northern countries and regions connected with the Norwegian High North seem almost forgotten. For example, neither the other Nordic countries nor Nordic cooperation in general are mentioned in the main political priorities, objectives or specific actions of the Strategy.

Fifth, the Government also aims to develop marine industries and business activities, particularly petroleum-based business activities, and therefore defines “the High North as a (new) petroleum province”, in cooperation with Russia, as a part of promoting sustainable use of off-shore petroleum and renewable marine resources (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 18). And furthermore, describes its determination to be “the best steward of resources in the High North” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 13 and 55). The premises for this is energy security on which the Strategy states that globally “energy is becoming more clearly defined as a part of security policy”, and further that “it is clear that climate change will have an impact on the security of countries and people all over the world” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 14).

Sixth, by focussing on (North-West) Russia, Norway is clearly defining the importance of regional cooperation and region-building as well as business development in foreign and security policy in terms of comprehensive security, economic growth, environmental management and knowledge-building. Furthermore, issues dealing with, particularly the cultures and livelihoods of, northern indigenous peoples are among the main priorities. Here the term “indigenous peoples” is used along with, or even more than, the term “Saami”.

Seventh, primarily, the High North Strategy is on one hand, an advanced continuity to the long-term Norwegian policy in the High North, meaning the Barents Sea region. The most strategic element is Norway’s focus on Russia and an active engagement of Russia’s participation in bilateral cooperation. On the other hand, it is for the strengthening of Norwegian state sovereignty in the High North, as is evident from statements, such as “large parts of the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea are under Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction”, or that Norway will maintain its “presence on the islands of Jan Mayen, Björnöya and Hopen” as well as its influence in Svalbard (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 31-32).

Finally, as mentioned earlier, the Norwegian High North Strategy, particularly the 2006 version, first of all reflects the relationship between Norway and Russia and the goal of further improving those relations. The Strategy can be seen as an important means to achieving such a goal. If this is the case, the Strategy cannot be seen as a real response to the newest significant geopolitical and environmental change in the Arctic region.

6. The Russian Federation

The Arctic policy of the Russian Federation “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period up to 2020 and Beyond” was adopted by President D. Medvedev in September 2008, and made public in 2009 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 30 2009). Here the English translation of the document, which was published (or “promulgated”) in the official governmental newspaper, Rossiyskaya Gazeta on the 30th of March in 2009, is used as the main reference.

The strategic priorities of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic (up to 2020 and beyond) are: first, to carry out an active interaction of Russia with the sub-Arctic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the basis of norms of interna-
tional law; second, to create a uniform Arctic search and rescue regime and prevention of man-caused accidents; third, to strengthen bilateral relationships within the framework of regional organizations, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council; fourth, to assist in the organization, management and effective use of cross-polar air routes and the Northern Sea Route for international navigation; fifth, to actively contribute to international Arctic forums through the Russia-European Union partnerships; sixth, to delimit maritime spaces in the Arctic Ocean and maintain a mutually advantageous presence of Russia in the Spitsbergen archipelago; seventh, to improve state management of the social and economic development of the Arctic, such as to increase support for scientific research; eight, to improve the quality of life for indigenous peoples and their social and economic activities; ninth, to develop the Arctic resource base through improved technological capabilities; and tenth, to modernize and develop the infrastructure of the Arctic transport system and fisheries in the Russian Arctic.

Background

In October 1987, a speech by the then-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) in Murmansk gave the initial impetus for the current intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic. It outlined six proposals; two of them were concerned with confidence building, arms control and disarmament, whereas the remaining four were concerned with civil cooperation. The speech was an early indicator of a change in the closed nature of the Soviet North and represented an important turning point for the entire Arctic. It led to a significant geopolitical change and the start of broad international northern cooperation, such as the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991. (e.g. Heininen 2004)

This development was a response to the following factors: first, since most of the seven federal districts and 83 subjects of the Russian Federation deal with northern regions, the North is important in the Russian context, and was very important in the modernisation project during the Soviet era (e.g. Helanterä-Tynkkynen 2003). Second, due to minerals, oil and gas drilling as well as all the investments of the Soviet era, the North is still an important reserve and resource area for the whole Russian Federation. Further, it is strategically important from a military point of view. Third, interestingly the discourse is increasingly academic including activities to create an academic network where the need to redefine the role of the Russian north is addressed. This is a response to the current changes taking place in the northern regions and to its peoples stating their concern of being merely a geo-strategically important resource reserve, ‘the other’. There are now new opportunities for increasingly horizontal discussions and cooperation between the northern regions, rather than being tied within the very sectoral structure of the Soviet Union, including the Soviet / Russian Academy of Science (RAS) with its many branches.

At the turn of the 21st century Russian political discussions on the West / EU / Russian relations and in terms of EU’s Northern Dimension were concerned with the role Russia might play in Northern (geo) politics (e.g. Sutyrin 2000). At the same time there was a more academic discourse where the importance of redefining the role of the Russian North as more than a geo-strategically important resource reserve was addressed (e.g. Alekseyev 2001). There was also an interesting, though not well known, statement by then-President Putin, who stated in his speech at the meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in March 2004 that there is a need for a long-term northern policy in the Russian Federation (ITAR-TASS 2004). Although nothing tangible emerged at the political level before September 2008, Russia has continued its scientific expeditions in the Arctic (and the Antarctic); tens of them every year. Among such expeditions, taking place back in 2007, were the North Pole-35 drift research station (supported by the Akademik Fedorov research vessel), the integrated high latitude Arctic Expedition (onboard the atomic icebreaker Rossiya), and the high latitude deepwater Arctic Expe-

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38 The speech outlined six proposals: The first two were about establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe and reducing military activities. The others discussed confidence-building measures in northern seas, civilian cooperation in developing natural resources, coordination of scientific research, cooperation in environmental protection, and the opening of the Northern Sea Route to foreign ships (Gorbachev 1987).
dition to the North Pole (IPY-2007/08 News, N 5-6, 2-6; IPY-2007/08 News, N 7, 2-12). The last one became a somewhat of an international public and media hype, largely misunderstood and misinterpreted. It is a manifestation of how an activity, which is basically scientific, can be transferred into a highly (geo)political incident (e.g. Heininen 2010).

In September of 2008 the newly-elected President Medvedev adopted an official state policy, Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic in the Period up to 2020 and Beyond. This was intended as a clear indication of national interests and basic objectives of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region, and of how Russia’s state policy in the region should be developed (e.g. Lavrov 2009). The document was supported by the guidelines of Russia’s Security Council on the same day (Lomagin 2008). A number of publications released by the State Duma were a part of the process leading up to the release of the September 2008 State Policy: The first one was the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2001 which had four broad objectives: guaranteeing free access to the Atlantic for Russian commercial fleets, access to natural resources within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (for example, in the Barents Sea), the strategic importance of security for Russia’s Northern Fleet, and the importance of the Northern Sea Route for sustainable economic development of the State.

A second important document is the “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, approved in July 2008 and which re-introduces Russia as an energy super-power. The Concept carries more than just symbolic weight since it also stipulates the exact importance of the Arctic and its resources to fulfilling Russia’s future economic plans, as well as the need for linking energy security with traditional forms of security. In July 2008 President Medvedev also signed a new Russian Law on Arctic Resources which determines how the country’s underwater arctic resources will be tapped, and that the continental shelf of
the Arctic Ocean is Russian national heritage (ibid). This follows from Russia’s ratification of UNCLOS in 1997 and its scientific expedition to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in August 2007 to gather evidence to support its submission of a proposal, or claim, to the shelf beyond.

A third document, useful in understanding Russia’s Arctic Policy, is “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020”, which was released in May 2009. It has a much stronger conciliatory tone when compared to its previous versions. It also greatly expands the traditional concepts of security to include aspects of human and environmental security, and reaches into new ground by emphasizing Russia’s continued commitment towards international law. Despite this, there remains an ominous sense of curiosity and anxiousness about the country’s intentions in adhering to these policies, since an unfavourable verdict on its maritime delimitation could spark hostile and uncooperative intentions.

A fourth important document dealing with the Russian Arctic and North in general is “Energy Strategy of Russia For the Period up to 2030” (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2010). It is a comprehensive and ambitious strategy with clear priorities and includes chapters on foreign energy policy and regional aspects and peculiarities of fuel and energy complex development. Finally, “The Concept of Sustainable Development Of The Small-numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East” was adopted and released in February 2009.

In addition to these, Prime Minister Putin’s speech of September 2010 at the international forum “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” in Moscow included another list of Russian top priorities. This list consists of three top priorities: first, “the creation of top-quality, comfortable living conditions for local people and the pursuit of a frugal attitude towards the indigenous and small Arctic nations’ socio-economic infrastructure and traditions”; second, “[S]upport for new economic growth points and incentives for large-scale domestic and foreign investment”, and exchange of ideas and innovations; and third, “[S]ubstantial investment in the scientific and nature-conservation infrastructure” which is intended to include

“a serious spring-cleaning of our Arctic territories in the most direct sense of the word. I mean cleaning up the garbage that have been accumulating for decades around the cities, villages, mineral deposits, military bases, seaports, airfields, on the tundra, on the islands and in the Arctic Ocean” (Putin 2010).

Summary of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic


The State Policy lays out the general objectives, main priorities, timeline and mechanisms for implementation of Russia’s interests in the North. Russia limits its geographical mapping of the Arctic to Siberia and the Far East (Russia), Norway, US, Canada and Denmark. Characteristics influencing the State Policy are: extreme natural climatic conditions; industrial economic growth within a low population-density; remoteness from centres and high economic dependency on transfers from southern hubs; and low sustainability of ecological systems (see also Loe 2011).

The section “National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” includes the basic national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, which are first, to use the Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base providing the solution of problems of social and economic development of the country; second, to maintain the region as a zone of peace and cooperation; third, to preserve the unique ecological sys-

39 The English translation of the State policy is short, about nine pages long.
tems; and fourth, to use the Northern Sea Route as a national sea transport route of Russia in the Arctic.

Also included is Russia’s commitment to international law:

"The realization of national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic is provided by institutions of the state power together with institutions of the civil society in strict conformity with the legislation of the Russian Federation and its international treaties."

The basic objectives of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are in the spheres of:

1) Social and economic development: expansion of the resource base (hydrocarbon resources, biological resources and strategic raw materials);

2) Military security: maintenance of a favorable operative regime in the Russian Arctic zone including that of fighting potential;

3) Environmental security: preservation and maintenance of the Arctic environment;

4) Information technologies and communication: formation of a uniform information area;

5) Science and technology: maintenance of a sufficient level of fundamental and applied scientific research on the accumulation of knowledge, and creation of scientific bases of management; and

6) International cooperation: maintenance of mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation of Russia with the sub-Arctic states on the basis of international treaties and agreements.

Correspondingly, the strategic priorities of the State Policy in the Arctic are:

1) Carrying out an active interaction of Russia with the sub-Arctic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the basis of norms of international law, mutual arrangements taking into account Russia’s national interests, and for tackling issues of an international legal substantiation of the external border of the Russian Arctic Zone;

2) Building-up on efforts to create a uniform Arctic search and rescue regime and joint preparedness;

3) Strengthening of bilateral relationships within the framework of regional organizations, including the Arctic Council and Barents EuroArctic Region Council, maximizing the potential for economic, scientific and cultural interactions as well as improved cooperation in the fields of natural resource management and environmental preservation;

4) Assistance in the organization, management and effective use of new transportation routes in the Arctic, including the Northern Sea Route for international navigation, according to international treaties;

5) Activation of the participation of Russian official agencies and public organizations in the work of international Arctic forums, including the inter-parliamentary initiatives through the Russia-EU partnerships;

6) Delimitation of maritime spaces in the Arctic Ocean and maintenance of a mutually advantageous presence of Russia in the Spitsbergen archipelago;

7) Improvement to state management of the social and economic development of the Arctic through increased support for scientific research;

8) Improvement of the quality of life for indigenous peoples and their economic activities in the Arctic environment;

9) Development of the Arctic resource base through improved technological capabilities; and

10) Modernization and development of the infrastructure of the Arctic transport system and fisheries in the Russian Arctic.

The section “Primary goals and measures on realization of the State Policy” identifies how the aforementioned basic priorities and strategies will be realized by solving the main problems such as:
1) Social and economic development: This section identifies challenges to economic activity in terms of technological capacity for hydro-carbon and mineral exploration in the Arctic natural environment and the need for improved infrastructure to realize future economic projects. It also supports the need for improved transportation, coast guard and military fleet vessels capable of navigating Arctic Ocean conditions. Further, there is reference made to improvements in social and economic development of Arctic residents through modernization of education, housing and health facilities;

2) Military, security and defense: This section discusses the necessity of creating armies of the Armed Forces, military formations and other organs capable of defending the Arctic region, depending on various political and military situations. Levels of control over the Arctic should be optimized through advanced boundary control, improvements to surveillance techniques of its maritime areas and greater patrolling of trade;

3) Environmental security: Objectives include ensuring environmental preservation and biological diversity of Arctic flora and fauna, while taking into account the potential of economic activity of Russia’s Arctic region and global climate change. Ways of achieving these aims are introduction of new wildlife management regimes, improving monitoring of pollution, and restoration of natural environments; and

4) Information, science and technology: Objectives include improved capacity for communications in Arctic communities, navigation and industries. Further, increased support for scientific research into environmental protection and climate change as well as the economy, health and military security is needed.

The next section describes basic mechanisms of how all levels of government will need to be active in order to carry out and implement the stated objectives. Commitment and targeted expenses from all government departments are required to improve the coordination of activities, efficiency of their implementation and enforcement of their authority. Also mentioned is the importance of commercial and non-commercial organizations for supporting these objectives, as well as the emphasis on the general population for commitments towards social and cultural development.

Finally, the State Policy will be realized and materialized in the following three stages: The first stage (2008-2010) prioritizes the expansion of resource exploration and trade; expansion of international cooperation including on issues related to resource development; greater financial commitments from state departments in support of technological capacity; and greater emphasis on investment projects from state-private partnerships. The second stage (2011-2015) prioritizes a legal recognition of Russia’s claims to its maritime boundaries and the realizations from its claims to resource exploration and transportation of its energy resources; structural reorganization of its northern economy; and developments in infrastructure and communication, including the North Sea Route. The third stage (2016-2020) prioritizes the realization of full exploration and exploitation of onshore and offshore resource activity, thus fulfilling its objective as a leading resource base of the Russian economy.

The Russian State Policy in the Arctic is concluded with the following statement:

“As a whole, in the intermediate term, the realization of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic will allow Russia to maintain the role of a leading Arctic power. Further, it is necessary, to carry out a complex construction of competitive advantages of the Arctic region in the Russian Federation with a view of strengthening the position of Russia in the Arctic, the consolidation of international security, and the maintenance of the peace and stability in the Arctic region.”
Relevant and interesting findings

First, it was not until the presidency of Medvedev that the Russian Federation managed to formulate a comprehensive state policy in its Arctic Zone as well as in the entire region. Situated at the level of the highest authorities it will be implemented by way of three Action Plans. Thus, Russia has recovered and defined itself as an Arctic state, and in a way is returning back to the Arctic region. The fact is, however, that even without the State Policy Russia is generally viewed as an Arctic nation, in some cases even ‘the’ Arctic nation.

Second, the new Arctic State Policy is strongly linked with and supported by other federal policies and strategies as the region is a strategic resource base for the whole Federation. This is an important consideration in the context of the socio-economic gap which exists within the Federation. This is largely supported by the Minister of Regional Development, Viktor Basargin, who interpreted in October 2010 that one of the three basic ideas of the Strategy is to harmonize the interests of the federal subjects and other actors into a common national Arctic policy.

Furthermore, it is possible to interpret the State Policy as a pragmatic means for domestic politics and development of the Federation, particularly in light of infrastructural challenges in the Russian Arctic and the out-of-date condition of elements such as the road network, air fields, harbors and fleets (also Numminen 2010). Improvements are needed, and of particular importance is the Northern Sea Route with a status of national passage and federal line of communications. This includes the construction of ten permanent stations of the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations along the Route, in cooperation with the Hydro-Meteorological Service. Here it is relevant to note that the economic crises did not have any significant impact on Russia’s policy in the Arctic, an example being the announcement on the 27th March 2009 of the plan to create an Arctic Group of Forces as a part of Russia’s strategy for Arctic exploration until 2020 (Lomagin 2010).

Third, when it comes to real priorities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, this State Policy document is not very helpful as so many priorities are included – altogether ten – all of which are called “strategic priorities”. Thus it comes as no surprise that several interpretations concerning the actual main priorities exist. An example would be Nikita Lomagin’s (2008) short list: first, active extraction of natural resources; second, building transport, telecommunications and border infrastructure; and third, make the Arctic a primary strategic resource base of Russia. Or, the above-mentioned interpretation by Minister Basargin (2010) that the State Policy includes three basic ideas.

Perhaps the most recent list of Russian real “top priorities” in the Arctic can be found in Prime Minister Putin’s 2010 speech mentioned above. It consists of the creation of top-quality, comfortable living conditions for local people; support for economic growth, large-scale investments, and exchange of ideas and innovations; and investment in the scientific and nature-conservation infrastructure.

Correspondingly, the main objectives of the State Policy can be interpreted to be on one hand, stabilizing Russia’s northern frontiers and guaranteeing legal ground for exploration of Arctic resources, and on the other hand, bridging the gap in socio-economic disparities between Russian Arctic regions and the rest of the country, paying special attention to indigenous populations and sustainable development. The tools with which to achieve these objectives will primarily be through bilateral and multilateral cooperation in areas which provide relatively speedy pay off and strengthens national security. All relevant federal ministries, regional authorities and academia are to be included into strategic planning of the Arctic and the appropriate financing will be provided by way of Federal

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41 The Forces would be readily deployable across the vast region and maintain interoperability with the general Russian armed forces, border guard and coast guard. Special ammunition, weaponry and transport would be designed for the ‘freezing temperature’ task force.

42 The emphasis of this interpretation is on the utilization of (northern) natural resources; mostly through mega-projects, such as in Chukotkaya, the Yakutia Region, the Urals, Nenetsia and the Murmansk Region (Terva 2020).
More interestingly the State Policy defines Russia’s basic national interests in the Arctic very clearly. The Russian Arctic as a strategic resource base is seen as a prerequisite to solving challenges of social and economic development. It is necessary to maintain the region as a “zone of peace and cooperation”, preserve its unique ecological systems, and use the Northern Sea Route as a national transport communication in the Arctic.

Fourth, taking into consideration that delimitation of maritime spaces in the Arctic Ocean (and maintenance of a mutually advantageous presence of Russia in the Spitsbergen archipelago) is one of the strategic priorities of the State Policy it is easier to understand why Norway and Russia were able to agree on the dispute of maritime borders in the Barents Sea and signed a treaty concerning maritime delimitation and cooperation as mentioned earlier (Treaty between The Kingdom of Norway and The Russian Federation 2010).

Fifth, another interesting notion is that the State Policy describes the Arctic both as “a zone of peace and cooperation” and as “the sphere of military security” including the maintenance of a favorable operative regime, such as “a necessary fighting potential”. Such contradiction is also found where concerns the environment. Preservation of the environment is to take place while at the same time Russia is going to increase its military presence and arrange for ‘serious spring-cleaning’ in the Arctic territories of the Federation.

In spite of the discourse concerning the race for natural resources and emerging conflicts, as well as some western reactions and responses, the Russian State Policy in the Arctic seems to be largely aimed at maintaining stability and the peaceful cooperation already found in the region (also Putin 2010).43

Sixth, in the State Policy the definition of the Arctic region includes only the five littoral states. International forums and regional organizations, such as the AC and the BEAC as well as bilateral relations, such as the Russia–EU partnership, are mentioned, although not greatly emphasized.

Finally, though the Russian State Policy in the Arctic can be interpreted as a response to the new geopolitical situation in the changing North, it is more a pragmatic means for domestic politics of the Federation to achieve the primary aim of President Putin, i.e. the stabilization of the Federation and its economy. Furthermore, the Policy can be seen as a process through which Russia will again become a (regional) major power and a global energy player in world politics.

7. Sweden

A Swedish strategy for policy in the Arctic region, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region” was adopted by the Swedish Government in May 2011 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press release, 12 May 2011). Here the Swedish version of the Strategy, “Sveriges strategi för den arktiska regionen” (Regeringskansliet, Sverige 2011), is used as the main reference44.

The Swedish Strategy particularly concerns three areas, which are defined as the priorities, are: first, Climate and the environment; second, Economic development; and third, The human dimension.

Correspondingly, Sweden’s Chairmanship Programme for the Arctic Council 2011-2013 gives priority “to issues that will promote environmentally sustainable development of the Arctic” emphasizes the following three areas: first, Environment and climate; second, The people; and third, A stronger Arctic Council (Government Offices of Sweden 2011).

43 After the break-up of the Soviet Union up to sixty thousand tons of oil products are still kept in bad quality; 250,000 barrels are scattered here and there. Moreover, there are more than one million empty barrels left. In addition to this, other materials such as coal, broken planes and radars, rusting trucks and various constructions further contribute to the situation. As a result, pollution exceeds acceptable levels six times. In order to solve the problem, Putin has called for the setting up of a private-state partnership, although initial efforts should be the responsibility of the state.

44 The Strategy is also published in English.
Background

As mentioned earlier in this study, Sweden was the last of the eight Arctic states to issue and approve its Arctic or northern strategy or policy, when the Government of Sweden adopted its first strategy on the entire Arctic region in 12th of May 2011. There was already a growing pressure toward Sweden and its government to do so, not least due to the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Indeed, at the same day when Sweden launched its Arctic Strategy the country took over the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Before this state, there were not so many political statements of Sweden, or speeches by Swedish politicians, on the Arctic and northern issues. One of those is the speech by Foreign Minister Carl Bildt at the Ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council in 2009, where he indicated which key issues or priorities may be found on the Swedish agenda. These included strengthening of the Arctic Council, shipping in Arctic waters, research, climate change and other environmental challenges, and policy concerning the Swedish Saami population (Bildt 2009).

Furthermore, two Swedish research institutions, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) organized an international conference “The New Arctic: Building cooperation in the face of emerging challenges” in April 2011 in Stockholm. It was the first conference organized in Sweden focused on identifying the emerging challenges in the Arctic, and on exploring how to promote cooperative governance frameworks, such as the Arctic Council.

Sweden has, however, been involved in the current international Arctic cooperation from the very beginning, since it is a co-founder of the Arctic Council. Historically Sweden has natural and strong ties which have linked Sweden to the Arctic region on one hand, geographically due to the fact that the country’s territory goes beyond the Arctic Circle, and on the other hand, demographically, since the Saami have lived in Sweden for centuries. As well, Sweden has substantially contributed to Polar research for more than a hundred years and this research is promoted and coordinated by the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat\(^4\)5. For example, the Abisko Scientific Research Station was established in the beginning of the 20th century, and one of latest Swedish research projects is “Mistra – Arctic Futures in a Global Context” (also SWE-DARCTIC and SWEDARP 2011-2015).

All in all, as the Strategy clearly points out, there are many ties which connect Sweden to the Arctic region.

Summary of the Swedish Arctic Strategy

At the very beginning, the Strategy explains that there are several reasons why there is a growing interest to the Arctic region and issues and why a strategy for the region is needed. Among them are climate change and global warming, the living conditions of indigenous peoples and natural resources. The introduction also briefly introduces (Arctic) strategies of the other Arctic states, and finally discussed on several definitions of “the Arctic (Arktis)”.

Then the Strategy clearly points out and lists that there are many ties linking - and have connected for a long time - Sweden to the Arctic region. These include historical ties, such as Carl Linney’s journeys in Lapland and other explorations; security-policy; economic interests, such as mining and space industry; climate and environment, research, such as Swedish expeditions in the Arctic for more than 150 years; and cultural ties, particularly the Saami culture.

The next chapter is about objectives of, and implementations in, Arctic cooperation. Here the Strategy clearly states that the well-functioning multilateral cooperation on the Arctic is the main priority for Sweden (Regerings-
As forums for cooperation it mentions the Arctic Council; the European Union; Nordic cooperation (including the Nordic Council of Ministers); the Barents region’s cooperation; the United Nations and its conventions (e.g. UNCLOS), agencies (e.g. IMO, UNFCCC and the UNs Convention on Biodiversity) and bodies (e.g. UNEP, WHO); the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean; and the Saami cooperation, particularly the Saami Parliamentary Council.

The rest of the document is all about the three Swedish priorities, or priority areas of the Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: Climate and the environment, Economic development, and The human dimension, i.e. people (of the region) and their living conditions. Each priority starts by a list of objectives, what Sweden will, or would like, do in the near future.

1) The first priority is climate and the environment. The mentioned sub-priorities, or focuses, under the main priority are Climate, Environmental protection, Biodiversity, and Research on climate and the environment. Particularly interesting and substantial is biodiversity.

Among the objectives, what Sweden will, or is planned to, do are: to work for to reduce greenhouse gases’ emissions; to ensure that climate change in the Arctic and its impacts is highlighted in international climate negotiations; to work for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the Arctic; and to invest for to be a leading nation in research on climate and the environment as well as the impacts of climate change on humans.

2) The second one is economic development with several business fields and interests. Somewhat surprisingly, Sweden has found many business and economic interests in (free trade of) the entire Arctic as well as in the Barents Region. Those include first, mining, petroleum (oil and gas resources) and forestry; second, land transport and infrastructure; third, maritime security and shipping; fourth, sea and air rescue; fifth, icebreaking; sixth, energy; seventh, tourism; eight, reindeer-herding; and ninth, other livelihoods, such as ICT and space technology. Education and research are also included as well as a few examples of further needs of education like for example, in the field of mining and mineral industry.

Among the objectives, what Sweden will, or is planned to, do are: to promote economically, socially and environmentally sustainable development (in the Arctic); to highlight the
importance of respecting international law when utilizing the energy resources (of the region); and to promote the use of Swedish expertise in environmental technology as well as for to promote Swedish commercial interests in the Arctic.

3) The third priority is the human dimension which includes people (of the region) and their living conditions. Six sub-priorities or focuses, which are mentioned, are: the Arctic conditions affecting human health; impacts of climate change and toxics affecting the people; impacts of climate change to indigenous cultures and industries; resistance of Saami languages; traditional knowledge; and a research program on the Saami society.

Among the objectives, what Sweden will, or plans to, do are: to highlight the human dimension, such as the Saami Convention, in the Arctic Council; to promote the preservation of the Saami and other indigenous languages; to support initiatives of more active participation of young people and women in political processes; and to use and utilize the Nordic and Arctic cooperation for to promote knowledge transfer between research and local indigenous and other Arctic communities.

Finally, the Strategy includes three appendices, fact sheets on the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Dimension.

Relevant and interesting findings

First, and foremost, it can be taken as an achievement that the Swedish Government, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adopted and launched the Arctic Strategy at the same time, even day, when the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council started. Although, Sweden was the last one of the Arctic states, there was not so much time for the preparations of the both, but a growing international pressure toward Sweden and domestic expectations toward the Government, to do so.

In a way, these circumstances can be seen in the Strategy which is rather traditional without any big surprises or special emphasizes. This might, however, be taken as strengthen, since now the Strategy is straight-forward and has clear, though not surprising, priorities.

Second, what is interesting here is the discussion of the many ties which linking, and have connected, Sweden to the Arctic region, such as historical, security-political and cultural ties. The main reason to include the chapter “Sweden and the Arctic” the Strategy might be to have a legitimacy to define Sweden as an Arctic country; and indeed, national identity-building is socially constructed and all the time under discourse. However, the chapter is first of all very informative and interesting, and it gives good background information on Sweden.

Third, as mentioned earlier the three priorities of the Strategy are neither surprising nor that climate and the environment is the first mentioned priority. The fact that there are only three priorities shows that the Swedish Strategy is one of the most focused among all the strategies of the Arctic states.

From the three priorities, economic development can be taken as the most rich and multifunctional one of the Strategy including an emphasis of free trade (in the entire Arctic region), industrial policy (in the Barents region) and economic interests in many fields, such as mining, petroleum, forestry, tourism, transport, shipping and ice-breaking, and reindeer-herding. A slightly surprising thing is that the Strategy emphasizes petroleum, i.e. oil and gas resources of the Barents Sea region, even more than mining which has been, and is still, the main industry in North Sweden. As a conclusion, economic development may even be some sort of top priority of Sweden’s arctic policy.

Fourth, the two other priorities, Climate environment and the environment, and The human dimension (i.e. people) are much the same as the focus areas of Sweden’s Chairmanship Programme for the Arctic Council 2011-2013. Here one relevant difference is that ‘Resilience’ which is some sort of flagship project of the Swedish Chairmanship
(Lind 2011), is not emphasized in the Strategy.

Fifth, the Strategy clearly states that the current and efficient multilateral cooperation in, and dealing with, the Arctic is a clear priority of Sweden. This is confirmed by a long list of forums and organizations, where Sweden is a member and actively involved in. Unlike the Finnish Strategy it does not, however, emphasize a role of the European Union in the Arctic.

This can be interpreted to be mentioned mostly due to the Swedish chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Actually, it is (also) much along to the main tradition of the foreign policy of Sweden to be active in international (multilateral) cooperation, which is now (first time) applied to the modern Arctic cooperation.

Finally, all in all, Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic covers most features of a modern strategy, particularly adopting concrete objectives of each priority. It can also be seen as a reflection and response to the recent significant and multi-functional (global) change(s) in the Arctic as well as to the growing interest and pressure by the other Arctic states and several non-Arctic states.

8. The United States of America

The United States of America’s document “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD – 66” concerning an “Arctic Region Policy” was released on January 9, 2009 by President Bush’s Administration (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary January 12, 2009).

Based on this US Arctic strategy the policy objectives / priority areas of the United States’ Arctic Policy are first, national security and homeland security; second, international governance; third, extended continental shelf and boundary issues; fourth, promoting international scientific cooperation; fifth, maritime transportation; sixth, economic issues, including energy; and seventh, environmental protection and conservation of natural resources.

Background

The Arctic has not played an important role in US foreign or domestic policy. However, the Clinton Administration issued, but did not publicly circulate, US Arctic Policy Objectives in 1994 with the following six objectives: protection of the Arctic environment, sustainable use of natural resources, strengthening of cooperative institutions among the Arctic states, involving northern indigenous peoples in decision making (that affects them), enhancing scientific monitoring and research, and to meet post-Cold War national security and defence needs (Macnab 2009).

After the Russian expedition to the North Pole in August 2007 some USA analysts testified before Congress that the US was falling behind Russia in the Arctic ‘race’. However, the U.S. State Department declared in September 2008 that Arctic countries use different criteria to define whether their territory is considered to be a part of the Arctic region or not; that Russia as well as other Arctic states has “its rights to delineate an extended continental shelf so long as the outer limits are consistent with international law as supported by sound scientific data” (Lomagin 2008). In early-21th century there were some lobbying efforts within the US, such as A Commonwealth North, the purpose of which was to emphasize that the United States needs “an Arctic agenda” and has to understand its identity as “an Arctic nation”, too (Commonwealth North Study Report, May 2009).

The United States released its Arctic Region Policy on January 9, 200946. This directive is said to supersede the “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26; issued 1994) with respect to Arctic policy but not Antarctic policy” (The White House 2009, 1). The Arctic Policy was released by President Bush just weeks before his presidency concluded, but because of its bipartisan flavour, it is still

46 It is said to go through “an extensive two-years consultation with a broad community of northern stakeholders” (Macnab 2009, 27).
considered relevant for current and future administrations. Indeed, the updated version places the Arctic as a much greater interest for the United States.

In her interview in Newsweek (2009/2010) Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also supported this view and has taken a personal interest in the region as was demonstrated in her hosting of the joint Antarctic Treaty-Arctic Council meeting last year. She also mentioned the Arctic as a new emerging area in the US foreign policy with “a matrix of issues”.

**Summary of the US Arctic Policy**

The first section of the US “Arctic Region Policy” clarifies the purpose of the Policy and that its implementation must be in honour of the US’ own Constitution, as well as in connection with its international treaty obligations and in concert with customary international law, such as the Law of the Sea. The second section provides background information and reaffirms the US’ interest in the region stating that “The United States is an Arctic nation” (The White House 2009, 2). It goes on to say that the directive will affect many departments because of the nature of global developments in security, resources, climate change and the work of the Arctic Council.

The Policy defines the US interests in the Arctic in light of several developments including:
1. Altered national policies on homeland security;
2. The effects of climate change and human activity;
3. The establishment and ongoing work of the Arctic Council; and
4. A growing awareness that the Arctic is both fragile and rich in resources. Other major points of interests are related to boundary delimitation, scientific research, transportation, energy and environmental protection. The Policy commits the United States to interstate cooperation but also leaves the door open to unilateral action if necessary.

The next section includes policy deliverables with six themes through which policies are organized. Based on this the Arctic Region Policy "is the policy of the United States to:

1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conser-
ve its biological resources;

3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;

4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);

5. Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and

6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.” (ibid, 2)

These general objectives are concretized and implemented by the following more exact policy objectives or priority areas, which consist of the major part of the policy document:

First, National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic: This section prioritizes the importance of national defence for the US’ policy in the Arctic by saying that the US is willing to cooperate, or act, unilaterally to safeguard its interests in the region. These interests are defined as: missile defence and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence and security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. The text also refers to the heightened human activity, which is projected to increase, and the necessity of asserting a more ‘active and influential’ presence in the region to protect its interests.

The USA clearly states that it preserves the rights and duties for navigation and overflight in the Arctic region which “supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straights”. Furthermore, the policy reaffirms its stance on the Northwest Passage and its recognition of it as an international strait by stating that “Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation”, as well as the Northern Sea Route, and thus “the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits” (ibid, 3). The quote also publically defends the importance of the Northwest Passage to be recognized by international law as an international strait and the detrimental precedent it could have on maritime navigation and transport if it is recognized otherwise.

The implementation of this policy is carried out through: first, the development of capabilities and capacity for protecting the US’ air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic; second, to increase Arctic maritime domain awareness to protect commerce and key resources; third, preservation of the global mobility of the US’ military and civilian vessels throughout the Arctic; fourth, projection of a sovereign US maritime presence in the region; and fifth, encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Second, International Governance: This section lists the involvement of the US government in the international Arctic political forum and recognizes the accomplishments of the Arctic Council for working within its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustainable development. Further, “the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed contributions” (ibid, 4). The text, however, does promote a revived Arctic Council that would require changes to its structure and mandate, and that “The United States is nevertheless open to updating the structure of the Council...to the extent such changes can clearly improve the Council’s work and are consistent with the general mandate of the Council” (ibid, 4). As regards implementation the policy document encourages the review of the Arctic Council’s recommendations by Arctic governments.

The text continues by recognizing the growing support for an Arctic Treaty, but dismisses the idea on the grounds that “it is not appropriate or necessary”.

This section also promotes the ratification of the Law of the Sea by listing the advantages of participation in fulfilling US maritime interests including the securing of US claims over its extended maritime areas and representation at the table when these decisions are carried
out. In its implementation of these policies, the text identifies that the US shall continue to cooperate on Arctic issues through the UN and its agencies and international laws, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Further, it supports the consideration of new international arrangements for the Arctic to address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in the region. Finally, it promotes the US ratification of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS).

Third, Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues: This section begins by identifying that the most effective method in safeguarding US offshore resources is through procedures available through LOS. The text continues by claiming that the United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea. It is recognized that a boundary in this area is based on equidistance, and further, that the boundary area may contain oil, natural gas, and other resources. The text also encourages Russia to ratify the boundary treaty concluded in 1990. Implementation of these policies should take place through taking all necessary legal actions for extending the US continental shelf, that the process of extension be in consideration of the natural environment and fragile marine ecosystem, and the encouragement of Russia to ratify its maritime boundary agreement.

Fourth, Promoting International Scientific Cooperation: The policy document recognises the importance of scientific research for the promotion of US interests in the Arctic and “promotes the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries in support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of the Arctic region in general and potential arctic change in particular” (ibid, 5). The text also asks and supports research in the Arctic Ocean, including portions expected to be ice-covered as well as seasonally ice-free regions, with other nations. The document manifests that the USA will “continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region” (ibid, 6).

Fifth, Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region: The US priorities in maritime transportation in the Arctic region are “to facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation; to protect maritime commerce; and to protect the environment” (ibid, 6). To ensure safety of navigation an effective search and rescue regime should be developed in the region requiring multi-level cooperation by all relevant actors. Correspondingly, implementation should include the establishment of a sort of ‘risk-based’ capacity for addressing hazards in the Arctic.

Sixth, Economic Issues, Including Energy: This section starts with sustainable development, which poses “particular challenges” in the Arctic, and climate change, which is “significantly affecting the lives of Arctic inhabitants, particularly indigenous communities” (ibid, 7). Furthermore, the USA intends to works “with other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development... is carried out in accordance with accepted best practices” (ibid, 8). The central focus is, however, on energy development in the Arctic region which “will play an important role in meeting growing global energy demand” (ibid, 7). Thus, the policy document seeks the protection of “United States interests with respect to hydrocarbons reservoirs that may overlap boundaries to mitigate adverse environmental and economic consequences related to their development” (ibid, 8).

Seventh, Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources: The first paragraph of this section clearly recognises the Arctic ecosystem as unique and in transition due to human activity, the result of which are additional stressors with potentially serious consequences for northern communities and the Arctic ecosystem. Also identified is the high level of uncertainty concerning the impacts of climate change; a top priority is to base all necessary decisions on “sound scientific and socioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research, monitoring, and vulnerability assessments” (ibid, 9). Implementation should include identifying “ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species”, and the pursuit of “marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic” (ibid, 9).
Relevant and interesting findings

First, the US Arctic Region Policy emphasizes strongly national and homeland security and borders, particularly dealing with maritime areas – “(F)reedom of the seas” - through increased military presence and “to project sea power throughout the region” (ibid, 3). This is not surprising, but what is striking (Macnab 2009) is that the US Policy is the only one excluding (indigenous) peoples or communities from main priorities or objectives, although the involvement of “Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them” is stated to be one of its targets (ibid, 2).

Second, US ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention is supported. Although the US have not as yet ratified the UNCLOS, it would like to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf as well as push Russia toward ratification of the 1990 US-Russian boundary agreement.

Third, the Policy places a high priority on the environmentally sustainable management of natural resources and economic development in the region. Furthermore, it appears to promote international governance taking place largely through the Arctic Council and the strengthening of institutional cooperation among the eight Arctic states.

Fourth, the Policy declares continued US cooperation on Arctic issues through the United Nations and its agencies as well as international treaties, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). On the issue of environmental protection the text identifies the challenge of climate change and the related uncertainties, and recognizes that “[B]asic data is lacking in many fields”. However, there is no mention of climate change as regards the implementation of the Policy.

Fifth, the Policy states that the United States of America is “an Arctic nation, with varied and compelling interests in that region” (ibid, 29). Furthermore, in order to implement the US objective to “continue to play a leadership role in research throughout the Arctic region”, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum in the summer of 2010 “that assigns responsibility for Arctic research to the White House National Science and Technology Council” (Farrow 2010).

Although, the US “Arctic Region Policy” was approved and released by the Bush Administration as one of its last documents, it itself as well as a few documents of the Obama Administration indicate that in the early-21st century the Arctic region is steadily emerging as a new important area in US foreign policy, as pointed out by State Secretary Hilary Clinton (Newsweek 2009/2010, 26-30).

Finally, the US Policy in the Arctic Region can be interpreted as a response to the newest significant geopolitical changes in the Arctic region to the point of making “it necessary to develop coherent approaches to problems that occupy a wide spectrum of issues” (Macnab 2009, 27).

9. The European Union

The European Union’s interests and policy objectives in the Arctic region are mostly based on the “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The European Union and the Arctic Region” (Commission of the European Communities 2008), which was launched in November 2008. It is supported by the European Council’s Conclusions on Arctic issues in March 2009 and in December 2009 (European Council 2009a and 2009b). Here the 2008 Communication and the December 2009 Conclusions are used as major references.

The main policy objectives of the EU Commission’s Communication (supported by the Council’s Conclusions) are first, protecting and preserving the Arctic environment and its population; second, promoting sustainable use of resources; and third, contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance.
Background

After Greenland left the European Community in 1985, the European Union was physically not part of the Arctic but has nonetheless remained influential for the region in several ways. In 1995 the European Union returned geographically to its northern, or arctic, dimension when Finland and Sweden joined the Union. This was promoted and strengthened by the Finnish initiative of including a Northern Dimension policy within the Union. Furthermore, the EU Commission adopted a Northern Dimension policy within the Union. This was promoted and strengthened by the Finnish initiative of including a Northern Dimension policy within the Union. Furthermore, the EU Commission was one of the original signatories of the Kirkenes Declaration, along with Russia and the Nordic countries, establishing the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 1993. This was largely due to efforts in confidence-building with Russia and in support of the EU referenda in Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Followed from this, the EU’s Commission claims in the 2008 Communication that the European Union “is inextricably tied to the Arctic Region... by a unique combination of history, geography, economy and scientific achievements. Three Member States—Denmark (Greenland), Finland and Sweden—have territories in the Arctic. Two other Arctic states—Iceland and Norway—are members of the European Economic Area. Canada, Russia and the United States are strategic partners of the EU. European Arctic areas are a priority in the Northern Dimension policy” (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 2).

Although, the EU is not (yet) a formal Arctic player, its influence in the Arctic is evident in several fields (e.g. Airoldi, 2008). Furthermore, the Union has a relevant role and legal competence in the Arctic; in some sectors strong competence (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2010). Among these are environmental and climate change policy, research, fisheries, animal welfare and trade, energy and maritime transport, and regional development through the cohesion policy and particular programs.

Due to the environmental issues of the Arctic being regulated internationally by international environmental treaties, such as the Stockholm Convention on POPs (Persistent Organic Pollutants), the EU has been involved either through its member-states or the EU Commission, or both. Furthermore, as long-range air and water pollution has been one of the most severe environmental problems in the highest latitudes, the EU legal competence would also come through the Common Agricultural Policy.

Impacts of climate change, which both directly and indirectly affects the Arctic ecosystem and peoples, has been recognized by the EU and is mentioned in many policy documents by the Union. Although the EU has not particularly emphasized the Arctic region’s vulnerability to climate change and its impacts, the Union has been involved in international negotiations on climate policy, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. It has also recognized the Arctic region as a key area of influence in Northern Hemisphere climate and climate research (e.g. Lipiatou 2008). This is based on the EU adopting a central role in international climate change negotiations and preferring to see itself as “a leader in fighting climate change” (Commission of European Communities 2008, 3), being a pathfinder in international climate policy by making climate change one of main priorities in internal and external relations (e.g. Barroso 2006; Airoldi 2008, 10; Neumann and Rudloff 2010, 7-8).

Logically, EU policy on research, as well as a European research agenda such as on the environment or the climate system, is also relevant for Arctic peoples and communities (e.g. Egerton 2008; Lipiatou 2008).

An active EU – Arctic relationship is seen in energy and transport, mainly because many EU member-states are heavily dependent on fossil fuels produced in, and transported from, the Norwegian and Russian parts of the Arctic. Furthermore, it is also seen in fisheries and conservation of marine resources, which

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48 The EU research on Polar Regions (both the Arctic and the Antarctic) has mostly been allocated via the Framework Programme; for example, more than 50 research projects of the Fifth and Sixth were related entirely or partially to polar issues (Lipiatou 2008).
under the common Fisheries Policy belongs to an exclusive competence of the Union. Here the Union’s main influence is reflected on how the Arctic fisheries are conducted; for example in terms of reducing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2010, 8 and 27-29). Although the EU member-states only hold a minor share, influence is exerted through fish trade as the EU is a major export destination for the Arctic states. For example, about 80% of Icelandic and 60% of Norwegian fish exports go to EU markets (Neumann and Rudloff 2010).

The EU’s legal competence in the Arctic region is clearly witnessed through sealing and trade in Arctic wildlife products. These issues, generally related to animal welfare, are under the Union’s agricultural and environmental policies, but also deals with the internal market regulations and northern Indigenous peoples (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2010, 10 and 32-36; Airoldi 2008, 87-90). These are controversial topics which have recently been the subject of disagreements between the EU, the Inuit and Canada as reflected in the EU trade ban on seals from April 2009 (e.g. Arctic Athabaskan Council 2008; Cannon 2009).

The Northern Dimension - the Finnish initiative from 1997 - was approved by the European Union in 2000 and implemented by way of two Action Plans. Originally, this policy was primarily defined as an external foreign policy of the Union in (North) Europe, particularly as regards (Northwest) Russia, and a part of confidence-building measures. Although not always explicitly mentioned, the Arctic region - mostly meaning European - has been a cross-cutting issue within the Northern Dimension policy. For example, in the process of the first Action Plan of the Northern Dimension (The European Council 2000) – its main aims were to increase stability and civic security; to enhance democratic reforms; and to create positive interdependence and sustainable development - the partner countries and Greenland had an almost equal voice and were able to take initiatives. One of those was the ‘Arctic Window’ within the Northern Dimension initiated by the Home Rule Government of Greenland in 1999. To include the Arctic as a real “cross-cutting issue, main-streamed within each key-priority” would emphasize the role of northern societies (ibid), and thus form new and more fruitful kinds of global north-south relations.

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49 Annually about 4% of all EU catches are caught in the Arctic waters, which is 2.6% of total EU catches.
Correspondingly, the new Northern Dimension of the European Union, adopted in November 2006, has been developed to mean a common policy by the EU, the Russian Federation, Iceland and Norway in and for North Europe (European Union Commission 2006). Rhetorically, this is a strong statement to promote dialogue and concrete cross-border cooperation, and strengthen stability and integration in the European part of the circumpolar North. It can also be interpreted as supporting the discourse of region-building (in the North) by state-actors through, for example, equal partnership of the EU, the Russian Federation, Iceland and Norway or the objective of visa-free travel between the EU and Russia. As a part of the Northern Dimension policy several Members of the European Parliament (MEP) from North Europe wanted to concentrate on the Baltic Sea Region, and consequently, the European Parliament adopted in July 2010 “The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region” (European Parliament 2010).

Finally, the European Union Commission approved its communication on the Arctic Region in November 2008, an indication of growing interest of the EU in the High North and that it is likely to develop its own Arctic policy. The Council of the European Union has released two Council Conclusions on Arctic issues in March 2009 and December 2009 with the same main policy objectives. A more final contribution, or even a statement, of the EU’s Arctic policy is expected to be implemented by the EU Council in its meeting in 2011.

The European Parliament has recently become active in Arctic affairs, for example by hosting the conference of The Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region in Brussels in September 2010. The “Report on a sustainable EU policy for the High North” (European Parliament 2010b) (with MEP Michael Gahler as the Rapporteur) was adopted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament in December 2009 and as non-legislative resolution by the Plenary sitting in January 2011. It builds on this trend by claiming that “there has been a longstanding engagement of the EU in the Arctic by way of its involvement” in Northern Dimension policy, the Barrents cooperation and bilateral cooperation (European Parliament 2010a, 5). Furthermore, through it the European Parliament would like to influence the Commission in the formulation of the Union’s ‘emerging’ Arctic policy. Therefore, the Report states that “whereas the Commission communication constitutes a formal first step towards responding to the European Parliament’s call for the formulation of an EU Arctic policy, whereas the Council Conclusions on Arctic issues should be recognised as a further step in the definition of an EU policy on the Arctic” (European Parliament 2010b, 5).

In conclusion, based on the Communication, Council Conclusions and Report an EU Arctic policy is emerging, though not yet officially launched.

**Summary of an emerging EU Arctic Policy**

As mentioned earlier the “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The European Union and the Arctic Region” includes three main policy objectives (Commission of the European Communities 2008) each of which contains concrete policy objectives and proposals for action51.

The first main policy objective is “Protecting and preserving the Arctic environment and its population” and its sub-themes are:

1) Environment and climate change where the main goal is “to prevent and mitigate the negative impacts of climate change as well as to support adaptation to inevitable changes” (ibid, 4);

2) Support to indigenous peoples and local populations with the statement that “[A]rctic indigenous peoples in the EU are protected

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50 The Final Report is much broader than the draft one (European Parliament 2010c) which for example largely takes “Sustainable development” as a given, though it is more a normative ideal, which should be defined and implemented, and should be interpreted as a process. In its Explanatory statement it is said that “the idea of an Arctic Treaty, modelled along the Treaty for the continent of Antarctica, ... is not only not promoted by the peoples and states of the Arctic, but also wouldn’t be an appropriate way to deal with the challenges of the Arctic” (ibid, 12). However, the Antarctic Treaty (System) cannot be a proper model for an Arctic treaty, because the situation of the Arctic much differs from that of the South Pole; actually the Antarctic Treaty has never really been a model for the Arctic.

51 The Communication is rather short, 12 pages long.
by special provisions under European Community Law”, and the notion that modern human activities have put certain marine mammals “in danger and there is growing concern in the EU about animal welfare” (ibid, 4); and

3) Research, monitoring and assessments with the statement that “EU Member States and the European Community are major contributors to Arctic research”, and a policy objective to “maintain the Arctic as a priority area for research to close knowledge gaps and assess future anthropogenic impacts, especially in the area of climate change” (ibid, 6).

Correspondingly, the sub-themes under “Promoting sustainable use of resources” are:

1) Hydrocarbons – including a comment on how the significant and known Arctic offshore hydrocarbon resources “are located inside the Exclusive Economic Zone of Arctic states” (ibid, 6), and a policy objective saying that the exploitation of these resources “should be provided in full respect of strict environmental standards taking into account the particular vulnerability of the Arctic” (ibid, 7);

2) Fisheries - including comments saying that “[T]he only significant Arctic fisheries occur at present in the Barents Sea and to the east and south of the Norwegian Sea”, and that “The EU is among the most important consumers of Arctic fish, of which only a small part is caught by Community vessels”. Also included is the policy objective of ensuring exploitation of Arctic fisheries to be “at sustainable levels whilst respecting the rights of local coastal communities” (ibid, 7); and

3) Transport -including a statement saying that

“EU Member States have the world’s largest merchant fleet and many of those ships use trans-oceanic routes. The melting of sea ice is progressively opening opportunities to navigate on routes through Arctic waters. This could considerably shorten trips from Europe to the Pacific.”

Also included here is policy objective of gradually introducing arctic commercial navigation, while promoting stricter safety and environmental standards, and defending “the principle of freedom of navigation” (ibid, 8); and

4) Tourism- including a policy objective of continuing “to support sustainable Arctic tourism” but try to minimise “its environmental footprint” (ibid, 9).

The last main policy objective “Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” is without sub-themes but include comments saying that “[T]here is no specific treaty regime for the Arctic. No country or group of countries have sovereignty over the North Pole or the Arctic Ocean around it” (ibid, 9). And, that “[A]n extensive international legal framework is already in place that also applies to the Arctic”, such as UNCLOS (ibid, 9). Furthermore, that “[T]he EU should work to uphold the further development of a cooperative Arctic governance system based on the UNCLOS which would ensure: security and stability, strict environmental management, including respect of the precautionary principle, and sustainable use of resources as well as open and equitable access” (ibid, 10). Separately, there is also a short paragraph on Greenland saying that although it is a part of Denmark it is also “one of the Overseas Countries Territories (OCTs) associated to the Community” (ibid, 12).

Finally, the conclusion states that the suggestions of the Communication aim “to provide the basis for a more detailed reflection”, and that it should lead “to a structured and coordinated approach to Arctic matters, as the first layer of an Arctic policy for the European Union” (ibid, 12).

The Communication was followed by two Conclusions of the European Union’s Council on Arctic issues in March and December 2009 (European Council 2009a and 2009b). Both include the main policy objectives mentioned above. The December 2009 Conclusion is more relevant because it includes several steps (altogether 23) “towards the formulation of an overarching approach to an emerging EU policy on Arctic issues”. It also requests that the EU Commission “present a report on
progress made in these areas by the end of June 2011” (European Council 2009b, 2 and 5). Among these are principle issues, such as to recognize “the particular vulnerability of the Arctic region” and that it is recognised that “EU policies on natural resource management that impact on the Arctic should be formulated in close dialogue with Arctic states and local communities”, to support “sustainable development for indigenous peoples”, and to state that “the EU should actively seek consensus approaches to relevant Arctic issues through cooperation also with Arctic states and/or territories outside the EU” (European Council 2009b).

There are also more concrete policy objectives, such as to contribute to the Sustainable Arctic Observing Networks, recognize the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment report, become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council, attach “great importance of the strong links between the EU and Greenland” as well as the Arctic EEA/EFTA countries, Iceland and Norway, and examine the benefits “of establishing an information centre on Arctic issues in the EU” (European Council 2009b).

**Relevant and interesting findings**

First, the main message of the EU Commission’s communication and its follow-ups is that the European Union has a growing interest in the Arctic and the High North and would like to secure its interests within the region. Therefore, the EU strives for increased involvement in the Arctic, with active participation in all aspects of Arctic policy and interaction as well as achieving the status of an observer of the Arctic Council.\(^\text{53}\) This is a result of a new geopolitical situation in the 21st century, in which the Arctic has become environmentally, economically and politically more important and attractive globally.

Second, followed from this, the Commission’s Communication indicates that the EU will create its own Arctic policy, or “a structured and coordinated approach to Arctic matters”. Therefore, “[T]he Council requests the Commission to present a report on progress made in these areas by the end of June 2011” (European Council 2009b, 5). This is clearly supported by the conclusions of the European Council in December 2009 where the aim is to take steps “towards the formulation of an overarching approach to EU policy on Arctic issues” (ibid, 2). Finally, both the whole process of the formation of a Union’s Arctic policy and the critical role of the Council Conclusions are strongly promoted by reports of the European Parliament, such as the above-mentioned “Report on a sustainable EU policy for the High North”.

However, although the adoption and launch of the Communication is a significant first step toward an EU Arctic policy - an emerging policy – it is not yet an official policy. It should nonetheless be viewed as an achievement, particularly when considering that until recently interest in the region was rather limited, and the fact that the EU has its Northern Dimension policy for North Europe and Russia and its strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

Third, the three main policy objectives of the European Union are not surprising - i.e. protection of the Arctic environment and its population, sustainable use of resources and governance - since these are largely mainstream and reflect well the soft values of the Union. If the Council Conclusions go along these lines and support these policy objectives, this would be slightly different from the report by the European Parliament, since the report mentions “New world transport routes” and “Natural resources” under the title of “The EU and the Arctic” before “Climate change and pollution effects on the Arctic”, “Sustainable socioeconomic development” and “Governance” (European Parliament 2010b, 7-10).

Followed from this and based on these policy objectives, the Communication and the Council Conclusions can also be interpreted to represent EU’s new moral language and geopolitical discourse with the objective of entering the North to assert control over northern social space and knowledge (Moisio

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52 This did not seem to take place, since such a report has not, yet, been published.

53 This did not, however, happen in the 7th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council on the 12th of May 2011 in Nuuk, Greenland. The meeting could only adopt the recommendations on the role and criteria for observers to the Arctic Council, but not accept new observers (Nuuk Declaration 2011).
2003). This is seen for example, in disagreements on whaling between the EU, and Norway, Iceland and the Inuit; those on sealing and trade in Arctic wildlife products between the EU, and the Inuit and Canada, such as the EU’s seal trade ban in April 2009, (e.g. Arctic Athabaskan Council 2008; Cannon 2009; also Airoldi 2008, 87-90); and disagreements on climate change and international climate policy between the EU and the Greenlandic Self-Government (e.g. Kleist 2010).

Or, the Communication can be interpreted to mean that the EU has moved “to join the scramble for the vast mineral riches of the Arctic being opened up by global warming” which could be a declaration of those resources being able to “help stem anxiety about Europe’s energy security” (Traynor 2008). Thus, the growing interest toward the Arctic will perhaps soon be reflected in the EU energy policy, particularly in terms of growing interest toward the rich hydrocarbons of the Arctic and northern seas, such as those of the Russian North and the Barents Sea region. Behind this interest towards energy is energy security, which together with climate change (and climate security) can be interpreted to constitute a sort of dualism of the new security dimension of the EU (see European Commission 2008).

Fourth, due to, or in spite of this, one might ask “why should the EU have an Arctic policy?” or “what are the premises of the EU’s arctic policy?” According to the “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union” the EU’s aims are: “to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”; it shall “offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers”; and “establish an internal market”; and “an economic and monetary union (EMU) whose currency is the euro”. Since the Arctic region is both stable and peaceful, these aims are of little consequence. The last goal where it is stated that “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens” perhaps sheds a light on the main premise. The EU is first of all an economic - and also political - union. It is neither a federation nor the United States of Europe. This means the deepening of economic and political integration in Europe and further expansion. Perhaps then, a key premise is to enlarge the core idea of EU integration “shared values mean added value” to cover the Arctic region.

Fifth, another kind of answer is derived from the EU and its legal competencies having had an impact in the Arctic in many ways, as mentioned earlier. The EU has adopted a central role in international climate policy negotiations and would like to see itself as a global leader in fighting climate change. Thus it needs an active Arctic policy, particularly in light of the Arctic’s central role in global climate change. From this point of view the EU can be interpreted to be “a global Arctic player” (as it is referred to in the Finnish Arctic Strategy). This would explain why all the three main policy objectives of the Communication clearly indicate that the EU would like to emphasize its ‘soft’ values and policy in the region. Among those are increased stability and the preservation of “the Arctic environment and the need for sustainable use of resources”, all of which can be interpreted to be key priorities of the emerging EU arctic policy.

Sixth, it is striking that the Northern Dimension policy is not more emphasized in the Communication. It is mentioned briefly (on page 4), whereas in the Council Conclusions of the Council meeting in December 2009 the ND policy received greater attention. Furthermore, there are no real visible connections between the EU’s ND policy and the emerging arctic policy, although the other parties of the ND - Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Greenland - are among the Arctic states. Norway, Russia and Greenland are also among the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, and Iceland and Norway among the EEA countries. The role of the Common ND policy is promoted by the Gahler Report, as mentioned earlier.

However, what is most interesting is that the Communication includes a short paragraph on Greenland where it is expressed that although Greenland is not a part of the EU territory de jure, it is “one of the Overseas Countries Territories (OCTs) associated to the Community” (ibid, 12), and thus constitutionally dependent on an EU member state
(Airoldi 2008, 94). The European Parliament’s report promotes this by mentioning “an increased interest in the exploration and exploitation of resources in Greenland and its Continental shelf” (European Parliament 2010b, 6).

All this shows clearly the unique geopolitical position Greenland has in (North) Europe and the entire Arctic. It is evident that the EU is perfectly aware of this and that it recognises the importance of Greenland. Consequently, the EU would like to increase its cooperation with Greenland and perhaps forge an even stronger relationship.

Seventh, generally speaking the Communication can be seen as a response to and recognition of environmental and geopolitical changes. Furthermore, it can partly be seen as a response to the ‘race’ for natural resources in the Arctic region, or the rhetoric of a race, largely created and followed by misinterpretations of the Russian expedition to the bottom of the Arctic Ocean in summer 2007 (e.g. Heininen 2010b).

Finally, the Union “is affected by Arctic policies and likewise has an impact on Arctic policies” through its northern member states and candidate countries (European Parliament 2010b, 7). In spite of this, the Communication and the Council’s Conclusions along with the European Parliament’s Report clearly indicate that, the current situation of being “inextricably linked to the Arctic region” is seen to weaken the Union and perceived to be a problem. Consequently, there is a perceived need for strengthening the Union’s position and presence in the High North, and the EU aims to become a real Arctic player.
Comparative Study of the Arctic Strategies and State Policies

National strategies and state policies concerning the Arctic region and northern affairs are a clear manifestation of the growing interest of the Arctic states toward their own northernmost regions as well as the entire Arctic Region. The communication of the European Union shows the same level of interest.

The Arctic strategies and state policies also show a need for a special emphasis toward arctic and other northern affairs, and international cooperation in the Arctic, either to be implemented by a strategy or policy. Furthermore, these Arctic strategies and state policies fall somewhere in between the classic, and the looser contemporary, definitions of the word ‘strategy’: First, they mostly cover civilian fields of international relations, such as economy and development, governance and environmental protection, and scientific cooperation. Some of them also cover the military, or a sphere where military force is not entirely out of the picture but might also be used in a variety of more ‘peaceful’ ways, such as for search and rescue; Second, a part of the policy challenge they address involves calculating one’s position in relation to other ‘powers’; Third, like earlier military strategies, these documents are about mapping future uncertainties and preparing both guidelines and instruments to deal with them; Fourth, they are designed to mobilize, steer and coordinate the national communities that they cover; and Fifth, two features of these papers strike a more modern note: a) the wide range of the substantive issues they cover, and b) their role as public documents (Bailes and Heininen, forth-coming).

Furthermore, the national strategies and state policies as well as the EU Communication can be seen as reflections of the recent changing conditions in the Arctic region in general, and / or dealing with the state, and consequently, interpreted as responses to the significant and multifunctional change in the Arctic environment and northern geopolitics. This is rather obvious in the cases of Canada, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, the USA and the EU.

The reasons for this range from the broad to the narrow: Security risks and threats to sovereignty because of potential impacts of climate change are large factors in the Canadian Strategy as well as in the EU Communication. Further, the growing global interests toward the Arctic region and its rich natural resources lie at the core of the Finnish Strategy, which also reflects the EU’s growing interest in the Arctic.

In the cases of The Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and Russia there are other reasons as important or even more so: The new self-governing status of Greenland as well as the first ad-hoc meeting of the five littoral states provides a central focus in the Denmark/Greenland’s Strategy. The Norwegian High North Strategy, however, is more independent and reflects Norway’s new position in the Post-Cold War and the new Norwegian-Russian relationship in the Barents Sea region, emphasizing closer bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Correspondingly, the Russian State Policy is first of all a pragmatic means for domestic politics of the Federation.

Fundamental to the emphasis of sovereignty and security “are two basic points of discussion that are most often referenced within Arctic geopolitics: that of conflict and cooperation” (e.g. Borlase 2010, 60-61). This is often the case when dealing with states and state interests, simply because ‘the state’ is (still) the major (international) actor of the international system. Now the situation is more complex as there are other international actors to consider, such as indigenous peoples and international non-governmental organizations. One of the special features of the post-Cold War Arctic has been that although the state is still the main international actor and centre of attention – these are strategies and policies of states - northern indigenous peoples have also emerged as international actors. They are now represented in international cooperation through their international organizations, as the permanent participants of the
Arctic Council include six such organizations.

Further, a common feature in the strategies and state policies is that the Arctic states as well as the EU either would like to become a natural or real, even leading, actor/player in the Arctic (or in some field of northern affairs), or would like to maintain a leading role there (see Table 6).

Finally, what, however, is surprising in these strategies and state policies is a lack of worldwide or global perspective(s), not explicitly mentioned in most of the strategies. Particularly so in a time and world of globalization, or when considering the strategic role of the Arctic Region and Northern issues in world politics and the globalized world economy, as is mentioned in the introduction. 54 That said, unlike most of the strategies, the Strategy for Denmark/Greenland does recognise that “Political globalization” is a reality which “requires a comprehensive strategy for effective representation of interests” (Namminersorne Rulluutik Oqartussat and Udenrigsministeriet, 2008, 7). Furthermore, the Finnish Strategy describes the Arctic as having new potential which stresses its strategic importance and global significance (Prime Minister’s Office 2010, 9-10 and 14-15).

Comparing this to the situation in the 1990s as regards internal and foreign policies of the Arctic states there has been a clear shift toward the Arctic or the North in general. My previous study on, and analysis of, national approaches and policies of the Arctic countries in the region in the period between the 1980s-1990s revealed that although certain knowledge existed there was barely a common understanding that the Arctic eight consisted of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia (the Soviet Union at the time), Sweden and the United States, although

“[A]ll these countries have vested interests in the Arctic region and correspondingly their own Arctic policies, in which

the major factors include those of the increasing strategic significance of the area and the growing interest in multilateral cooperation. However, the ‘northern feeling’ has tended to come and go in waves.” (Heininen 1992, 36)

Further, in the classification of the 1992 study on national approaches to the Arctic there are “two countries which most evidently meet the criteria of Arctic states” i.e. Canada and Norway and which had “an explicit Arctic policy” (ibid, 36).

One of the main conclusions of the 1997 study was that all the Arctic states “have vested their national interests in the North, i.e. either a northern dimension, or even their own northern policy” including “national approaches to issues related to the Arctic region and northern affairs in the following fields: ‘Arctic ambience and identity, sovereignty and security, indigenous peoples, national resources and research’” (Heininen 1997, 219). 55

In this section I discuss and compare the recent Arctic strategies and state policies, their priorities and main objectives, followed by a brief conclusion. 57 I will begin by (re)positioning and (re)defining the Arctic states.

(Re) constructing, (re) defining and (re) mapping

The strategies and state policies show the need and interest of each Arctic state, and the European Union, to on one hand (re)position and (re)define itself as an Arctic or Northern country or nation. On the other hand, to (re)construct its internal and foreign policies dealing with Arctic or northern affairs as well as (re)map the Arctic region (also Dahl 2010, 34). Consequently, Arctic states (re)define or (re)map their northernmost regions and waters as a part of the entire Arctic region and international Arctic cooperation.


55 The Soviet Union and the USA as the global major nuclear powers of the Cold War were excluded in the 1992 study.

56 In the study a northern dimension meant “national aspects and activities in the North and/or dealing with the North, and a northern policy (meant) a national strategy toward the North” and/or to gain something there (Heininen 1997, 243).

57 A deeper, more detailed analysis is underway in a forth-coming paper by Banik and Heininen.
This is reflected in the way in which each state / nation identifies itself as an Arctic or Northern country or nation (or major player, or leading power in the Arctic). For some states it is the first time they identify themselves in such a way, such as in the case of Finland, an “Arctic country” or the US, an “Arctic nation”. The eight Arctic states identify themselves as follows: (see also Table 6).\textsuperscript{58}

According to its 2009 Northern Strategy Canada is a “Northern country” and “the global leader in Arctic science, and “the North is central to the Canadian national identity”. There is nothing new in this since Canada has been “an arctic state, a multicultural society, a consciously northern nation” although the images of “northern homeland and northern frontier” when it comes to the Canadian North may be seen as representing two different northern solitudes (Penikett 1997).

The joint (draft) Strategy of The Kingdom of Denmark has the objective of maintaining “the Kingdom [of Denmark]’s position as a major player in the Arctic”. Correspondingly, the Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 has the aim “to strengthen the Kingdom’s status as global player in the Arctic” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 11). Thus, Denmark has its current interests in the North, but even more so it has had historically its interests there through the ‘overseas territory’, i.e. Greenland (Heininen 1997, 220).

The Finnish Strategy defines Finland as an “Arctic country” and “a natural actor in the Arctic region”. Although Finland is a Nordic country with its own northern identity “the North has been a rather delicate issue for Finland, both in foreign policy and in domestic terms”. This includes on one hand strong ambitions and efforts to emerge as a major power in the European North, and on the other hand, periods in which it has appeared to lose interest (ibid, 220-221). At the early-21st century, in an emerging Arctic Age the situation might be changing so that Finland’s self-perception naturally includes not only a northern, but also arctic, dimension\textsuperscript{59}.

Iceland is “the only country located entirely within the Arctic region” according to the Icelandic Report. In addition to this, Iceland is primarily a northern marine nation - in between Europe and North America - largely dependent for its survival on the resources from the surrounding seas (ibid, 221).

Norway is a “leading nation as regards environmental policy and...as a steward of the natural and cultural heritage in the High North”. Furthermore, there is a “[G]rowing recognition of the importance of the High North for Norway as a whole” according to the Government’s High North Strategy. Indeed, Norway has always had important national interests in the North (those of security, economic development and regional cooperation) since the North is and historically has been “a natural direction, important and sensitive for Norway” (ibid, 221).

According to its State Policy in the Arctic the Russian Federation would like to “maintain the role of a leading Arctic power”. Indeed, the geographical and geopolitical fact that the Federation owns and controls the rimland of the Eurasian North - almost a half of the coastal area of the Arctic Ocean - makes Russia very much a northern and Arctic country. The end of the Cold War meant an end to the costly arms race and the collapse of the Soviet Union - which modernized, industrialized and militarized the Russian North for decades -, dramatically decreased state funding of infrastructure and settlements in the North. This became problematic for Moscow for a while, but never meant that Russia would lose its interest in the Arctic, a real asset for Russia in the future.

Correspondingly, the Swedish Strategy clearly points out that there are many ties which continue to link Sweden to the Arctic, historical, security-political, economic, climate and environmental, scientific and cultural ones.

Based on the current US Arctic Region Policy

\textsuperscript{58} All the quotations are referred from the strategies and state policies.

\textsuperscript{59} As an example of this, the Finnish know-how, also introduced by the Finnish Arctic Strategy, was advertised as a new brand, the “Finnish snow-how” meaning the efficiency of the Helsinki-Vantaa Airport as well as that of the City of Helsinki to clean the masses of snow in winters (e.g. the winter of 2010-11) within a short timeframe (e.g. HS and 9.1.2011. A15).
the USA is an “Arctic nation”. Indeed, the United States of (North) America is an Arctic state because of Alaska which was bought from Russia in the 19th century. However, in the 1980s, and perhaps to some extent a bit later, there was a general attitude that “most Americans do not think of Alaska as a part of the United States in the same way that they think of distinctive geographical regions of other states”, rather it remains a remote, frozen desert (Roederer 1990, 15).

What is interesting, though not particularly surprising, is that almost all the strategies and policies include a definition of the region, i.e. how the region – the Arctic, or the circumpolar North, or the High North (in the case of Norway) - is defined by each state. The documents include the following kinds of definitions:

Canada: “Own North” is Canada’s Far North, and “Canada’s North is about people”;

The Kingdom of Denmark: “The Arctic in recent years becomes a central location on the world map”, and “One of the most significant global issues over the past 10 years is the vast changes in the Arctic region... The Arctic and the global community are presented with both new challenges and new opportunities.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 9);

Finland: “The Arctic Region can be defined using various criteria, e.g. the Arctic Circle”;

Iceland: The country is located “on the periphery of the Arctic in the center of the North Atlantic Ocean”

Norway: The High North means “the Barents Sea and the surrounding areas” including Svalbard, though it is described as a “broad concept both geographically and politically... broader than Northern Norway and Svalbard since Norway has major interests to safeguard in a greater region”;

Sweden: There are several definitions of the Arctic, such as the Arctic Ocean (and its five littoral states) and the (eight) Arctic states;

The Russian Federation: To be consisted of the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean;

The USA: The Arctic represents “a matrix of issues” for the USA.

Summary of priorities, priority areas and objectives

In this section I will begin with a brief summary of the (strategic) priorities / priority-areas and policy objectives of the Arctic strategies and state policies. Based on these it is possible to identify and define which might be the most proper indicators to be used for a comparative study of the strategies and state policies as well as their priorities and objectives.

The priority areas of Canada’s Northern Strategy are:
1) Exercising our Arctic sovereignty;
2) Promoting social and economic development;
3) Protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and
4) Improving and devolving northern governance

The joint draft strategy of Denmark and Greenland “contains a series of objectives, which is twofold:
1) Supporting and strengthening Greenland’s development towards increased autonomy; and
2) Maintaining the Commonwealth’s position as a major player in the Arctic”

Correspondingly, the strategic priorities of The Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 can be interpreted to be:
1) A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic;
2) Self-sustaining growth and development;
3) Development with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate, environment and nature; and
4) Close cooperation with international partners.

Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region defines the country’s objectives in the following
Substantial sectors:
1) The environment;
2) Economic activities and know-how;
3) Transport and infrastructure; and
4) Indigenous peoples.

In addition, there is a list of means for the different levels with which to reach policy goals as well as proposals for further measures.

The six highlights of Iceland’s position in the Arctic are:
1) International cooperation;
2) Security (through international cooperation);
3) Resource development and environmental protection;
4) Transportation;
5) People and cultures; and
6) Research and monitoring

The revised and advanced strategic priorities areas of the Norwegian High North Strategy (based on the 2009 version) are:
1) To develop knowledge about climate change and the environment in the High North;
2) To improve monitoring, emergency (and oil spill) response and maritime safety systems in northern waters;
3) To promote sustainable use (and business activities) of off-shore petroleum and renewable marine resources;
4) To promote on-shore business (and industry) development in the North;
5) To further-develop the infrastructure in the North;
6) To continue to exercise sovereignty firmly and strengthen cross-border cooperation (with Russia) in the North; and
7) To safeguard the cultures and livelihoods of indigenous peoples.

The strategic priorities of the Russian State policy in the Arctic are:
1) To carry out an active interaction of Russia with the sub-Arctic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the basis of norms of international law;
2) To create a uniform Arctic search and rescue regime and prevention of man-caused accidents;
3) To strengthen bilateral relationships within the framework of regional organizations, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council;
4) To assist in the organization, management and effective use of cross-polar air routes and the Northern Sea Route for international navigation;
5) To actively contribute to international Arctic forums through the Russia-European Union partnerships;
6) To delimit maritime spaces in the Arctic Ocean and maintain a mutually advantageous presence of Russia in the Spitsbergen archipelago;
7) To improve state management of the social and economic development of the Arctic, such as to increase support for scientific research;
8) To improve the quality of life for indigenous peoples and their social and economic activities;
9) To develop the Arctic resource base through improved technological capabilities; and
10) To modernize and develop the infrastructure of the Arctic transport system and fisheries in the Russian Arctic

Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region particularly concerns the following three areas, which it defines as the Swedish priorities:
1) Climate and the environment;
2) Economic development; and
3) The human dimension.

The strategy and policy objectives / priority areas of the United States’ Arctic Policy are:
1) National security and homeland security;
2) International governance;
3) Extended continental shelf and boundary issues;
4) Promoting international scientific cooperation;
5) Maritime transportation;
6) Economic issues, including energy; and
7) Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources

The main policy objectives of the EU Communication on the European Union and the Arctic Region are:
1) Protecting and preserving the Arctic environment and its population;
2) Promoting sustainable use of resources; and
3) Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance

Comparative study of priorities / priority areas and objectives

Based on the (strategic) priorities / priority areas, substantial sectors and policy objectives of the strategies and state policies - published or emerging - it is possible to paint a holistic picture of the primary (national) interests and policy objectives of the Arctic states, as well as the European Union. Furthermore, it is possible to gain a general understanding of the potentially most important and relevant issues in the Arctic region in the early-21st century in the context of state politics.

Here I have defined ten inwards and outwards-oriented indicators which I have used in a comparison of the strategies and policies. These are the following ones:

1) sovereignty and national security (including security/military-policy and defence);
2) comprehensive security;
3) economic development (including utilization of natural resources and energy);
4) regional development and infrastructure;
5) transportation;
6) the environment (including environmental protection);
7) governance and management (including rescue and safety);
8) peoples (including indigenous peoples);
9) science (including scientific research and cooperation, and knowledge) (see Table 7); and finally
10) international cooperation (see Table 9).

1) Sovereignty and national security

The first indicator, “Sovereignty and national security” includes state sovereignty (or autonomy)- territorial and maritime spaces - sovereignty -, and national (or homeland) security, security/military-policy and defence.

Briefly stated, sovereignty and national security are among the strategic priorities, or priority areas, of all five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean. This is not so for Finland, Iceland and Sweden. The Swedish Strategy, for example, only mentions security as that of Sweden having been influenced by Arctic developments for a long time.

In the case of Canada and the USA it is the primary priority. The Canadian Strategy claims that in spite of existing disputes with the USA Canada’s sovereignty over its Arctic lands and islands is “undisputed” and Canada’s first priority will be to “seek to resolve boundary issues in the Arctic region” (Government of Canada 2010, 6). Correspondingly, the US Arctic Policy reaffirms its stance on the Northwest Passage and its recognition as an international strait by stating that “Freedom of the seas is a top national priority” (The White House 2009, 3).

Furthermore, the strategic importance of sovereignty and national security is manifested by implementation of defence and strengthening of military presence and control in the Arctic, as Canada states. Consequently, Canada’s first priority includes strengthening of Canada’s military presence in the North for example, by establishing an Army Training Centre in Resolute Bay and expanding the capabilities of the Canadian Rangers (Government of Canada 2010, 10). Or, projecting sea power through the region, as the USA does by preserving “the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and air-
craf" (The White House 2009, 3). Correspondingly, the Russian State policy states that the Arctic is also "the sphere of military security" (including creation of groupings of army forces, protection and control of state borders) to the Russian Federation, which is one of the basic objectives of the state policy in the Arctic. At the same time, one of the strategic priorities of the Russian State Policy is international cooperation "within the framework of regional organizations". Also the Danish/Greenlandic Strategy includes the aspect of defence under both sovereignty ("Defence authorities in Greenland") and Home Rule Government ("Upgrading of the Thule Radar") (Namminersornerulutik Oqartussat, Udenrigsministeriet 2008, 10 and 12).

The Norwegian High North Strategy is rather multi-functional when dealing with sovereignty and defence: On one hand, it states that presence of armed forces as well as police and prosecuting authorities is imperative to the priority of the exercise of authority, or "sovereignty firmly", and consequently, it mentions, though not emphasizes, defence, i.e. the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the North; interestingly this chapter is after that of "Cooperation with Russia" (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 17-20).

On the other hand, it emphasizes developing of border control and civilian border surveillance, increasing of coast guard activities, and strengthening of (bilateral) competence-building and cultural cooperation and "good neighbourly relations" with Russia (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 37-42 and 54-57).

There are, however, also more sophisticated pictures among those who emphasize the importance of sovereignty and national security: For example, Canada's priority area on sovereignty is said to include human dimension. The Strategy of Denmark/Greenland makes a linkage between the importance of security and for protecting the economic base of Greenland's economy. Furthermore, the Norwegian Strategy states that climate change has an impact on the security of countries and peoples, and includes energy as a part of security policy. This is in line with the primary goals of Norway's High North policy; first the strengthening of its cooperation with Russia and increased stability in Post-Cold War Barents Sea region and then second, the benefit of the country's economy.

2) Comprehensive security

Followed from and contrary to the first indicator, "Comprehensive security" includes human and environmental (and climate) security.

Briefly stated, comparative security is a starting point in the Arctic strategies of Finland, Iceland and Sweden, since these strategies - as well as the EU Communication - emphasize neither (state) sovereignty nor national security / defence. On the contrary they stress the importance of international and multilateral cooperation. For Sweden, for example, it is the main priority. Furthermore, they emphasize the use of international treaties in an Arctic where the likelihood of a military confrontation or armed conflict is very low. This is in line with the notion that political stability as well as economic, environmental and political security can be best maintained and fostered through cooperation across national borders (e.g. Heininen 2004, 207).

Correspondingly, this is also a good - or maybe the best - way to guarantee national security (without warfare).

Indeed, these strategies also emphasize comprehensive security, for example by promoting "safety in the wide sense" (Prime Minster's Office 2010, 10), or the Arctic will stay as a region of low security-political tension (Regeringskansliet, Sverige 2011, 2). Consequently, the Icelandic Report explicitly mentions security emphasizing environmental security and response measures against accidents and environmental emergencies. Finally, the EU emphasizes its ‘soft’ values and policy in the Arctic.

3) Economic development

The third indicator "Economic development" includes the utilization of natural resources, exploration of energy resources, tourism and other economic activities as well as knowledge and relevant know-how.
As a brief summary, economic development is among the main priorities or key objectives of all the states in question, as well as the EU. Generally this refers to exploitation of natural resources, both renewable resources such as fisheries and marine mammals and non-renewable ones, particularly fossil energy resources, and different kinds of economic activities in, and dealing with, the Arctic.

For example, both strategies of The Kingdom of Denmark has a strong emphasis on (new) industrial activities in addition to fisheries, such as hydropower, mining, tourism, oil exploration, and other minerals and energy resources which are viewed as critical to development in Greenland. Finland would like to improve the opportunities of Finnish companies to benefit from their arctic expertise and know-how in the large and mega-projects of the Barents Region. Norway is very actively engaged in activities of oil and natural gas drilling and (re)defines the High North as a “new petroleum province”. Through its new State Policy Russia would like to “develop the Arctic resource base through improved technological capabilities”. Finally, for Sweden economic development is to some extent a top priority.

A more comprehensive and sophisticated method would be to link the environment and resources, including their utilization. This linkage can be found in the Icelandic Report which emphasizes “sustainable” and “long-term economic” development, particularly in terms of ensuring their full share in sustainable fisheries. Norway intends to be the best steward of environmental and natural resources in the High North. High environmental standards will be set for all exploitation of natural resources with a particular emphasis on the protection of “vulnerable areas against negative environmental pressures and impacts” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006, 45).

Indeed, in many cases the rhetoric generally indicates that economic development, including activities, means “sustainable use” of natural resources: For example, the Danish/Greenlandic strategy speaks of “protection and sustainable use of natural resources” and, the US Policy of “environmentally sustain-

able”. Further, the EU Communication speaks of “Promoting sustainable use of resources” with exploitation of Arctic offshore hydrocarbons “provided in full respect of strict environmental standards taking into account the particular vulnerability of the Arctic”, and that Arctic fisheries should take place “at sustainable levels whilst respecting the rights of local coastal communities” (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 7).

4) Regional development and infrastructure

Economic development and activities mostly do - or should - include regional economic development and improvement of regional infrastructure. Regional development is, however, referred to in different ways in the strategies and state policies and thus it is treated here as a separate indicator.

In the Canadian Strategy they speak of “promoting social and economic development” and “improving self-sufficiency and the health of northern communities”; Russia intends “to modernize and develop the infrastructure of the Arctic transport system and fisheries in the Russian Arctic”.

Concerning regional policy and regionalism the Icelandic Report emphasizes the role of Akureyri, particularly the importance of the University of Akureyri. Correspondingly, in addition to Svalbard - which has a special status and role due to its unique position in, and access to, the Arctic - the Norwegian High North Strategy mentions a few important northern universities and towns in North Norway, such as the University of Tromsø and other knowledge-based institutions in Tromsø, Kirkenes (including the International and Norwegian Barents secretariats) and the university colleges of Narvik and Bodø.

5) Transportation

The fifth indicator, “Transportation” generally refers to navigation, shipping and maritime, transportation, but also air transport and aviation, and regional aviation networks.

To summarise briefly, transportation, largely in terms of maritime shipping and transport, is among the priorities or objectives of the
strategies and policies of Finland, Iceland, Russia and the USA. Less so in those of Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Sweden and the EU. For example, one of the priority areas of the US Arctic Policy is maritime transportation “to facilitate safe, secure, and reliable navigation”, and to protect maritime commerce and the environment.

Correspondingly, the island-state of Iceland has a particularly strong emphasis on shipping and northern sea routes, such as trans-arctic routes, but also on aviation. Russia, similarly to Iceland, emphasizes “management and effective use of cross-polar air routes and the Northern Sea Route for international navigation”.

6) Environment

Here the environment includes several aspects: first, environmental protection and conservation, and protecting or preserving environmental heritage; second, climate change and its impacts; third, knowledge about the environment and climate change; and finally, international cooperation for environmental protection and on climate change.

To summarise briefly, the environment is either explicitly mentioned as a priority or priority area in most of the strategies and policies, or one of the basic objectives. In some strategies the environment / environmental protection is a priority (area) per se, such as “The Environment” in the Finnish Strategy, and “Climate and the Environment” in the Swedish one. Meanwhile, in some it is one of the policy objectives, such as “Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources” in the US State Policy. Correspondingly, in some strategies the environment / environmental protection is linked with resource use or development. This is the case in the Icelandic Report where environmental protection has been linked with resource development. Furthermore, the first priority area of the revised 2009 Norwegian Strategy is “Developing knowledge about climate change and the environment in the High North” including the development of a centre for climate and environmental studies (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, 8). Correspondingly, Sweden emphasizes biodiversity as well as research on climate and the environment.

The draft Denmark/Greenland Strategy includes “Protection and sustainable use of natural resources” with a concentration of management and efficient use of resources. The Final Strategy of the Kingdom goes further and includes the Arctic’s vulnerable climate, environment and nature as a strategic priority for example, by pursuing ambitious knowledge building on climate change in the Arctic.

Interestingly, the Norwegian and Swedish strategies are the ones where climate change is explicitly mentioned in the priorities (though in the case of Sweden it is “climate”). Environment and climate change is however the main sub-theme under a main policy objective in the EU Communication “to prevent and mitigate the negative impacts of climate change as well as to support adaptation to inevitable changes”, (Commission of the European Communities 2008, 3).

The Finnish Strategy emphasizes special attention “to measures that would support the adaptation of livelihoods dependent on the Arctic environment” and aims to support the development of regional climate models (along with monitoring of the environment) “as the basis for decision-making” (Prime Minister’s Office 2010, 13-15). The US State Policy says that “[H]igh levels of uncertainty remain concerning the effects of climate change and increased human activity in the Arctic. Given the need for decisions to be based on sound scientific and socioeconomic information” (The White House 2009, 9). Correspondingly, in the chapter on energy and minerals of the Denmark/Greenland’s Strategy it is said that climate change “will increase accessibility and opportunities for exploration” (Namminersøorrnerullutik Oqartussat, Udenrigsministeriet 2008, 22-23). The Icelandic Report refers to the new shipping routes which are expected to be open as a result of decreasing ice.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) report is mentioned in most of the strategies, (except in those of Russia, Sweden and the USA.)
7) Governance and management

Here “Governance and management” includes on one hand, concern and measures for management of resources, establishing rules for development, and improving and devolving northern governance. On the other hand, it includes safety and rescue, i.e. safety in navigation and preparedness, response and rescue measures in the case of air or maritime accidents.

To summarise briefly, governance - and management of resources - is among, or integrated in, the main priorities and / or objectives of all the strategies or policies, though explicitly mentioned in the cases of Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the USA and the EU. This is most probably because governance can be understood to mean almost everything dealing with the environment and natural resources such as environmental protection and / or management of resources.

Safety and rescue is explicitly mentioned in the strategies of Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Russia, and the Finnish and Swedish strategies refer to the need for maritime security and safety, and safe navigation. The 2009 Norwegian Strategy ties monitoring and emergency response to oil spills in with maritime safety systems in northern waters. The Russian State Policy adopts a comprehensive approach by aiming to create “a uniform Arctic search and rescue regime and prevention of man-caused accidents”.

8) Peoples

The eighth indicator “Peoples” includes all the residents of the Arctic region and their communities, mostly emphasizing indigenous peoples. One of the special features of the post-Cold War Arctic - though the state is still the main international actor and the centre of attention - is how northern indigenous peoples have emerged as international actors and are represented in international cooperation through their own (international) organizations. For example, the permanent participants of the Arctic Council include six such organizations.

To summarise briefly, “(Indigenous) Peoples”, or “Population” (or “The human dimension”) are explicitly mentioned among the priorities or objectives of the strategies and policies of Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the EU. In the cases of Finland, Norway and Russia (only) indigenous peoples are explicitly mentioned. Finland, for example would like to ensure their participation when dealing with their own affairs and decisions that affect them. If the Danish/Greenlandic joint Strategy uses the title of “Original Peoples of the Arctic”, the final 2011 Strategy emphasizes arctic cooperation on human health and social coherence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 40).

Iceland and Sweden as well as the EU, however, refer to people (and cultures) in general terms; Sweden frames it in terms of “The human dimension” including people (of the region) and their living conditions; and in Iceland there are no aboriginal peoples. Finally, in the Norwegian Strategy and the EU Communication both indigenous peoples and the population of the region are mentioned, though indigenous peoples are emphasised.

It is important to note that the rest of the strategies and state policies include the human aspect in terms of people (s) although they have not been explicitly referred to in the priorities or policy objectives. For example, the Canadian 2009 Strategy states that “Canada’s North is “first and foremost about people – the Inuit…” (Government of Canada 2009, 3), and in the 2010 Statement “Empowering the Peoples of the North” is included among the priorities. The other objectives of the Danish/Greenlandic strategy is strengthening of Greenland’s increased autonomy, which is all about the people of the island, primarily the Inuit. The Arctic indigenous communities are also mentioned as one of the targets of the US State Policy.

9) Science

“Science” here includes first, science and scientific research; second, technology and know-how; third, higher education; fourth, knowledge in general, and finally, international cooperation on research, monitoring and higher education, such as through the International Polar Year (IPY).
To summarise briefly, science is explicitly mentioned as a priority in the Iceland Report: “Research and monitoring”, the Norwegian High North Strategy: “To develop knowledge about climate change”, in the Russian State Policy: “To develop the Arctic resource base through improved technological capabilities”, and in the US State Policy: “Promoting international scientific cooperation”.

It is either as one of the main objectives in the remaining strategies, or in some cases otherwise implicitly integrated. For example, in the mentioned activities of the 2009 Canadian Strategy “Arctic Science and International Polar Year (IPY)” is connected with the key priority areas of climate change, and health and well-being. The Norwegian High North Strategy includes science and education, particularly meaning development of “knowledge about climate change and the environment”.

The second section of the Finnish Strategy includes research, i.e. “technology-based expertise” and “know-how” with objectives such as to strengthen Finland’s role as an international expert on arctic issues and make better use of Finnish technology-based expertise of winter shipping and transport, and ship-building. One of the priorities of the Russian State Policy is “technological capabilities” which includes technology-based expertise. Finally, the Swedish Strategy includes research on climate and the environment as one of the sub-priorities under “Climate and the Environment”.

Another interesting note is that the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) – the result of international scientific cooperation, like the ACIA report - is mentioned in the strategies of Canada, Denmark/Greenland and Iceland.

A comparison of these priorities / priority areas and policy objectives, to the situation at the turn of the 1980s-1990s and the early-1990s - emphasising and implementing national interests of the Arctic states after the end of the Cold War - is not entirely valid, since in the early-1990s only Canada and Norway had some sort of an explicit Arctic policy. Whereas there were no clear priorities or priority areas and policy objectives defined by the Arctic states at that time, today the case is quite different.

The main conclusion is, however, that there are many commonalities between the current list of indicators on the priorities and objectives of national strategies and state policies, and the previous one of national interests and agendas. Based on my studies (Heininen 1992 and 1997) all the previous indicators are included in the current list, i.e. sovereignty (the five littoral states); security-policy (all Arctic states); economic development (all Arctic states, excluding perhaps Sweden); the environment / environmental protection (Canada (esp. the AWPPA), Finland (esp. the AEPS), Iceland (e.g. nuclear safety) and Russia (due to the initiatives by President Gorbachev)); indigenous peoples (Canada, Denmark (The Home Rule Government of Greenland) and Norway (the Alta case)); and science (Canada, Norway, Russia, Sweden (e.g. the voyage of YMER) and the USA (see also Table 8)).

In addition to these, at the early-21st century there are more and new fields of activities, and thus, the whole picture of national interests is more sophisticated.

**International Cooperation**

As the last indicator of the study, there is “International Cooperation”. It includes international – both multilateral and bilateral - cooperation in general, and particularly cooperation within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with world-wide perspectives, such as the UNs and the IMO, and within IGOs with regional perspectives, such as the AC, the EU, and finally, within IGOs with sub-regional approaches, such as the NCMs and the BEAC.

The intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other international bodies mentioned, or prioritised, in each strategy and state policy are the following ones (see Table 9):

**Canada:**

Canada’s Northern Strategy has a strong emphasis on international cooperation at different levels and with several international organizations and partners, and it is further
promoted by the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. On one hand, the Arctic Council is emphasized as the major venue and forum for a multilateral policy dialogue, and on the other hand, the “Arctic Ocean Foreign Ministers’ meeting” is mentioned with the notion that it “needs to be strengthened to ensure that it is equipped to address tomorrow’s challenges” (Government of Canada 2010, 24). In bilateral cooperation Canada prioritises its Arctic partners, particularly the USA (e.g. the North American Aerospace Defence Command, NORAD), Russia and the Nordic countries, and UK as a non-Arctic state. Among the global IGOs are the United Nations and its CLOS as well as its Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the IMO; among regional bodies NATO, OSCE and EFTA, and the ICC representing the Inuit.

**The Kingdom of Denmark:**

Denmark/Greenland’s (draft) Strategy emphasizes the fact that Denmark/Greenland hosted the Arctic or Polar Sea Conference in Ilulissat in May of 2008. The role of the Arctic Council is emphasised but also criticized. The strategic importance of NATO and the Danish-US, or Danish-Greenlandic-US cooperation for sovereignty and defence is emphasized; interestingly this trilateral cooperation also covers other fields, such as culture and education. Other organizations are the EU’s Northern Dimension and its Arctic Window, in general cooperation with the EU, and the Nordic cooperation at a regional level, and the UNCLOS at a global level. Finally, the Strategy mentions cooperation between indigenous peoples within the United Nations and its Human Rights Council at a global level, for example, to establish a Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples Affairs, and at a regional level the AC as well as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The Kingdom’s final Strategy also mentions IMO, NAMMCO, NAFO and NEAFC, and International Whaling Commission (IWC) as well as the NCMs and the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (NORA).

**Finland:**

The Finnish Strategy clearly states that “[i]nternational cooperation and international treaties also lay the foundation for Finland’s activities in the Arctic” (Prime Minister’s Office 2010, 10). Consequently, the most important intergovernmental organizations, or “Arctic Policy Tools”, are the United Nations, particularly the UNCLOS but also the International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169 (though Finland has not yet ratified it), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) at a global level, and the Arctic Council “as the primary cooperation forum on Arctic matters” (ibid, 37) - though it should be strengthened in various ways - , the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and its Regional Council, and the NCMs at a regional level, and bilateral cooperation with Norway and Russia. Finally, as mentioned earlier there is a special emphasis on the European Union “as a global Arctic player”, and the EU’s Northern Dimension “as a tool in the European Union’s Arctic Policy” (ibid, 48).

**Iceland:**

International cooperation, particularly with neighbouring countries within the Arctic region, is one of the highlights or priority areas of the Icelandic Report. The Arctic Council and its working groups, and BEAC, are particularly mentioned as important venues for cooperation. The Nordic cooperation, particularly West-Norden, and the EU’s Northern Dimension are also mentioned. Concerning security and maritime safety (the) IMO is mentioned. Also referred to are NASCO, NAMMCO, NAFO and NEAFC in the context of fishery and other resource development. Under “People and culture” the six indigenous peoples’ organizations are mentioned, i.e. the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, as well as the Northern Forum and the BEAC and its Regional Council. Important partners in international cooperation on research and monitoring include the ICSU and the WMO, particularly dealing with the IPY, the IASC, the IASSA - and finally - the University of the Arctic, and the Northern Research Forum (NRF).

**Norway:**

The two last main political priorities of the Norwegian 2006 High North Strategy are first, to “further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North”, and second, to “strengthen our cooperation with Rus-
sia” and increase Russia’s engagement. This is followed-up by the 2009 Strategy with an aim to further develop border control (in the Norwegian-Russian border) and strengthen competence-building with Russia and develop cultural cooperation. Indeed, bilateral relations and cooperation with Russia - for example, on the environment -, and cooperation within and in the context of the Barents Sea region are explicitly mentioned as main, and very pragmatic, targets and platforms of cooperation, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area (BEATA). However, Norway also participates “in a number of cooperation forums” linked to the AC, the Nordic Council, the BEAR, the Baltic Sea region and the Northern Dimension. Finally, under “Knowledge generation and competence building” the University of the Arctic is mentioned. Under “The management and utilisation of marine resources” the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is mentioned and as part of improving maritime safety, the IMO.

**Russia:**

One of the strategic priorities of the Russian Arctic policy is to strengthen bilateral relationships both within regional organizations, including the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and good neighborly relations with sub-arctic states. Another priority, activation of Russian official agencies’ participation in international forums, includes “the inter-parliamentary interaction within the framework of the Russia-European Union partnership”.

**Sweden:**

The Swedish Strategy clearly states that the well-functioning multilateral cooperation dealing with the Arctic is the main priority for Sweden. The strategy mentions several forums for cooperation, such as the Arctic Council, IASC and the University of the Arctic dealing with the Arctic; the European Union and its Northern Dimension, the Nordic cooperation, and the BEAC and its Regional Council in (North) Europe; and IGOs with worldwide perspectives, the United Nations and its Convention on the Law of the Sea, IMO and other UN bodies (e.g. UNFCCC, CBD, UNDP, UNEP, WHO). The strategy also mentions the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, and the Saami cooperation, particularly that within the Saami Parliamentary Council.

**The USA:**

One of the purposes of the US Arctic Region Policy is to “strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations” (The White House 2009, 2), but no institutions are mentioned. However, later on in the text the value and effectiveness of the Arctic Council is recognized; that it “should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate”, and further, to cooperate “on Arctic issues through the United Nations” and its agencies, such as the UNFCCC and the UNCLOS, though the USA has not (yet) ratified it (ibid, 4).

**The EU:**

The European Union being “inextricably linked to the Arctic Region” the EU Commission’s Communication on the Arctic Region is to a great extent about (international) cooperation. On the one hand, with the Arctic states including Greenland, and on the other hand with the Arctic Council (with the aim of being active within the Council in the future). Under the three main policy objectives the Communication names functional cooperation with the BEAC, the International Whaling Commission, the NEAFC, the IMO and the UNCLOS, and further to promote dialogue with the Arctic EEA and EFTA countries as well as with the Northern Dimension’s parties.

To summarise briefly, international cooperation per se as well as several bodies for cooperation are explicitly mentioned in all the Arctic strategies and state policies. When it comes to prioritizing which organizations to connect and cooperate with, there are inconsistencies between the strategies and state policies: All of them, including the EU communication, explicitly mention the Arctic Council and cooperation within (and in the case of the EU with) the Council. Furthermore Canada, Finland, Iceland and Sweden also emphasize the (Arctic) Council as an important or major venue for international cooperation.

Other intergovernmental organizations or
bodies, which are mentioned in more than half of the strategies, are the United Nations and its agencies, UNCLoS and IMO (as global bodies).

Furthermore, the EU’s Northern Dimension is mentioned in the strategies of the Nordic countries and the EU. Also the BEAC is mentioned by most of the Nordic countries and the Russian State Policy.

Finally, when it comes to bilateral cooperation other Arctic countries are usually mentioned. For example, in the cases of Canada and Denmark/Greenland, the USA is particularly mentioned. In the case of Finland, Norway and Russia are mentioned, and correspondingly, in that of Norway, Russia is mentioned, and cooperation with Russia is emphasized.

Comparing the intensity of international cooperation at the early-21st century to that of the turn of the 1980s-1990s and the early-1990s there is a clear difference. International, largely multilateral, Arctic cooperation – since the approval of the AEPS in 1991 - has emerged and expanded since that time, at which there was less cooperation. However, there were at the time: the Nordic cooperation between five (Nordic) Arctic states; military cooperation between five (NATO) Arctic states; and cooperation on fisheries between North-West Atlantic countries. There were also new and emerging bilateral relations between the Arctic states, even across the Iron Curtain, such as the scientific cooperation between Canada and the Soviet Union, and economic cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union (Heininen 1992, 49-52).

Conclusions

The Arctic region in the early-21st century is stable and peaceful without armed conflicts or the likelihood thereof. There are also geopolitical and economic realities corresponding on one hand to the fact that the entire region is legally and politically divided by the national borders of the eight Arctic states, and on the other hand to real changes and challenges in the Arctic, since the resource-rich region is under pressure for an increased utilization of its rich (energy) resources. Furthermore, there are land claims by northern indigenous peoples, maritime border disputes and asymmetric environmental conflicts. There are also two other perspectives that deserve more attention and may enable an approach to Arctic geopolitics that goes beyond the familiar terms of conflict and cooperation: First, a significant and rapid environmental, geo-economic and geopolitical change has occurred in the Arctic; and second, the region’s geo-strategic importance is increasing, and consequently, the region is playing a more important role in world politics.

The position of the Arctic states is changing - changing again after the end of the Cold War, when stability and peace building through international cooperation became the ultimate aim instead of confrontation: As a soft-law instrument, the Arctic Council is still the major forum for both intergovernmental and other cross-border cooperation on arctic affairs, much enriched by the knowledgeable contributions by its Permanent Participants, Indigenous Peoples’ organizations and by other non-state actors. More strategic emphasis is now placed on sovereignty and national interests linked to climate change or energy security. As evidence of this the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean are using all legal rights available to them (in the UNCLOS) to make submissions for sovereign rights to resources on the main basin of the Ocean, and holding their exclusive (ministerial) meetings.

Finally, a reflection of a new position or a response to the multifunctional changes that have already taken place, is that all eight Arctic states - the five littoral states and Finland, Iceland, Sweden - have in a short time period (within 2008-2011) approved - and some them also promoted - their own strategy or...
state policy in the Arctic and northern affairs, setting their national priorities or priority areas.

Here is a brief conclusion of the inwards and outwards-oriented indicators based on the priorities / priority-areas as well as the main policy objectives of these strategies and state policies, and the Communication of the European Union:

First, Sovereignty and national security is among the main priorities and policy objectives of the strategies and state policies of the five littoral states; in the case of Canada and the USA it is a primary objective;

Second, Finland, Iceland and Sweden as well as the European Union neither emphasize national security nor sovereignty but comprehensive security;

Third, Economic development is among the main priorities or key objectives of all the strategies as well as in that of the EU. It generally refers to the exploitation of natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable ones, particularly fossil energy resources. There are also examples of more comprehensive and sophisticated methods to link the environment and the utilization of natural resources;

Fourth, In most of the strategies economic activities also include regional development and improvement of regional infrastructure but is referred to in different ways;

Fifth, Transportation, meaning maritime shipping and transportation is among the priorities or objectives of the strategies and policies of Finland, Iceland, Russia and the USA. Transportation in terms of aviation is only mentioned by Iceland and Russia;

Sixth, The environment including environmental protection is explicitly mentioned as a priority or priority area in most of the strategies and state policies. In that of Russia it is referred to as an objective;

Seventh, Governance and management is among the main priorities or objectives of most of the strategies or policies. Maritime safety and rescue is mentioned in the strategies of Iceland, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Russia;

Eighth, Peoples - generally, though not always referring to indigenous peoples - are explicitly mentioned among the priorities or priority areas of most of the strategies and policies, except in those of Canada, Denmark/Greenland and the USA. Furthermore, Norway and the EU talk about people (and cultures) both in terms of a general population and indigenous peoples;

Ninth, Science, including technology, knowledge, and scientific cooperation, is explicitly mentioned as a priority or main objective in four of all the strategies and policies, those of Iceland, Norway, Russia and the USA. In others it is integrated into other priorities;

Tenth, International cooperation in general, particularly the Arctic Council and cooperation within the Council, is explicitly mentioned in all the strategies and state policies. Other intergovernmental organizations or bodies, mentioned in more than half the strategies, are the UNCLOS and the IMO (as global bodies) and the EU’s Northern Dimension and the BEAC (as regional ones).

Finally, what is a common feature in the strategies and state policies, is that the Arctic states, as Arctic countries or nations, as well as the EU either would like to become a natural, or real, or major actor or player, or even (global) leader or power, in the Arctic (or in some field of northern affairs), or would like to maintain a leading role there. Furthermore, another common and surprising feature is how little a world-wide, global perspective is discussed in most of the strategies, except the Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy, where it is taken into consideration and mentioned.
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## Appendix - Tables

### Table 1. Membership of the Arctic States in Intergovernmental Political Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNs</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>EAPC</th>
<th>G7/8/20</th>
<th>IMO</th>
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</table>

UNs = The United Nations
EU = The European Union; Greenland has the status of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Union, and Iceland has started the accession talks with the European Union.
NATO = The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EAPC = The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
G7/8/20 = Canada and the USA are members of G7, the two ones and Russia are members of G8, and the three states and the EU are member of G20
IMO = The International Maritime Organization; The Faroe Islands is an associate member of the IMO

### Table 2. Membership of the Arctic States in Intergovernmental Economic Associations and Areas

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</table>

EEA = The European Economic Area
EFTA = The European Free Trade Association
NAFTA = The North American Free Trade Area
Table 3. Membership of the Arctic States in Regional Organizations and Arrangements

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<th>BEAC</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

AEPS / AC = Arctic Council
Ilulissat = Ministerial meeting of the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean
IASC = International Arctic Science Committee
BEAC = Barents Euro-Arctic Council (x+ = country within the rotation of the chairmanship)
CBSS = Council of Baltic Sea States
NCM = Nordic Council / Nordic Council of Ministers
ND = EU’s Northern Dimension (it is not clear, if the Faroe Islands is involved in the EU’s ND, or not)

Table 4. Membership in and ratification of the Arctic States in Relevant International Agreements / Bodies

<table>
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<th>London C.</th>
<th>MARPOL</th>
<th>POPs</th>
<th>Kyoto P.</th>
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<tr>
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<td>x</td>
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UNCLOS = UN’s Convention of the Law of the Sea, 1982 (in the table the year of ratification)
MARPOL = International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (the Faroe Islands is an associate member; EU Commission has an observer status)
POPs = Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001 (Denmark has ratified the Convention “with a territorial exclusion in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland)
Kyoto P: = Kyoto Protocol, 1997 (Denmark with the territorial exclusion to the Faroe Islands)
ATS = Antarctic Treaty System, 1959 (x = consultative member, xx = with claims)
IWC = International Whaling Commission, 1946
### Table 5. Membership in and ratification of the Arctic States in International Agreements / Bodies dealing with the Arctic Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ILO169</th>
<th>Svalbard</th>
<th>PolarB</th>
<th>NEAFC</th>
<th>NAFO</th>
<th>AMEC</th>
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</table>

ILO169 = ILO Convention 169, 1989  
Svalbard = International Treaty on Spitzbergen, 1920  
PolarB = International Agreement on Polar Bears, 1973  
NEAFC = North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, 1982 - contracting parties (Denmark is a party in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland) (Canada and Japan are non-contracting parties)  
NAFO = North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organization, 1979  
AMEC = Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, 1996

### Table 6. Each state described itself as an Arctic / Northern country / state

Canada is a “Northern country” and “the global leader in Arctic science, and “The North is central to the Canadian national identity”.

The Kingdom of Denmark seeks “to strengthen the Kingdom’s status as global player in the Arctic”.

Finland as an “Arctic country is a natural actor in the Arctic region”.

Iceland is “the only country located entirely within the Arctic region”.

Norway is a “leading nation as regards environmental policy and...as a steward of the natural and cultural heritage in the High North”, and furthermore, there is a “[G]rowing recognition of the importance of the High North for Norway as a whole”.

Russia would like to “maintain the role of a leading Arctic power”.

Sweden: “(T)here are many ties linking Sweden to the Arctic”.

The USA is an “Arctic nation”.

### Table 7. Priorities / Priority Areas or Highlights of the Arctic Strategies / State Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sover/Sec</th>
<th>Econ/Dev</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Envir</th>
<th>Gov/Res</th>
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<th>Scien.</th>
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</table>

Sover = Sovereignty and national security  
Sec = Comprehensive security  
Econ = Economic development  
Dev = Regional development and infrastructure  
Transport = Sea transportation and aviation  
Envir = Environment and environmental protection  
Gov = Governance and management  
Res = Rescue and safety  
Peo = Peoples (in general)  
Ind = Indigenous peoples  
Scien = Science, technology and knowledge, and scientific cooperation

### Table 8. Main Objectives and Highlights of National Interests of the Arctic States at the turn of 1980s-1990s (Heininen 1992 and 1997)

<table>
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Sover = Sovereignty  
SecPol = Security-policy and national responses  
Econ = Economic activities and natural resources  
Envir = Environment and environmental protection (and cooperation)  
Indi = Indigenous peoples  
Scien = Scientific research
Table 9. Intergovernmental and Other International Organizations and bodies mentioned in the Arctic Strategies and State Policies

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AC = The Arctic Council  
A5 = the eight arctic states  
AS = the five littoral states  
BASREC = Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation  
BEAC = The Barents Euro-Arctic Council  
BEATA = The Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area  
EU = The European Union  
IASC = International Arctic Science Committee  
ICC = The Inuit Circumpolar Council  
ILO = The International Labour Organization  
IWC = International Whaling Commission  
NAFO = The North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organization  
NAMMCO = The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission  
NASCO = The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization  
NCM = The Nordic Council of Ministers  
ND = The EU’s Northern Dimension  
NEAFC = The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission  
NORA = Nordic Atlantic Cooperation  
NORAD = The North American Aerospace Defence Command  
NRF = The Northern Research Forum  
Saami = The Saami Parliamentary Council  
UArctic = The University of the Arctic  
UNCLOS = The United Nation’s Convention of the Law of the Sea  
UNEP = The United Nation’s Environmental Program  
UNFCCC = The United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change  
WHO = The World Health Organization